Posts tagged ‘USA’

July 14, 2016

Three Men Shot In Virginia While Streaming Live On Facebook

by mkleit

 

Buzzfeed

A Facebook live stream ended abruptly on Tuesday when three men listening to music inside a car in Norfolk, Virginia, were suddenly shot, authorities said.

Police said three men — two age 27 and the other age 29 — were taken to a nearby hospital for treatment, with two suffering life-threatening injuries.

In a statement Wednesday morning, police said two of the men were “doing better, but one is still listed in critical condition.”

“During the shooting incident, one of the men inside the car was broadcasting a live video to Facebook,” police said. “This video has been confirmed to be of the actual shooting incident.”

The video, posted on Facebook by T.J. Williams, shows the trio smoking in a car while listening to music. After about five minutes, a string of gunshots are heard and the camera falls to the ground.

After the gunshots stop, a man can be heard saying, “Call an ambulance, please.” Moments later, a person is heard again asking for an ambulance and providing an address.

A man is then heard repeatedly telling another person to “stay calm, stay relaxed.” He says to “stay with me. They’re all good — we called the paramedics already.” He continues to talk with the presumably injured victims until the ambulance arrives, saying “they are breathing and keep focused on me.”

After about 10 minutes, emergency responders can be heard in the background.

The video continues to roll for more than an hour until the phone appears to run out of battery.

June 9, 2016

مواقف المرشحان الرئاسيان كلينتون وترامب حول أبرز القضايا في البلاد

by mkleit

تستعد المرشحة الديمقراطية للانتخابات الرئاسية هيلاري كلينتون لمواجهة منافسها الجمهوري دونالد ترامب في الانتخابات الرئاسية الأمريكية، والتي تنطلق في شهر تشرين الأول من السنة الحالية.

بعد فوز كلينتون بالترشيح الشبه رسمي للحزب الديمقراطي (لم تصل إلى العدد المطلوب من المندوبين حتى الآن، بل وصلت بأصوات المندوبين الكبار والذين يستطيعون أن ينقلوا أصواتهم إلى منافسها بيرني ساندرز)، فإن كلينتون تستعد لخوض المرحلة الثانية من الانتخابات في مواجهة المرشح الجمهوري الذي حسم معركته في حزبه سابقاً، دونالد ترامب.

ورغم أن ساندرز يعقد الآمال على الفوز بترشيح الحزب رسمياً خلال مؤتمر الحزب في الشهر القادم، فإن كلينتون واثقة من دعم الحزب لترشحها لأنها تعتقد أنها “الأجدر بمنافسة ترامب” بحسب أحد تصريحاتها الشهر الماضي في إحدى جولات الانتخابات التمهيدية.

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ولكن كلينتون وترامب مختلفان بشكل كبير في أسلوب معالجة أبرز القضايا على الساحة السياسية والاجتماعية والاقتصادية الأمريكية. التالي هو آراء ترامب وكلينتون في بعض الملفات الداخلية والخارجية:

حول الهجرة:

كلينتون تعارض ترحيل 11 مليون مهاجر غير مسجّل، بينما ترامب يؤيد، بالإضافة إلى نيّته بناء جدار ما بين المكسيك والولايات المتحدة لمنع المهاجرين من اجتياز الحدود، حين قال” سندع الناس (المكسيكيين) تدخل، ولكن ستدخل بشكل قانوني… وسنجعل المكسيك تدفع ثمن ذلك”. ومن ناحية التعامل مع المسلمين الأجانب، فكلينتون تعارض أن تضع شروطاً إضافية للهجرة على القادمين من الدول الإسلامية، بينما ترامب يؤيد.

حول الحرب على الإرهاب:

ترفض كلينتون زيادة ميزانية الجيش الأمريكي، وطالبت لإنشاء لجنة لبحث أساليب التخلص من بعض المصاريف. أما ترامب، فيؤيد رفع نسبة مصاريف الجيش، ولكنه يشجع على جعل “الآخرين بالقيام بمحاربة الإرهاب”. إضافة إلى ذلك، يرفض المرشحان وجود قوات أمريكية في أي مكان في العالم لمحاربة الإرهاب، ويؤكدان على ضرورة مراقبة المواطنين الأمريكيين لتحديد الإرهابيين في الولايات المتحدة.

وفي الشأن السوري، يرفض المرشحان خوض معارك مباشرة مع تنظيم داعش الإرهابي، بيد أن كلينتون تطالب بإسقاط نظام الرئيس السوري بشار الأسد، ولكن ترامب يعارض تلك الفكرة. ولكن بالرغم من هذا الإختلاف، فإن الطرفان يوافقان على التعامل مع الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين لمحاربة داعش.

ضبط انتشار الأسلحة:

تؤيد كلينتون وضع شروطاً متشددة لحيازة أي سلاح، إضافة إلى البحث المعمق في خلفية الشخص الذي يريد شراء سلاح من أي نوع، باستثناء الأسلحة الرشاشة التي تعارض وجودها على رفوف المحال التجارية. بينما ترامب يعارض أي شروط إضافية، وهو الذي كان يعارض انتشار الأسلحة بشكل كبير مع بداية دخوله الساحة السياسية في السنوات الماضية، ولا يمانع التساهل في مسألة البحث المعمق وبيع الأسلحة الرشاشة. 

الاقتصاد:

قال ترامب في إحدى مناظراته أنه سيكون “أفضل رئيس لخلق الوظائف في التاريخ”، ولكن المرشح ذو الأصل الألماني يعارض رفع الحد الأدنى للأجور ورفع نسبة الضريبة على أغنياء الولايات المتحدة، ولكنه يؤيد رفع نسبة الضرائب على الشركات الدولية ذات الأصل الأمريكي. الأمر الذي توافق عليه كلينتون أيضاً، ولكنها تعارض ترامب من ناحية عدم وضع ضرائب على الأغنياء ورفع الحد الأدنى للأجور.

وقد حصدت كلينتون 2203 صوتاً من المندوبين العاديين و574 من المندوبين الكبار، بمجموع 2777، وهي تحتاج إلى 2383 صوتاً لنيل الترشيح الرسمي للحزب الديمقراطي. بيد أن منافسها، السيناتور ساندرز (لديه 1828 صوتاً من المندوبين العاديين و48 من الكبار بمجموع 1876)، لم يفقد الأمل، نظراً لقدرة المندوبين الكبار نقل أصواتهم من طرف إلى آخر، وهو يعوّل على دعم المندوبين الكبار له لنيل كافة الأصوات الـ2383 والفوز بترشيح الحزب.

April 6, 2016

Armenia and Azerbaijan – The History Behind the Recent Tensions

by mkleit

Andrew Korybko

Source

 

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The unprecedented upsurge in violence along the Line of Contact between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh has raised universal concern that a larger conflict might be brewing, with some analysts seeing it as an outgrowth of Turkey’s destabilizing anti-Russian policies over the past couple of months.

As attractive as it may be to believe such that Azerbaijan is behaving as a total puppet of the West, such an explanation is only a superficial description of what is happening and importantly neglects to factor in Baku’s recent foreign policy pivot over the past year. It’s not to necessarily suggest that Russia’s CSTO ally Armenia is to blame for the latest ceasefire violations, but rather to raise the point that this unfolding series of militantly destabilizing events is actually a lot more complex than initially meets the eye, although the general conclusion that the US is reaping an intrinsic strategic benefit from all of this is clearly indisputable.

Instead of beginning the research from a century ago and rehashing the dueling historic interpretations that both sides have over Nagorno-Karabakh, the article at hand begins at the present day and proceeds from the existing on-the-ground state of affairs after the 1994 ceasefire, whereby the disputed territory has de-facto been administered as its own unrecognized state with strong Armenian support in all sectors. There’s no attempt to advocate one side or denigrate the other, but rather to objectively understand the situation as it is and forecast its unfolding developments.

In keeping with the task at hand, it’s essential that the point of analytical departure be an overview of Armenia and Azerbaijan’s latest geopolitical moves in the year preceding the latest clashes. Afterwards, it’s required that an analysis be given about the limits to Russia’s CSTO commitment to Armenia, which thus helps to put Russia’s active diplomatic moves into the appropriate perspective.

Following that, Part II of the article raises awareness about the US’ Reverse Brzezinski stratagem of peripheral quagmire-like destabilization along the post-Soviet rim and how the recent outbreak of violence is likely part and parcel of this calculated plan. Finally, the two-part series concludes with the suggested appeal that Armenia and Azerbaijan replace the stale OSCE Minsk Group conflict resolution format with a fresh analogue via their newly shared dialogue partner status under the SCO.

 

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Not What One Would Expect

Over the past year or so, Armenia and Azerbaijan’s geopolitical trajectories haven’t exactly been moving along the course that casual commentators would expect that they would. Before beginning this section, it’s necessary to preface it with a disclaimer that the author is not referring to the average Armenian or Azeri citizen in the following analysis, but rather is using their respective countries’ names interchangeably with their given governments, so “Armenia” in this instance refers to the Yerevan political establishment while “Azerbaijan” relates to its Baku counterpart.

This advisory note is needed in order to proactively prevent the reader from misunderstanding the author’s words and analyses, since the topic is full of highly emotionally charged elements and generally evokes a strong reaction among many, especially those of either of the two ethnicities.

 

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Armenian troops during clashes with Azerbaijan

 

Armenia:

The general trend is that the prevailing geopolitical stereotypes about Armenia and Azerbaijan are not as accurate as one would immediately think, and that neither country adheres to them to the degree that one would initially expect. It’s true that Armenia is a staunch and loyal Russian CSTO ally which maintains a presence of 5,000 troops, a handful of jets and helicopters, a forthcoming air defense shield, and possibly soon even Iskander missiles there, but it’s been progressively diversifying its foreign policy tangent by taking strong strides in attempting to reach an Association Agreement with the EU despite its formal Eurasian Union membership.

This has yet to be clinched, but the resolute intent that Yerevan clearly demonstrated in May 2015 raises uncomfortable questions about the extent to which its decision-making elite may have been co-opted by Western influences. The author was so concerned about this eventuality that he published a very controversial analysis that month explaining the various ploys by which the West has sought to woo Armenia over to its side, including the shedding of crocodile tears for its genocide victims during their centenary remembrance commemoration.

As is the established pattern which was most clearly proven by Ukraine, the more intensely that a geostrategically positioned country flirts with the West, the more susceptible that it is to a forthcoming Color Revolution attempt, so it’s unsurprising in hindsight that the “Electric Yerevan” destabilization was commenced just one month after the Armenian President was publicly hobnobbing with so many of his Western “partners”.

That anti-government push was a proto-manifestation of what the author later described in an unrelated work as “Color Revolution 1.5” technologies which seek to use “civil society” and “anti-corruption” elements as experimental triggers for testing the catalyzation of large-scale regime change movements. The geopolitical end goal in all of this, as the author wrote in his “Electric Yerevan” piece cited above, was to get Armenian nationalists such as Nikol Pashinyan into power so that they can provoke a continuation war in Nagorno-Karabakh that might conceivably end up dragging in Russia.

They thankfully didn’t succeed in this, and the sitting Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan has repeatedly underscored that Armenia does not want to see a conflict escalation in the disputed territory.

Strangely, despite the regime change attempt that the West tried to engineer against Armenia, Sargsyan still declared in early 2016 that “Armenia’s cooperation and development of relations with the EU remain a priority for Armenia’s foreign policy” and “expressed gratitude to the EU for their assistance in carrying out reforms in Armenia.” Also, the EU’s External Action Service reports that the two sides formally relaunched their negotiation process with one another on 7 December with the aim of reaching a “new agreement (that) will replace the current EU-Armenia Partnership and Cooperation agreement.”

An EU analyst remarked in March of this year that he obviously doesn’t believe that it will be identical to the Association Agreement that the EU had offered to Armenia prior to its Eurasian Union ascension, but that of course doesn’t mean that it couldn’t share many similarities with its predecessor and create geopolitical complications for Yerevan’s economic alliance with Moscow.

It must be emphasized at this point that while the Armenian state is still closely linked to Russia on the military-political level and formally part of the Eurasian Union, it is provocatively taking strong economic steps in the direction of the EU and the general Western community, disturbingly raising the prospect that its schizophrenic policies might one day engender a crisis of loyalty where Yerevan is forced to choose between Moscow and Brussels much as Kiev was artificially made to do so as well (and possibly with similar pro-Western urban terrorist consequences for the “wrong choice”).

 

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Armenian house destroyed due to Azerbaijan shelling

 

Azerbaijan:

On the other hand, while Armenia was bucking the conventional stereotype by moving closer to the West, Azerbaijan was also doing something similar by realigning itself closer to Russia. Baku’s relations with Washington, Brussels, Ankara, and even Tel Aviv (which it supplies 40% of its energy to via the BTC pipeline) are well documented, as is its geostrategic function as a non-Russian energy source for the EU (particularly in the context of the Southern Corridor project), so there’s no use regurgitating well-known and established facts inside of this analysis.

Rather, what’s especially interesting to pay attention to is how dramatically the ties between Azerbaijan and the West have declined over the past year. Even more fascinating is that all of it was so unnecessary and had barely anything to do with Baku’s own initiative.

What happened was that Brussels started a soft power campaign against Baku by alleging that the latter had been violating “human rights” and “democratic” principles, which resulted in Azerbaijan boldly announcing in September 2015 that it was cancelling the planned visit of a European Commission delegation and considering whether it “should review [its] ties with the European Union, where anti-Azeri and anti-Islam tendencies are strong.”

For a country that is stereotypically seen as being under the Western thumb, that’s the complete opposite of a subservient move and one that exudes defiance to the West. Earlier that year in February 2015, Quartz online magazine even exaggeratedly fear mongered that “Azerbaijan is transforming into a mini-Russia” because of its strengthening domestic security capabilities in dealing with asymmetrical threats.

While Azerbaijan’s resistance certainly has its pragmatic limits owing to the country’s entrenched strategic and energy infrastructural relationship with the West over the past couple of decades, it’s telling that it would so publicly rebuke the West in the fashion that it did and suggests that the problems between Azerbaijan and the West are deeper than just a simple spat.

Part of the reason for the West’s extreme dislike of the Azerbaijani government has been its recent pragmatic and phased emulation of Russia’s NGO security legislation which aims to curb the effectiveness of intelligence-controlled proxy organizations in fomenting Color Revolutions. Having lost its influence over the country via the post-modern “grassroots-‘bottom-up’” approach, it’s very plausible that the US and its allies decided to find a way to instigate Nagorno-Karabakh clashes as a means of regaining their sway over their wayward Caspian ‘ally’.

Amidst this recent falling out between Azerbaijan and the West and even in the years preceding it, Moscow has been able to more confidently position itself as a reliable, trustworthy, and non-discriminatory partner which would never interfere with Baku’s domestic processes or base its bilateral relations with the country on whatever its counterpart chooses to do at home.

Other than the unmistakable security influence that Russia has had on Azerbaijan’s NGO legislation, the two sides have also increased their military-technical cooperation through a surge of agreements that totaled $4 billion by 2013. By 2015, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that Azerbaijan’s total arms spending for the five-year period of 2011-2014 had increased by 249%, with 85% of its supplies coming from Russia.

In parallel to that, it also asserted that Russia’s weapons exports to Europe for 2011-2015 increased by 264%, “mainly due to deliveries to Azerbaijan”. It’s plain to see that Russia isn’t treating Azerbaijan as though it were an unredeemable Western puppet state, but is instead applying a shrewd and calculated military balancing strategy between it and Armenia.

While unconfirmed by official sources, the head of the Political Researches Department of the Yerevan-based Caucasian Institute Sergey Minasian claimed in 2009 that Russia was supplying its Gyumri base in Armenia via air transit permission from Azerbaijan after Georgia banned such overflights through its territory after the 2008 war.

If this is true, then it would suggest that Russian-Azeri strategic relations are at their most trusted level in post-independence history and that Baku has full faith that Moscow will not do anything to upset the military balance in the Southern Caucasus, which of course includes the paranoid fear that some Azeri observers have expressed about Russia conspiring with Armenia to wage another war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

 

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Armenian troops during clashes with Azerbaijan

 

Strategic Calculations and CSTO Limits

Russia And Armenia:

Everything that was written above likely comes as a complete shock to the casual observer of international affairs because it flies in the face of presumed “logic”, but this just goes to show that the prevailing geopolitical stereotypes about Armenia and Azerbaijan are inaccurate and do not fully reflect the present state of affairs.

The common denominator between the two rival states is their evolving relationship with Russia, which as was just described, appears to be progressively moving in opposite directions. Again, the author does not intend to give the impression that this reflects popular sentiment in either country or its expatriate and diaspora communities, especially Armenia and its affiliated ethnic nationals, since the general attitude inside the country (despite the highly publicized “Electric Yerevan” failed Color Revolution attempt) and for the most part by its compatriots outside of it could safely be described as favorable to Russia.

This makes Yerevan’s pro-Western advances all the more puzzling, but that only means that the answer to this paradox lies more in the vision (and possible monetary incentives) of the country’s leadership than the will of its people. Still, the situation is not critical and has yet to approach the point where the pragmatic and trusted state of bilateral relations is endangered.

Russia And Azerbaijan:

That being said, to many conventional observers, Russia’s close military cooperation with Azerbaijan might seem just as peculiar as Armenia’s intimation of a forthcoming pro-Western economic pivot, but that too can be explained by a strategic calculation, albeit one of a much more pragmatic and understandable nature.

Russia has aspired to play the role of a pivotal balancing force between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and truth be told and much to the dismay of many Armenians, it did approve of UNSC Resolutions affirming Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity along its internationally recognized borders, specifically the most recent 62/243 one from 2008 which:

“Reaffirms continued respect and support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders” and “Demands the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan”.

What’s happening isn’t that Russia is “betraying Armenia” like some overactive nationalist pundits like to allege, but that it’s maintaining what has been its consistent position since the conflict began and is abiding by its stated international guiding principle in supporting territorial integrity.

Key to this understanding is that the conception of territorial integrity is a guiding, but not an irreversible, tenet of Russian foreign policy, and the 2008 Russian peace-enforcement operation in Georgia that led to the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the 2014 reunification with Crimea prove that extenuating circumstances can result in a change of long-standing policy on a case-by-case basis.

This can be interpreted as meaning that Moscow at this stage (operative qualifier) does not support the independence of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, but to be fair, neither does Yerevan, although the Armenian state just recently repeated its previously stated position that it could recognize the Armenian-populated region as a separate country if the present hostilities with Azerbaijan increase.

Therefore, the main condition that could push Armenia to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state and possibly even pressure Russia to follow suit would be the prolonged escalation of conflict around the Line of Contact.Geopolitical Consistency:

 

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Armenian troops during clashes with Azerbaijan

 

The Unification Conundrum:

As much as some participants and international observers might think of such a move as being historically just and long overdue, Russia would likely have a much more cautious approach to any unilateral moves that Armenia makes about recognizing the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.

To repeat what was earlier emphasized about Russia’s political approach to this conflict, this would not amount to a “betrayal” of Armenia but instead would be a pragmatic and sober assessment of the global geostrategic environment and the likely fact that such a move could instantly suck Russia into the war.

As it stands, Russia has a mutual defense commitment to Armenia which makes it responsible for protecting its ally from any aggression against it, however this only corresponds to the territory that Russia internationally recognizes as Armenia’s own, thereby excluding any Armenian forces and passport holders in Nagorno-Karabakh.

If Armenia recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state, it would likely initiate a rapidly progressing process whereby the two Armenian-populated entities vote for unification, which would then place Russia in the very uncomfortable position of having to consider whether it will recognize such a unilateral move by its ally and thereby extend its mutual defense umbrella over what would by then be newly incorporated and Russian-recognized Armenian territory.

On the one hand, Moscow wouldn’t want to be perceived as “betraying” its centuries-long Armenian ally and thenceforth engendering its unshakable hate for the foreseeable future, but on the other, it might have certain reservations about getting directly involved in the military conflict as a warfighting participant and forever losing the positive New Cold War inroads that it has made with Baku.

Russian-Azeri relations, if pragmatically managed along the same constructive trajectory that they’ve already been proceeding along, could lead to Moscow gaining a strategic foothold over an important Turkish, EU, and Israeli energy supplier and thus giving Russia the premier possibility of indirectly exerting its influence towards them vis-à-vis its ties with Baku.

In any case, the Russian Foreign Ministry would prefer not to be placed on the spot and in such a zero-sum position where it is forced to choose between honoring its Armenian ally’s unilateral unification with Nagorno-Karabakh and abandoning its potential outpost of transregional strategic influence in Azerbaijan, or pursuing its gambit to acquire grand transregional influence via Azerbaijan at the perceived expense of its long-standing South Caucasus ally and risk losing its ultra-strategic military presence in the country.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Question is thus a quandary of epic and far-reaching geostrategic proportions for Russia, which is doing everything that it can to neutrally negotiate between the two sides in offsetting this utterly destabilizing scenario and preventing it from being forced to choose a disastrous zero-sum commitment in what will be argued in Part II to likely be an externally third-party/US-constructed military-political dilemma.

Furthermore, both Armenia and Azerbaijan want to retain Russian support and neither wants to risk losing it, which also explains why Azerbaijan has yet to unleash its full military potential against the Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and why Armenia hasn’t unilaterally recognized Nagorno-Karabakh or made an effort to politically unite with it.

Conclusively, it can be surmised that the only actor which wants to force this false choice of “either-or” onto Russia is the US, which always benefits whenever destabilization strikes Moscow’s periphery and its Eurasian adversary is forced into a pressing geopolitical dilemma.

March 17, 2016

Snowden: Climate Change is a Hoax by the CIA

by mkleit

Source1

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY WHISTLEBLOWER EDWARD SNOWDEN, HAS MADE A NEW CONTROVERSIAL CLAIM YESTERDAY DURING AN INTERVIEW, SAYING THAT HE POSSESSES SOME CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROVING THAT THE CIA IS BEHIND THE “THEORY OF GLOBAL WARMING”.

Let me begin by saying that unless you’ve taken the time to look into Edward Snowden, then he’s probably not who you think he is. He’s certainly not the low level data entry schmuck the media made him out to be when he spilled many of the NSA’s secrets and then had to flee the country back in 2013. The public was led to believe that Snowden was little more than the guy from IT that you call when the printer toner runs out, but being a sneaky little bastard, he managed to sneak in a zip drive one day and downloaded all kinds of top secret information. Nothing could be further from the truth. 

Since Snowden’s most recent revelation is something so big it will shatter the world view of tens of millions of people if true, I thought I’d provide a little background on the man before the article below. After all, Snowden isn’t revealing that there is no such thing as Santa Clause. He’s saying that “global warming is a complete hoax that was invented by the CIA.” There’s a damn good reason the media painted Snowden to be such a nobody, and that’s because they knew they had to discredit him publicly before he dropped any major truth bombs.

Edward Snowden was not some guy that you call when the printer toner runs low. We’re talking about a guy whose co-worker at the NSA once told Forbes Magazine that although the NSA was filled with tons of smart people, Snowden was “a genius among geniuses,” The following brief summary comes from wikipedia, but it’s highly condensed. It is my intention to provide just enough information to spark your curiosity, so that you’ll watch the AMAZING documentary below. With a claim the size of the one Snowden is making, it’s important you get a sense of precisely who is making it. Wikipedia says: 

On May 7, 2004, Snowden enlisted in the United States Army Reserve as a Special Forces candidate through its 18X enlistment option, but he did not complete the training. After breaking both legs in a training accident, he was discharged. He was then employed for less than a year in 2005 as a “security specialist” at the University of Maryland’s Center for Advanced Study of Language, a non-classified facility.

In 2006, after attending a job fair focused on intelligence agencies, Snowden was offered a position at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which he joined. After distinguishing himself as a junior employee on the top computer team, Snowden was sent to the CIA’s secret school for technology specialists, where he lived in a hotel for six months while studying and training full-time. According to a co-worker, while there Snowden was “considered the top technical and cybersecurity expert” in that country and “was hand-picked by the CIA to support the president at the 2008 NATO summit in Romania.”

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Later, during his four years with Dell, Snowden rose from supervising NSA computer system upgrades to working as what his résumé termed a “cyberstrategist” and an “expert in cyber counterintelligence” at several U.S. locations. In that capacity, he was consulted by the chiefs of the CIA’s technical branches, including the agency’s chief information officer and its chief technology officer. U.S. officials and other sources familiar with the Snowden case say that he began downloading documents describing the government’s electronic spying programs while working for Dell in April 2012. Investigators estimated that of the 50,000 to 200,000 documents Snowden gave to Greenwald and Poitras, most were copied by Snowden while working at Dell.

At the time of his departure from the United States in May 2013, he had been employed for 15 months inside the NSA’s Hawaii regional operations center, which focuses on the electronic monitoring of China and North Korea, the last three of which were with consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton which hired Snowden in 2013 as an NSA contractor. Prior to starting with Booz Allen Hamilton, Snowden’s “career high” annual salary was $200,000, but he took a pay cut at Booz Allen Hamilton because he knew he would have the opportunity to gather data, and then ultimately release details of the NSA’s worldwide surveillance activity.

Intelligence officials have described Snowden’s position with Booz Allen Hamilton as a “system administrator,” but Snowden says he was an “infrastructure analyst.” That meant his job was to look for new ways to break into Internet and telephone traffic around the world. Gradually, over the span of his career with the NSA, Snowden began to move from merely overseeing different systems to actively directing their use. Snowden regularly had sit downs with the CIO of the CIA, the CTO of the CIA, and the chiefs of all the technical branches.

So, when Edward Snowden says that global warming is a total farce that was manufactured by the U.S. government, as you just read, if anyone was in a position to know, it would have been him. The following documentary goes into much more detail, and then just a few days ago the article below came out when he makes the shocking new revelation.

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November 25, 2015

Five Families to Rule us all خمس عائلات لتحكمنا جميعا

by mkleit

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1- Morgans: Morgans and Rothschilds have lent the US government 3.5 million ounces of gold in 1893, through their control on US gold routes. The family helped in forming the biggest US corporations, and Morgan junior lent the government 500 million US dollars to enter the World War, and today they own the biggest gold reservoir in the world.

2- Rockerfeller: They established “Standard Oil” and then became the richest man on each with 400 billion US dollars. The family still continues its work by controlling “Chase Manhattan”, “Exxon Mobil”, “Chevron”, and “British Petroleum”. The family’s plan included also building a UN HQ and funding Belderburg meetings, for those who own world fortunes.

3- Bush: The political family started with Prescott Sheldon Bush (1895), who led a failed coup against Roosevelt in 1933, which aimed to create a fascist regime in the US. George W. Bush initiated a war on Iraq, in which many companies profited from. The Bush family is considered the strongest political family in the US, and it has great fortunes in oil and banking fields.

4- Du Pont: In 1802, Du Pont created a gunpowder factory in Delaware throughout WWI, and his company owned 40% of global explosives and grenades production. By WWII, the company produced Plutonium for US nuclear weapons. The family funds project “Doomsday Seeds” which produces edible plants post-apocalypse.

5-   Rothschild: The family’s fortune varies between 500 billion of personal belongings and 100 trillion US dollars from general belongings (ones they don’t have direct claim to). The family works in the fields of global funding since the 60’s of the 18th century, when Mayer Amschel Rothschild sent his sons to the world’s primary five central banks in the world. The family now practices its power through the US Federal Bank.

October 11, 2015

How The US Uses (Takfiri) Extremists

by mkleit

Source

ScreenHunter_1549-Apr.-20-16.42

Many doubts, questions, and dilemmas have arisen concerning the contradicting conduct of the West while dealing with extremist movements. The West exploited these movements in Afghanistan during the late 1970’s, opposed them in the Arabian Peninsula in the nineties, and then launched war against them in Afghanistan in 2001, and in Iraq after the invasion of 2003. However, in 2011, the West returned to taking advantage of these extremist groups and we are currently faced with a rather vague Western connection with Isis.

The reason behind the doubts and different points of view is that analyses are based on relatively rigid mental paradigms which fail to proceed in accordance with the flexibility and pragmatic segmentation of the cowboy mentality. On the other hand, the alignment of extremist groups in many instances with the West has induced powers which oppose these groups to accuse them of treacherous conduct.

This is accurate, but it is accomplished through the Western scheme of indirect control of these groups. This indirect control is due to the ideological and strategic disorder which extremist groups suffer from, and the disapproval which those in their infrastructure, supportive environment, and their mustering forces maintain toward any connection with the United States- let alone full alliance with America. This is what the inconstancies in relations from 1979 up until this day indicate.

Another factor which has spurned these doubts is the vehement self-defense which the “takfiris” display when they are accused of having connections with the United States or with any countries which adhere to America or revolve around it.

The examination of the course of this movement leads to a specific model which displays how the relation with Isis is controlled by Western powers with the United States at their head. This model is composed of three aspects:

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1) Commission 2) Steering 3) Restraint

Each one of these aspects forms a set of tools which The US select according to the time and condition they deem as most appropriate. They do not necessarily benefit from all of these aspects in a simultaneous manner.

1) Commission

This policy depends on assessing which geographical area is most suitable for the movement of extremist groups, but under the condition that these movements do not pose a threat on American interests and that they also provide a strategic advantage. This policy is fulfilled according to circumstances and through certain means which are chosen according to time and place. There are five essential means.

1) Ensuring geographical domains: Weakening a country’s control in the target region through commotions, political turmoil, political settlement, and national uprising – as was the case in Syria in 2011, and Mosul in 2014.

2) Securing logistical pathways: Ensuring roads for extremists to reach target regions whether these pathways are by land, sea, or air. They also provide visas and even means of transportation in order to reach the area of conflict. They used Egypt, Pakistan, and Yemen as transits during the war on Afghanistan in 1979, and Turkey and Jordan during the war on Syria in 2011

3) Allowing financial aid and armament: Giving approval to their allied powers which wish to support extremist groups with money and weapons whether directly or indirectly (through certain institutions and weapon dealers). Rationing and organizing financial aid is done according to the time which ensures the imposition of a strategic course upon extremist groups.

The United States might also resort to direct weapon provision in some cases of tactical exceptions, such as throwing weapons and equipment from the air to Isis fighters in Kobani more than five times, and presenting this act in the guise of “a mistake”.

4) Transport: Expelling extremists from the countries which are harmed by their presence or from countries which desire to take advantage of them.

5) Facilitating the work of preachers: Allowing extremist preachers to fulfill their activity of spreading extremist ideology and mobilizing “takfiris” in the areas of transference, at departure, and at arrival. Extremist preachers are also allowed to spread their views on satellite TV stations and through different media.

2) Steering

This policy is based upon exerting an effort in media, mobilization, and in the field of action in order to direct the strategic priority of extremist groups toward movement in a certain sphere only, to target a specific enemy, or even to change the strategic and tactical course at a certain stage. All of this is done according to circumstances, requirements, and capacity.

The United States is very active in this domain with the aid of its regional and international allies. It achieves its aim through nine principal means.

1) Specifying the “preferable enemy”: the US have created “stars” among the “takfiri” environment for their own purposes and interests. They shed light on commanders or convenient extremist factions through inserting them on the list of terrorism. They focus on them in the media and select them in a way in which their prominence on the political scene leads to regional and international political achievements. For example, at the beginning of the war on Iraq, Colin Powell proclaimed that the enemy of the United States was al-Zarqawi. The US media machine placed him under the spotlight in a way where he became a prominent figure on the scene, and the conflict considerably shifted to internal Iraqi strife.

This is what Israel did a few months ago when it imposed on Jabhat Nusra to assign certain commanders in charge of control of the positions along the Jolan Heights- under threat of military intervention.

2) Assassinating commanders: Targeting extremist leaders who pose a threat on American or Western national security, or leaders whose regional influence negatively affects the scheme of steering and exploiting. For example, assassinating Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al-‘Awlaqi, and most Qaeda commanders in Yemen.

3) Arabian and International Media: Delivering ideological and provocative concepts which aggravate extremist groups and urge them to head to a certain target region to fight the side which America chooses.

4) Saudi Arabian clerics: The Saudi Arabian religious institution is performing a central role through issuing fatwas which declare jihad in a target region.

5) Security Breaches: Recruiting, sending “Islamized” Western men to fight, the role of Arabian secret services, imprisonment, and attracting a supportive environment which is discontent with the conduct of the extremists. Prisons play a central role in recruiting commanders and prominent figures whether in an explicit or indirect way.

6) Taking command of conflicts: Handling the crisis in the target region in a way which achieves the goals of the United States, and preserving the controllable and exploitable extremist power through suspicious operations and different means of steering.

7) Causing a suitable environment of strife: Creating a setting of conflict in which the mustering forces of the extremist groups are presented as the targets, the oppressed, and the infringed upon – as in the case of Afghanistan and Syria.

8) Dividing the “takfiri” factions: Creating conflicts, tactical clashes in the field of combat, and producing a multiple set of goals and priorities through different means in order to prevent the formation of a unified power- as in the case of the clash between Isis and Jabhat Nusra in Syria.

9) Strategic Theorization: Presenting comprehensive strategic plans which represent the interest of the extremist scheme in the targeted geographical range. The security services infiltrates the Salafist jihadi virtual world and make their own Salafist websites, and in some cases they have the advantage of recruiting few ideologue under the coercion or persuasive instrument in the secret jails, those ideologue are capable of making the paradigm shift when needed.

3) Restraint

Takfiri factions strive to maintain their own agendas – in spite of the great influence of the United States and its agents – in order to preserve their rank among their mustering forces and political authorities. Western powers need to restrain takfiri groups in order to prevent them from crossing strategic or military limits, and they fulfill this through force or control of their incomes.

Regulation is based on six essential means:
1) Direct Confrontation: Carrying out direct military operations to strike at the critical takfiri forces or those which pose a threat, as in the case of Afghanistan in 2001 for example.

2) Limiting financial aid and armament: Monitoring the flow of money and weapons; the amount, type, and timing. They also uphold the limits which prevent the takfiris from becoming a threat while allowing them to act in a way which benefits the United States, as in the case of Syria since 2011.

3) Geographical Restraint: When necessary, the military forces of the United States or its allies fire at the posts where takfiris pose a current or future threat, as the coalition forces did when Isis fighters entered Irbil.

4) Providing a Geographical Substitute: If takfiri groups increase in number or if it becomes hard to control them or their actions, a new battlefield is provided which forms a vent for emotional and military zeal. The most prominent example is allowing Isis forces to engage in fighting in Mosul.

5) Steering through the Media: Provocations in the media contribute to maintaining military and political zeal to achieve the intended and previously specified goal. Thus, it becomes difficult for the leaders of takfiri factions to turn around on the intermediate range.

6) Assassinating Commanders: This was explained among the aforementioned means of steering. The best example on resorting to this course of action during operations of restraint is the assassination of Al-Zarqawi when the United States became suspicious that he had pledged allegiance to Bin Laden and that he had restored the struggle against America as his main priority.

terrorist Abu Mes'ab al Zarqawi

terrorist Abu Mes’ab al Zarqawi

Exemplification

The usage of these means was fulfilled in different circumstances and course of events. In Afghanistan in 1979, the United States had previously designated the course of events. The National Security Advisor to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had formulated a plan to bring Islamists to Afghanistan, to lure the Soviets, and to trigger a long term exhaustive struggle between them.

The second example was after the eleventh of September when the United States resorted to means of restraint in the face of takfiri groups which had left Afghanistan in search of a range of movement. A clash of interests ensued and resulted in the war on Afghanistan in 2001 and the operation of complete security restraint in Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, the zeal of these takfiri groups was directed toward Iraq in 2003 under the banner of fighting America only to be steered toward internal strife.

After that, the great operation to engage in Syria commenced and it is still continuing. The takfiri factions had envisioned in their consciousness and political cognizance an old enterprise in that country. One of the results of this operation was the emergence of Isis whose military effort has been steered once again toward Iraq- in limited mutual interests which the United States has not allowed to cross their specified sphere. Now, Isis is heading toward targeting Saudi Arabia which induced the international coalition to strike it.

Art of the Possible

The United States, its allies, and its regional adherents have adopted this three dimensional policy. This is due to the deep hostility which Arabian and Islamic nations hold toward America, the inability of the US army to engage in the battlefield for military and economic reasons, and the steady growth of powers which oppose America and Israel. Thus, the need for substitute armies able to accomplish strategic and tactical missions arose.

The second reason is the difficulty in engaging in direct combat with takfiri groups which Bin Laden had been temporarily able to drive toward fighting the far enemy in the late nineties and the new millennium, and the need which arose after September eleventh to return these groups to their favorite ideology of targeting the near enemy and regional foes.

Thirdly, Western powers were most of the time in need for an excuse for military intervention. They were also in need of signing long-term agreements (in security, economics…) with the terrorist takfiris. This is why they enabled the takfiris to be present- in order to justify intervention as in the case of Iraq in 2003.

Fourth is the need of America and Western countries to import the takfiri individuals who are active on their soil and to get rid of them.

Regional allies have other concerns – the most important which is the need to vent the internal pressure which these takfiri movements of revolutionary quality pose, and to solve jurisprudential issues when dealing with takfiri groups which lessen their excommunicative speech against certain regimes when they find a suitable range of movement abroad.

On another level, Arabian and Islamic countries need to get rid of the organizational structures of the takfiris or to weaken them as much as possible through driving them toward areas of conflict and strategic ambushes, as Saudi Arabia did in 2003 when it imported its dilemma with Qaeda to Iraq and got rid of that great predicament. The final motive for countries which are involved in the strategy of indirect control has to do with the regional aspect- they make use of takfiri groups to accomplish political regional goals, as in the case of Syria since 2011.

The nature of the takfiri groups is the reason why they have a tendency to be under this strategy. They are hostile and excommunicate everyone, even one another. Thus, they are prone to be steered in any possible direction. Due to the intellectual and jurisprudential differences among takfiri groups, and the lack of a unified command and strategy, they have a tendency to be infiltrated and to be steered in different directions. They also suffer from great vulnerability in security and this has facilitated the endeavors to recruit agents and secret intelligence infiltration.

They are also faced with a major problem which is financial aid – they lack an independent Islamic country which provides them with the money they need. This is why they depend on countries which exclusively adhere to the United States such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Pakistan. On the other hand, due to the security and political pressure exerted on takfiri groups, they are usually in search of any available outlet- especially since their speech carries very ambitious goals in comparison with their ability and narrow range of movement.

ألعوبة السعودية في سوريا

ألعوبة السعودية في سوريا

Courses of Action and Achievements

The main cases in this strategy are Afghanistan 1979, Iraq 2003, and Syria 2011. These cases have been generally successful in accomplishing their main goal which is transformation as much as possible of the threat which takfiri movements pose into a chance, and to take advantage of their blood-thirsty and destructive nature for the benefit of strategic US enterprises. They were successful in Afghanistan which the Soviets left, and they were successful in kindling sectarian and ethnic turmoil in Iraq in 2003. Currently, the United States has benefitted from these takfiri groups in Syria through destroying a great deal of the infrastructure of that country which is central in the allegiance of resistance. Israel has benefitted in creating an obstructive line on the border of the Jolan Heights which is formed of the Jabhat Nusra forces. In Iraq today, Isis represents a case which we wait to discover its outcomes and strategic courses.

On the long term, this strategy has been successful in shifting the military effort of takfiri groups away from directly targeting the West. In Afghanistan, the enemy was the Soviet Union, and in the period after that the targeting of American interests commenced up until the eleventh of September. Steering and indirect control were successful in Iraq in making American interests a secondary priority for takfiri groups in opposition to the priority of targeting other regional powers. As for Syria, American interests became completely distant from takfiri attacks, and Isis has almost fully eliminated attempts to target American interests. The main concern has become the geographical region- to establish the state of Isis, expand it, and to preserve its lands.

The profound and structural results show that America has been able to prevent takfiris from being active in regions where they pose threats on American interests. As a result of wide American domination, takfiri groups have not been able to move in an effective way which has influential political results anymore. They are only able to do so when there is no opposition to US interests which means where the US are at an advantage due to their presence. Thus, these takfiri groups – in an objective way- have become a part of the American scheme. With time they have avoided all regions vital to the United States and are active in less crucial areas.

September 3, 2015

الأدوار الخفية للمنظمات غير الحكومية

by mkleit

هادي قبيسي

USAID-is-CIA-395x300

“إن الكثير مما نقوم به اليوم كانت تقوم به وكالة الإستخبارات المركزية قبل خمس وعشرين عاماً”

آلان وينستاين 1991 / مؤسس الوقفية الوطنية للديموقراطية

تأسست الوقفية الوطنية للديموقراطية بعد مرحلة ريغان مباشرةً بعد انكشاف عدد كبير من أنشطة السي آي إي، فتم إنشاء لجنة متخصصة للإشراف على عمل الإستخبارات، رسمت توجهاً جديداً للعمل تحت غطاء المنظمات غير الحكومية التي ترفع الشعارات الديموقراطية في مختلف أصقاع العالم، فكان إنشاء الوقفية في هذا السياق. ويوضح لنا الرئيس الأول للمؤسسة كارل غيرشمان في تصريح له عام 1986 طبيعة الوقفية والحاجة الكامنة خلف تأسيسها بالقول :”لم يعد ممكناً للمجموعات الديموقراطية حول العالم أن تنظر لنفسها على أنها عميلة للسي آي إي”. ويعتبر الكاتب ديفون دوغلاس بوير تعليقاً على حالة الوقفية ومؤسسات أخرى مشابهة من حيث الدور والغطاء أنه و”في حين أن للمنظمات غير الحكومية تأثيراً إيجابياً على المجتمع ككل، ينبغي الإلتفات إلى خلفيتها، من المسؤول عنها، ومن أين تحصل على تمويلها، لأن طبيعة هذه المنظمات في تغير، وهي تنخرط أكثر فأكثر في المنظومة الإمبريالية للسيطرة والإستغلال، وأصبحت تمثل بعثات امبريالية” (للمزيد أنظر : NGOs: Missionaries of Empire).

أخذنا هذا المثال للإضاءة على قضية من قضايا الآن، البالغة الحساسية، وهي تمويل الدول الإستعمارية الغربية القديمة والجديدة، لمنظمات غير حكومية وفق برامج “ديموقراطية” محددة، في البلدان التي كانت سابقاً، في الأمس البعيد أو القريب، هدفاً للإحتلال الإستعماري المباشر، وهي الآن هدف للإستعمار الحديث.

ترى هل بدأت هذه الأنشطة بعد ريغان فقط؟ أم أن لها سوابق تاريخية؟ يؤكد الباحث المتخصص وليام ديمارس في دراسة له نشرت في الفصلية المتخصصة للإستخبارات أن :” التعاون بين المنظمات غير الحكومية والأجهزة الإستخباراتية الأمريكية له تاريخ طويل من التطور، فمنذ تأسيس وكالة الإستخبارات المركزية عام 1947 قامت ببناء خطوط اتصال مع عدد كبير من المؤسسات الأمريكية خارج البلاد، من ضمنها المؤسسات التجارية، الكنائس، المؤسسات الإعلامية، والمؤسسات الرعائية والخدماتية. بعض تلك الخطوط تمت الإستفادة منها لتمويل بعض المؤسسات بشكل سري. وتلك المؤسسات كانت تدعم وتمول المنظمات غير الحكومية. حركة هذه المؤسسات تمت الإستفادة منها في جمع المعلومات الإستخبارية، وكذلك شكلت جزءاً من البنية التحتية للأفراد الذين يمكن تجنيدهم للعمل السري”. إذن هي جزء من عملية تهيئة بيئة سياسية واجتماعية لنقلها من حالة العداء مع المستعمر إلى حالة التعاون “الديموقراطي” معه مروراً بحالة انكسار الحواجز النفسية المختلفة بالتدريج. ويؤكد الباحث في نفس الدراسة أن ” المنظمات غير الحكومية المتنوعة ومختلف الأجهزة الإستخباراتية الأمريكية تجد نفسها بشكل متزايد جنباً إلى جنب على خطوط الجبهات في مواجهة الحروب الصغيرة وحركات التمرد في العالم الثالث والدول السوفياتية السابقة”، مرجعاً تعويل أجهزة الإستخبارات الأمريكية على المنظمات غير الحكومية إلى أن” المنظمات غير الحكومية والعاملين فيها يحصلون على معلومات لا تستطيع أجهزة الإستخبارات الحصول عليها من طرق أخرى”، حيث ” تشكل الشبكة العالمية من المنظمات غير الحكومية مصدراً هاماً للمعلومات بالنسبة لأجهزة الإستخبارات الأمريكية” وفي كثير من الأحيان “يتم إرسال المعلومات التي تحصل عليها المنظمات غير الحكومية بشكل مباشر إلى قيادة وكالة الإستخبارات المركزية لتحليلها” (للمزيد أنظر : NGOs and United States Intelligence in Small Wars).

منظومة تعاون متكاملة وراسخة بين الإستخبارات والمنظمات دعت جامعة هانلي بوتنام المتخصصة في المجال الأمني إلى تقديم برنامج تعليمي خاص حول الدور الإستخباراتي للمنظمات غير الحكومية، وتوضح الجامعة على موقعها على الإنترنت مبررات إنشاء هذا البرنامج بالقول إن ” ثمة أعمالاً استخباراتية عديدة جداً في دائرة نشاط المنظمات غير الحكومية، وهي تستفيد من باحثين ومحللين يمتلكون مجموعة مهارات استخباراتية خاصة”.

يهتم موقع وكالة الإستخبارات المركزية بهذا الموضوع أيضاً فينشر دراسة حول ضرورة تطوير التعاون مع المنظمات غير الحكومية يؤكد فيها الباحث ألن ليبسون أن “أجهزة الإستخبارات الأمريكية تعمل في مناطق النزاعات جنباً إلى جنب مع المنظمات غير الحكومية” معتبراً أن ” المعلومات التي توفرها المنظمات غير الحكومية تعد حيوية في عملية اتخاذ القرار السياسي” (للمزيد أنظر : Can the USG and NGOs Do More ).

دول عديدة واجهت هذه الظاهرة الشديدة الخطورة، المتمثلة بغزو المنظمات غير الحكومية لكل جوانب الحياة السياسية والإعلامية والإقتصادية والأمنية بتمويل وتوجيه من دولة أجنبية معادية بغطاء “ديموقراطي”، مصر ما بعد الثورة هي إحدى تلك الدول فبتاريخ 27 كانون أول 2011 داهمت قوات الأمن المصرية 17 مركزاً لمنظمات غير حكومية في القاهرة، كانت تعمل كغطاء لوكالة الإستخبارات المركزية، ولاحقاً وضعت أكثر من 400 منظمة غير حكومية تحت التحقيق، وكانت تلك العملية ذات تأثير سلبي كبير على نشاط الإستخبارات الأمريكية في الشرق الأوسط، ويؤكد الباحث باتريك هانينغسن أنه و” في العقود الخمس السابقة، عملت وكالة الإستخبارات المركزية الأمريكية بشكل غير مكشوف تقريباً في حين أنها كانت تتحرك تحت غطاء المنظمات غير الحكومية مثل USAID ” (للمزيد أنظر : The CIA Operating behind a Web of “Pro-Demcracy” NGOs ).

في بوليفيا كذلك، تمت مواجهة زحف المنظمات العميلة، ويعتبر الرئيس البوليفي أن المنظمات غير الحكومية عملت بشكل سري متعاونةً مع أعداء بوليفيا للتآمر ضد البلاد، وهي تعتبر كمنظومة تجسسية. روسيا هي الأخرى أقرت قانوناً تعتبر فيه المنظمات الأجنبية جواسيس، و يقول الكسندر سيدياكين الذي اقترح القانون في مجلس الدوما بأن ثمة شبكة كاملة من المنظمات غير الحكومية التي تقع تحت نظر الشك لناحية تمويلها. (للمزيد أنظر : For Russian Government NGOs are Like spies).

إيران واجهت نفس المشكلة خلال الثورة الملونة التي جرت هناك عام 2009، ويشير موقع قناة برس تي في الإيراني باللغة الإنجليزية إلى الدور البريطاني الكبير في هذا المجال حيث تشعر بريطانيا بالحاجة إلى الحضور في الدول المعادية للقيام بالتغيير من الداخل على الرغم من استفادتها من كافة الوسائل الإستخباراتية المعاصرة المختلفة، مع التذكير بأن هذا المسار له تاريخ طويل، فبريطانيا استعملت المستكشفين والرحالة والكتاب وعلماء الآثار للتجسس على البلدان المختلفة (للمزيد أنظر : British govt. exploits NGOs to spy other countries ).

لبنان هو إحدى ساحات نشاط تلك المنظمات التي تعمل ضمن شبكات مرتبطة بالسفارات الأجنبية، واللافت للنظر عددها وانتشارها وتنوع نشاطاتها، ويمكن العودة إلى موقع يو أس إيد فرع لبنان لإلقاء نظرة واستكشاف طبيعة الإجتياح الأمريكي الذي يجري بصمت مستهدفاً العقول والقلوب في بلد المقاومة العربية الأول.

لا يمكن وضع كل المنظمات غير الحكومية في سلة واحدة وتصنيفها في خانة العمل الواعي لخدمة الأهداف الأمريكية لكن الأكيد أن المنظمات التي تتعاطى الشأن السياسي والإعلامي والتي شهدت طفرة في التمويل بعد حرب عام 2006 هي تخدم المشروع الأمريكي، الذي يحدد المصلحة الأمريكية في الشرق الأوسط بحماية اسرائيل. الدولة اللبنانية المنقسمة على نفسها في غاية العجز والضعف، تاركةً الحبل ملقىً على غاربه، فيما تجتاح مئات المنظمات البلاد ليجمع بعضها المعلومات عن المقاومة وتقوم أخرى بتحضير شرائح مختلفة للتعاون والتواصل مع وكر التجسس في السفارة الأمريكية.

المصدر

September 1, 2015

Otpor: The support of global revolutions, even in Lebanon

by mkleit

The Revolution Business, 2011 – Consultants are helping people countries like Ukraine and Egypt build a foundation of knowledge in order to start revolutions.

Democratic change has been demanded across the Middle East. But was what seems like a spontaneous revolution actually a strategically planned event, fabricated by ‘revolution consultants’ long in advance?

Revolution consultants are the worst nightmare of every regime. Srdja Popovic was a founder of the organisation ‘Otpor’, a revolution training school. It was instrumental in the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in the 1990s and has now inspired a new generation of activists. Political commentators like William Engdahl are convinced Otpor is being financed by the USA. “The people from Otpor gave us a book in which they described all their strategies”, says Ezzedine Zaatour of the Tunisian uprising. That book was written by an American, Gene Sharp, and is now considered the “revolution guide book”, being used by opposition movements worldwide. As Optor release their latest gadget, a resistance training computer game sponsored by American organisations, world leaders are voicing their concerns. “This is called a gentle coup!”, insists Hugo Chavez.

July 31, 2015

Ottoman Hustler

by mkleit
Turkish president Recip-Tayyip Erdogan

Turkish president Recip-Tayyip Erdogan

Turkish president Recip-Tayyip Erdogan has understood the economic and geopolitical importance of the Iranian nuclear deal. Iran will have now more power in the Middle East to support its affiliates, especially Syria, which would diminish Erdogan’s hopes in toppling Bashar al-Assad’s regime. This would explain the policy-change Erdogan took towards ISIL, by supporting the US-led coalition against the terrorist group, and in return, US would support Turkey in toppling the Syrian regime and support his plan to create a buffer zone in Northern Syria.

Map of Middle East with Kurdistan

Map of Middle East with Kurdistan

The Turkish government has done its best to practice madness in politics and military in the past few weeks, and sometimes, schizophrenia. First, it has a dream to topple neighboring Syria’s regime, thus it supported armed opposition divisions, as well as radical brigades like Ahrar al-Sham and others. Then, it logistically aided ISIL, whom are anti-regime and anti-opposition and are looking for build their own state. And finally, bombing sites for Kurdish brigades, whom have their own dream of an independent Kurdistan. A dream that Turkey has always fought to stop, politically and militarily.

It’s not a surprise why the Turkish government would raid several PKK sites in Syria and Iraq, but it’s strange that this would happen after a terrorist attacks targeting a pro-Kurdish rally in Suruc, southern Turkey, on July 23rd, killing 32 persons and wounding 100 others. The Turkish government later on held ISIL responsibility of the attack. But wait a minute! Turkish government accuses ISIL yet it attacks Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq? Yes.

Erdogan’s has succeeded in making use of the terrorist attack by launching air-strikes on the Kurds and ISIL at the same, with the Kurds suffering the most of it. In the end, Turkey wouldn’t go too far in bombing ISIL, the group that Turkey itself trained and opened routes in and out of Syria and Iraq, as well as opening a market for ISIL-connected oil smugglers coming from oil-rich areas of Deir al-Zour and Raqqa in Eastern and Northern Syria.

Kurdish fighters heading for Kobane in Northern Syria to fight ISIL

Kurdish fighters heading for Kobane in Northern Syria to fight ISIL

He also used the “humanitarian crisis” to support his claims during a press conference at one of Turkey’s airports before heading to China on the 28th of July, when saying that creating a buffer zone in Northern Syria “would help a million and 700 thousand refugees go back” and then adding “no peace process with those who endanger Turkish unity”, meaning the creation of an independent Kurdistan which would take part of Turkish lands. But the Turkish government, headed by Erdogan’s right-hand man, Ahmet Davutoğlu, is resuming talks with Turkish political parties, including the Kurds, to create the new government, which just adds to dichotomy.

But there’s a reason for this new rhetoric, since war a sign to escape the loss in the recent parliamentary elections and the upcoming government, as well as winning people’s support, by manufacturing fear and insecurity. Thus the war on the Kurds would make the latter think twice before forming Kurdistan, as well as joining Kurdish areas in northern Syria after it was dismantled by ISIL militants.

Erdogan making the ISIS beast a friendly pet

Erdogan making the ISIS beast a friendly pet

Although over six ISIL-related attacks occurred in Turkey and threats of more to come, as German intelligence warned Turkish governments of attacks targeting metro stations and malls in Istanbul; Turkey has not placed ISIL on its terrorist list yet.

Nonetheless, ISIL was able to succeed in one thing – if it was ever intentional; it loosened the Kurdish forces’ pressure on northern Syria by shifting the latter’s fights gradually towards the Syrian – Iraqi – Turkish joint borders, as well as letting Turkey focus on bombing Kurdish military sites in Iraq and Syria – as if Turkey never wanted that to happen.

While the Kurds have also made use of the ISIL attacks by forming their own local security forces in Kurdish cities in Southern and Eastern Turkey. Soon enough, roadblocks, identity checks, questioning of passengers, and prevention of state security from entering those areas will soon be evident in the aforementioned cities.

Through all this, the “war on terror” rhetoric that Erdogan has been waving recently, seems to be another PR campaign for his political party, in addition to a pretext to start a war on the Kurds, and possibly the Syrian army. But his newly-made war may turn into a war of three fronts: ISIL, Kurds, and Syrian army, which Erdogan wouldn’t be sure he could handle, knowing that the first two are inside Turkey already.

Published also on: Teleghraph

July 20, 2015

Iraq crisis: How Saudi Arabia helped Isis take over the north of the country

by mkleit

Independent

How far is Saudi Arabia complicit in the Isis takeover of much of northern Iraq, and is it stoking an escalating Sunni-Shia conflict across the Islamic world? Some time before 9/11, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, once the powerful Saudi ambassador in Washington and head of Saudi intelligence until a few months ago, had a revealing and ominous conversation with the head of the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove. Prince Bandar told him: “The time is not far off in the Middle East, Richard, when it will be literally ‘God help the Shia’. More than a billion Sunnis have simply had enough of them.”

The fatal moment predicted by Prince Bandar may now have come for many Shia, with Saudi Arabia playing an important role in bringing it about by supporting the anti-Shia jihad in Iraq and Syria. Since the capture of Mosul by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isis) on 10 June, Shia women and children have been killed in villages south of Kirkuk, and Shia air force cadets machine-gunned and buried in mass graves near Tikrit.

In Mosul, Shia shrines and mosques have been blown up, and in the nearby Shia Turkoman city of Tal Afar 4,000 houses have been taken over by Isis fighters as “spoils of war”. Simply to be identified as Shia or a related sect, such as the Alawites, in Sunni rebel-held parts of Iraq and Syria today, has become as dangerous as being a Jew was in Nazi-controlled parts of Europe in 1940.

There is no doubt about the accuracy of the quote by Prince Bandar, secretary-general of the Saudi National Security Council from 2005 and head of General Intelligence between 2012 and 2014, the crucial two years when al-Qa’ida-type jihadis took over the Sunni-armed opposition in Iraq and Syria. Speaking at the Royal United Services Institute last week, Dearlove, who headed MI6 from 1999 to 2004, emphasised the significance of Prince Bandar’s words, saying that they constituted “a chilling comment that I remember very well indeed”.

He does not doubt that substantial and sustained funding from private donors in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to which the authorities may have turned a blind eye, has played a central role in the Isis surge into Sunni areas of Iraq. He said: “Such things simply do not happen spontaneously.” This sounds realistic since the tribal and communal leadership in Sunni majority provinces is much beholden to Saudi and Gulf paymasters, and would be unlikely to cooperate with Isis without their consent.

Prince Bandar bin Sultan

Prince Bandar bin Sultan

Dearlove’s explosive revelation about the prediction of a day of reckoning for the Shia by Prince Bandar, and the former head of MI6’s view that Saudi Arabia is involved in the Isis-led Sunni rebellion, has attracted surprisingly little attention. Coverage of Dearlove’s speech focused instead on his main theme that the threat from Isis to the West is being exaggerated because, unlike Bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida, it is absorbed in a new conflict that “is essentially Muslim on Muslim”. Unfortunately, Christians in areas captured by Isis are finding this is not true, as their churches are desecrated and they are forced to flee. A difference between al-Qa’ida and Isis is that the latter is much better organised; if it does attack Western targets the results are likely to be devastating.

The forecast by Prince Bandar, who was at the heart of Saudi security policy for more than three decades, that the 100 million Shia in the Middle East face disaster at the hands of the Sunni majority, will convince many Shia that they are the victims of a Saudi-led campaign to crush them. “The Shia in general are getting very frightened after what happened in northern Iraq,” said an Iraqi commentator, who did not want his name published. Shia see the threat as not only military but stemming from the expanded influence over mainstream Sunni Islam of Wahhabism, the puritanical and intolerant version of Islam espoused by Saudi Arabia that condemns Shia and other Islamic sects as non-Muslim apostates and polytheists.

Dearlove says that he has no inside knowledge obtained since he retired as head of MI6 10 years ago to become Master of Pembroke College in Cambridge. But, drawing on past experience, he sees Saudi strategic thinking as being shaped by two deep-seated beliefs or attitudes. First, they are convinced that there “can be no legitimate or admissible challenge to the Islamic purity of their Wahhabi credentials as guardians of Islam’s holiest shrines”. But, perhaps more significantly given the deepening Sunni-Shia confrontation, the Saudi belief that they possess a monopoly of Islamic truth leads them to be “deeply attracted towards any militancy which can effectively challenge Shia-dom”.

Western governments traditionally play down the connection between Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabist faith, on the one hand, and jihadism, whether of the variety espoused by Osama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida or by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Isis. There is nothing conspiratorial or secret about these links: 15 out of 19 of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudis, as was Bin Laden and most of the private donors who funded the operation.

Sir Richard Dearlove

Sir Richard Dearlove

But there has always been a second theme to Saudi policy towards al-Qa’ida type jihadis, contradicting Prince Bandar’s approach and seeing jihadis as a mortal threat to the Kingdom. Dearlove illustrates this attitude by relating how, soon after 9/11, he visited the Saudi capital Riyadh with Tony Blair.

He remembers the then head of Saudi General Intelligence “literally shouting at me across his office: ‘9/11 is a mere pinprick on the West. In the medium term, it is nothing more than a series of personal tragedies. What these terrorists want is to destroy the House of Saud and remake the Middle East.'” In the event, Saudi Arabia adopted both policies, encouraging the jihadis as a useful tool of Saudi anti-Shia influence abroad but suppressing them at home as a threat to the status quo. It is this dual policy that has fallen apart over the last year.

Saudi sympathy for anti-Shia “militancy” is identified in leaked US official documents. The then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote in December 2009 in a cable released by Wikileaks that “Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, LeT [Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan] and other terrorist groups.” She said that, in so far as Saudi Arabia did act against al-Qa’ida, it was as a domestic threat and not because of its activities abroad. This policy may now be changing with the dismissal of Prince Bandar as head of intelligence this year. But the change is very recent, still ambivalent and may be too late: it was only last week that a Saudi prince said he would no longer fund a satellite television station notorious for its anti-Shia bias based in Egypt.

The Sunni Ahmed al-Rifai shrine near Tal Afar is bulldozed

The Sunni Ahmed al-Rifai shrine near Tal Afar is bulldozed

The problem for the Saudis is that their attempts since Bandar lost his job to create an anti-Maliki and anti-Assad Sunni constituency which is simultaneously against al-Qa’ida and its clones have failed.

By seeking to weaken Maliki and Assad in the interest of a more moderate Sunni faction, Saudi Arabia and its allies are in practice playing into the hands of Isis which is swiftly gaining full control of the Sunni opposition in Syria and Iraq. In Mosul, as happened previously in its Syrian capital Raqqa, potential critics and opponents are disarmed, forced to swear allegiance to the new caliphate and killed if they resist.

The West may have to pay a price for its alliance with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, which have always found Sunni jihadism more attractive than democracy. A striking example of double standards by the western powers was the Saudi-backed suppression of peaceful democratic protests by the Shia majority in Bahrain in March 2011. Some 1,500 Saudi troops were sent across the causeway to the island kingdom as the demonstrations were ended with great brutality and Shia mosques and shrines were destroyed.

An alibi used by the US and Britain is that the Sunni al-Khalifa royal family in Bahrain is pursuing dialogue and reform. But this excuse looked thin last week as Bahrain expelled a top US diplomat, the assistant secretary of state for human rights Tom Malinowksi, for meeting leaders of the main Shia opposition party al-Wifaq. Mr Malinowski tweeted that the Bahrain government’s action was “not about me but about undermining dialogue”.

Iraqi leader al-Maliki

Iraqi leader al-Maliki

Western powers and their regional allies have largely escaped criticism for their role in reigniting the war in Iraq. Publicly and privately, they have blamed the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for persecuting and marginalising the Sunni minority, so provoking them into supporting the Isis-led revolt. There is much truth in this, but it is by no means the whole story. Maliki did enough to enrage the Sunni, partly because he wanted to frighten Shia voters into supporting him in the 30 April election by claiming to be the Shia community’s protector against Sunni counter-revolution.

But for all his gargantuan mistakes, Maliki’s failings are not the reason why the Iraqi state is disintegrating. What destabilised Iraq from 2011 on was the revolt of the Sunni in Syria and the takeover of that revolt by jihadis, who were often sponsored by donors in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. Again and again Iraqi politicians warned that by not seeking to close down the civil war in Syria, Western leaders were making it inevitable that the conflict in Iraq would restart. “I guess they just didn’t believe us and were fixated on getting rid of [President Bashar al-] Assad,” said an Iraqi leader in Baghdad last week.

Of course, US and British politicians and diplomats would argue that they were in no position to bring an end to the Syrian conflict. But this is misleading. By insisting that peace negotiations must be about the departure of Assad from power, something that was never going to happen since Assad held most of the cities in the country and his troops were advancing, the US and Britain made sure the war would continue.

The chief beneficiary is Isis which over the last two weeks has been mopping up the last opposition to its rule in eastern Syria. The Kurds in the north and the official al-Qa’ida representative, Jabhat al-Nusra, are faltering under the impact of Isis forces high in morale and using tanks and artillery captured from the Iraqi army. It is also, without the rest of the world taking notice, taking over many of the Syrian oil wells that it did not already control.

The Shia Al-Qubba Husseiniya mosque in Mosul explodes

The Shia Al-Qubba Husseiniya mosque in Mosul explodes

Saudi Arabia has created a Frankenstein’s monster over which it is rapidly losing control. The same is true of its allies such as Turkey which has been a vital back-base for Isis and Jabhat al-Nusra by keeping the 510-mile-long Turkish-Syrian border open. As Kurdish-held border crossings fall to Isis, Turkey will find it has a new neighbour of extraordinary violence, and one deeply ungrateful for past favours from the Turkish intelligence service.

As for Saudi Arabia, it may come to regret its support for the Sunni revolts in Syria and Iraq as jihadi social media begins to speak of the House of Saud as its next target. It is the unnamed head of Saudi General Intelligence quoted by Dearlove after 9/11 who is turning out to have analysed the potential threat to Saudi Arabia correctly and not Prince Bandar, which may explain why the latter was sacked earlier this year.

Nor is this the only point on which Prince Bandar was dangerously mistaken. The rise of Isis is bad news for the Shia of Iraq but it is worse news for the Sunni whose leadership has been ceded to a pathologically bloodthirsty and intolerant movement, a sort of Islamic Khmer Rouge, which has no aim but war without end.

The Sunni caliphate rules a large, impoverished and isolated area from which people are fleeing. Several million Sunni in and around Baghdad are vulnerable to attack and 255 Sunni prisoners have already been massacred. In the long term, Isis cannot win, but its mix of fanaticism and good organisation makes it difficult to dislodge.

“God help the Shia,” said Prince Bandar, but, partly thanks to him, the shattered Sunni communities of Iraq and Syria may need divine help even more than the Shia.

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