Posts tagged ‘Syria’

November 11, 2015

Photos from Destroyed Neighborhoods in Syria

by mkleit

The following photos are not mine nor do I claim rights to them.

I have shared them in this post to show the amount of destruction caused by all sides of the Syrian crisis; regime, opposition, extremist groups, all are responsible for the chaos and disasters in Syria.

Syrian kid selling merchandises on a table in Der el Zour

Syrian kid selling merchandises on a table in Der el Zour

Syrian kid plays on tricycle in a besieged neighborhood by FSA in Homs

Syrian kid plays on tricycle in a besieged neighborhood by FSA in Homs

Syrian students playing in the courtyard of their school in rebel-controlled Idlib

Syrian students playing in the courtyard of their school in rebel-controlled Idlib

Girls playing in Homs

Girls playing in Homs

Children taking a walk in destroyed neighborhood of Douma, Damascus

Children taking a walk in destroyed neighborhood of Douma, Damascus

Young man riding by a bomb in Douma, Damascus

Young man riding by a bomb in Douma, Damascus

Kids swimming in a crater caused by bombing in Aleppo

Kids swimming in a crater caused by bombing in Aleppo

Girl holding a bag of licorice (unknown area)

Girl holding a bag of licorice (unknown area)

October 11, 2015

How The US Uses (Takfiri) Extremists

by mkleit



Many doubts, questions, and dilemmas have arisen concerning the contradicting conduct of the West while dealing with extremist movements. The West exploited these movements in Afghanistan during the late 1970’s, opposed them in the Arabian Peninsula in the nineties, and then launched war against them in Afghanistan in 2001, and in Iraq after the invasion of 2003. However, in 2011, the West returned to taking advantage of these extremist groups and we are currently faced with a rather vague Western connection with Isis.

The reason behind the doubts and different points of view is that analyses are based on relatively rigid mental paradigms which fail to proceed in accordance with the flexibility and pragmatic segmentation of the cowboy mentality. On the other hand, the alignment of extremist groups in many instances with the West has induced powers which oppose these groups to accuse them of treacherous conduct.

This is accurate, but it is accomplished through the Western scheme of indirect control of these groups. This indirect control is due to the ideological and strategic disorder which extremist groups suffer from, and the disapproval which those in their infrastructure, supportive environment, and their mustering forces maintain toward any connection with the United States- let alone full alliance with America. This is what the inconstancies in relations from 1979 up until this day indicate.

Another factor which has spurned these doubts is the vehement self-defense which the “takfiris” display when they are accused of having connections with the United States or with any countries which adhere to America or revolve around it.

The examination of the course of this movement leads to a specific model which displays how the relation with Isis is controlled by Western powers with the United States at their head. This model is composed of three aspects:


1) Commission 2) Steering 3) Restraint

Each one of these aspects forms a set of tools which The US select according to the time and condition they deem as most appropriate. They do not necessarily benefit from all of these aspects in a simultaneous manner.

1) Commission

This policy depends on assessing which geographical area is most suitable for the movement of extremist groups, but under the condition that these movements do not pose a threat on American interests and that they also provide a strategic advantage. This policy is fulfilled according to circumstances and through certain means which are chosen according to time and place. There are five essential means.

1) Ensuring geographical domains: Weakening a country’s control in the target region through commotions, political turmoil, political settlement, and national uprising – as was the case in Syria in 2011, and Mosul in 2014.

2) Securing logistical pathways: Ensuring roads for extremists to reach target regions whether these pathways are by land, sea, or air. They also provide visas and even means of transportation in order to reach the area of conflict. They used Egypt, Pakistan, and Yemen as transits during the war on Afghanistan in 1979, and Turkey and Jordan during the war on Syria in 2011

3) Allowing financial aid and armament: Giving approval to their allied powers which wish to support extremist groups with money and weapons whether directly or indirectly (through certain institutions and weapon dealers). Rationing and organizing financial aid is done according to the time which ensures the imposition of a strategic course upon extremist groups.

The United States might also resort to direct weapon provision in some cases of tactical exceptions, such as throwing weapons and equipment from the air to Isis fighters in Kobani more than five times, and presenting this act in the guise of “a mistake”.

4) Transport: Expelling extremists from the countries which are harmed by their presence or from countries which desire to take advantage of them.

5) Facilitating the work of preachers: Allowing extremist preachers to fulfill their activity of spreading extremist ideology and mobilizing “takfiris” in the areas of transference, at departure, and at arrival. Extremist preachers are also allowed to spread their views on satellite TV stations and through different media.

2) Steering

This policy is based upon exerting an effort in media, mobilization, and in the field of action in order to direct the strategic priority of extremist groups toward movement in a certain sphere only, to target a specific enemy, or even to change the strategic and tactical course at a certain stage. All of this is done according to circumstances, requirements, and capacity.

The United States is very active in this domain with the aid of its regional and international allies. It achieves its aim through nine principal means.

1) Specifying the “preferable enemy”: the US have created “stars” among the “takfiri” environment for their own purposes and interests. They shed light on commanders or convenient extremist factions through inserting them on the list of terrorism. They focus on them in the media and select them in a way in which their prominence on the political scene leads to regional and international political achievements. For example, at the beginning of the war on Iraq, Colin Powell proclaimed that the enemy of the United States was al-Zarqawi. The US media machine placed him under the spotlight in a way where he became a prominent figure on the scene, and the conflict considerably shifted to internal Iraqi strife.

This is what Israel did a few months ago when it imposed on Jabhat Nusra to assign certain commanders in charge of control of the positions along the Jolan Heights- under threat of military intervention.

2) Assassinating commanders: Targeting extremist leaders who pose a threat on American or Western national security, or leaders whose regional influence negatively affects the scheme of steering and exploiting. For example, assassinating Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al-‘Awlaqi, and most Qaeda commanders in Yemen.

3) Arabian and International Media: Delivering ideological and provocative concepts which aggravate extremist groups and urge them to head to a certain target region to fight the side which America chooses.

4) Saudi Arabian clerics: The Saudi Arabian religious institution is performing a central role through issuing fatwas which declare jihad in a target region.

5) Security Breaches: Recruiting, sending “Islamized” Western men to fight, the role of Arabian secret services, imprisonment, and attracting a supportive environment which is discontent with the conduct of the extremists. Prisons play a central role in recruiting commanders and prominent figures whether in an explicit or indirect way.

6) Taking command of conflicts: Handling the crisis in the target region in a way which achieves the goals of the United States, and preserving the controllable and exploitable extremist power through suspicious operations and different means of steering.

7) Causing a suitable environment of strife: Creating a setting of conflict in which the mustering forces of the extremist groups are presented as the targets, the oppressed, and the infringed upon – as in the case of Afghanistan and Syria.

8) Dividing the “takfiri” factions: Creating conflicts, tactical clashes in the field of combat, and producing a multiple set of goals and priorities through different means in order to prevent the formation of a unified power- as in the case of the clash between Isis and Jabhat Nusra in Syria.

9) Strategic Theorization: Presenting comprehensive strategic plans which represent the interest of the extremist scheme in the targeted geographical range. The security services infiltrates the Salafist jihadi virtual world and make their own Salafist websites, and in some cases they have the advantage of recruiting few ideologue under the coercion or persuasive instrument in the secret jails, those ideologue are capable of making the paradigm shift when needed.

3) Restraint

Takfiri factions strive to maintain their own agendas – in spite of the great influence of the United States and its agents – in order to preserve their rank among their mustering forces and political authorities. Western powers need to restrain takfiri groups in order to prevent them from crossing strategic or military limits, and they fulfill this through force or control of their incomes.

Regulation is based on six essential means:
1) Direct Confrontation: Carrying out direct military operations to strike at the critical takfiri forces or those which pose a threat, as in the case of Afghanistan in 2001 for example.

2) Limiting financial aid and armament: Monitoring the flow of money and weapons; the amount, type, and timing. They also uphold the limits which prevent the takfiris from becoming a threat while allowing them to act in a way which benefits the United States, as in the case of Syria since 2011.

3) Geographical Restraint: When necessary, the military forces of the United States or its allies fire at the posts where takfiris pose a current or future threat, as the coalition forces did when Isis fighters entered Irbil.

4) Providing a Geographical Substitute: If takfiri groups increase in number or if it becomes hard to control them or their actions, a new battlefield is provided which forms a vent for emotional and military zeal. The most prominent example is allowing Isis forces to engage in fighting in Mosul.

5) Steering through the Media: Provocations in the media contribute to maintaining military and political zeal to achieve the intended and previously specified goal. Thus, it becomes difficult for the leaders of takfiri factions to turn around on the intermediate range.

6) Assassinating Commanders: This was explained among the aforementioned means of steering. The best example on resorting to this course of action during operations of restraint is the assassination of Al-Zarqawi when the United States became suspicious that he had pledged allegiance to Bin Laden and that he had restored the struggle against America as his main priority.

terrorist Abu Mes'ab al Zarqawi

terrorist Abu Mes’ab al Zarqawi


The usage of these means was fulfilled in different circumstances and course of events. In Afghanistan in 1979, the United States had previously designated the course of events. The National Security Advisor to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had formulated a plan to bring Islamists to Afghanistan, to lure the Soviets, and to trigger a long term exhaustive struggle between them.

The second example was after the eleventh of September when the United States resorted to means of restraint in the face of takfiri groups which had left Afghanistan in search of a range of movement. A clash of interests ensued and resulted in the war on Afghanistan in 2001 and the operation of complete security restraint in Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, the zeal of these takfiri groups was directed toward Iraq in 2003 under the banner of fighting America only to be steered toward internal strife.

After that, the great operation to engage in Syria commenced and it is still continuing. The takfiri factions had envisioned in their consciousness and political cognizance an old enterprise in that country. One of the results of this operation was the emergence of Isis whose military effort has been steered once again toward Iraq- in limited mutual interests which the United States has not allowed to cross their specified sphere. Now, Isis is heading toward targeting Saudi Arabia which induced the international coalition to strike it.

Art of the Possible

The United States, its allies, and its regional adherents have adopted this three dimensional policy. This is due to the deep hostility which Arabian and Islamic nations hold toward America, the inability of the US army to engage in the battlefield for military and economic reasons, and the steady growth of powers which oppose America and Israel. Thus, the need for substitute armies able to accomplish strategic and tactical missions arose.

The second reason is the difficulty in engaging in direct combat with takfiri groups which Bin Laden had been temporarily able to drive toward fighting the far enemy in the late nineties and the new millennium, and the need which arose after September eleventh to return these groups to their favorite ideology of targeting the near enemy and regional foes.

Thirdly, Western powers were most of the time in need for an excuse for military intervention. They were also in need of signing long-term agreements (in security, economics…) with the terrorist takfiris. This is why they enabled the takfiris to be present- in order to justify intervention as in the case of Iraq in 2003.

Fourth is the need of America and Western countries to import the takfiri individuals who are active on their soil and to get rid of them.

Regional allies have other concerns – the most important which is the need to vent the internal pressure which these takfiri movements of revolutionary quality pose, and to solve jurisprudential issues when dealing with takfiri groups which lessen their excommunicative speech against certain regimes when they find a suitable range of movement abroad.

On another level, Arabian and Islamic countries need to get rid of the organizational structures of the takfiris or to weaken them as much as possible through driving them toward areas of conflict and strategic ambushes, as Saudi Arabia did in 2003 when it imported its dilemma with Qaeda to Iraq and got rid of that great predicament. The final motive for countries which are involved in the strategy of indirect control has to do with the regional aspect- they make use of takfiri groups to accomplish political regional goals, as in the case of Syria since 2011.

The nature of the takfiri groups is the reason why they have a tendency to be under this strategy. They are hostile and excommunicate everyone, even one another. Thus, they are prone to be steered in any possible direction. Due to the intellectual and jurisprudential differences among takfiri groups, and the lack of a unified command and strategy, they have a tendency to be infiltrated and to be steered in different directions. They also suffer from great vulnerability in security and this has facilitated the endeavors to recruit agents and secret intelligence infiltration.

They are also faced with a major problem which is financial aid – they lack an independent Islamic country which provides them with the money they need. This is why they depend on countries which exclusively adhere to the United States such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Pakistan. On the other hand, due to the security and political pressure exerted on takfiri groups, they are usually in search of any available outlet- especially since their speech carries very ambitious goals in comparison with their ability and narrow range of movement.

ألعوبة السعودية في سوريا

ألعوبة السعودية في سوريا

Courses of Action and Achievements

The main cases in this strategy are Afghanistan 1979, Iraq 2003, and Syria 2011. These cases have been generally successful in accomplishing their main goal which is transformation as much as possible of the threat which takfiri movements pose into a chance, and to take advantage of their blood-thirsty and destructive nature for the benefit of strategic US enterprises. They were successful in Afghanistan which the Soviets left, and they were successful in kindling sectarian and ethnic turmoil in Iraq in 2003. Currently, the United States has benefitted from these takfiri groups in Syria through destroying a great deal of the infrastructure of that country which is central in the allegiance of resistance. Israel has benefitted in creating an obstructive line on the border of the Jolan Heights which is formed of the Jabhat Nusra forces. In Iraq today, Isis represents a case which we wait to discover its outcomes and strategic courses.

On the long term, this strategy has been successful in shifting the military effort of takfiri groups away from directly targeting the West. In Afghanistan, the enemy was the Soviet Union, and in the period after that the targeting of American interests commenced up until the eleventh of September. Steering and indirect control were successful in Iraq in making American interests a secondary priority for takfiri groups in opposition to the priority of targeting other regional powers. As for Syria, American interests became completely distant from takfiri attacks, and Isis has almost fully eliminated attempts to target American interests. The main concern has become the geographical region- to establish the state of Isis, expand it, and to preserve its lands.

The profound and structural results show that America has been able to prevent takfiris from being active in regions where they pose threats on American interests. As a result of wide American domination, takfiri groups have not been able to move in an effective way which has influential political results anymore. They are only able to do so when there is no opposition to US interests which means where the US are at an advantage due to their presence. Thus, these takfiri groups – in an objective way- have become a part of the American scheme. With time they have avoided all regions vital to the United States and are active in less crucial areas.

September 2, 2015

The Syrian kid who killed the world

by mkleit

The body of a Syrian migrant child was washed ashore on a beach after a boat carrying 12 migrants heading to Greece sank off the coast of Mugla’s Bodrum district, Turkey on September 02, 2015.

and these images summarize the saddest story in history.

The boy was part of a group of 11 Syrians who drowned in the coastal town of Bodrum in Turkey


August 31, 2015

التمدد الإسلامي عبر النزوح يواجه الإسلاموفوبيا

by mkleit

محمد قليط وفاطمة جلعوط

شاهد نيوز

صلاة المسلمين في ستراسبوغ، شرقيّ فرنسا

قال الرئيس الليبي السابق معمر القذافي في تمبكتو، مالي، يوم 10 أبريل 2006 إن “أوروبا ستصبح مسلمة بدون الغزو بالسيف أو الانتحاريين، ولكن 50 مليون مسلم سيحولونها إلى ذلك”. وهذا ما يحصل في أوروبا مؤخراً عبر حركة النزوح العالمية باتجاه القارة العجوز، حيث وصل قرابة 107500 لاجئ خلال شهر حزيران فقط، وهو أعلى معدل لجوء في تاريخ أوروبا.

بدأت تظهر بوادر أزمة النزوح من العالم الإسلامي – أكثر النازحين من سوريا وأفغانستان – في أوروبا بشكل الإسلاموفوبيا على المستويين الشعبي والرسمي، وقد دفع ضغط تدفق اللاجئين وبخاصة السوريين دولة سلوفاكيا إلى “انتقاء” اللاجئين الذين ترغب في إيوائهم، فوقع النصيب على أولئك الذين يعتنقون المسيحية، وتم إقرار منع المسلمين لأنهم “لن يشعروا بالراحة” و”لن يعجبهم البلد”، بحسب ما قال المتحدث باسم وزارة الداخلية السلوفاكية إيفان نيتيك الأسبوع المنصرم. لم تكن الدولة السلافية الأولى التي تتخذ هذا القرار، إذ كانت بلجيكا قد سبقتها بسنة حين “انتقت” 244 سورياً مسيحياً من حلب بنية حمايتهم “من المسلمين المتشددين في سوريا”، بحسب تصريح وزير الدولة البلجيكية لشؤون اللاجئين تيو فرانكن.

ويعود سبب رهبة الأوروبيين إلى عدة عوامل منها: قلة الإنجاب لدى الأوروبيين مع غياب ثقافة التكاثر العددي منذ عدّة سنوات. ولعل آخر دعوة إلى زيادة الإنجاب كانت في ألمانيا النازية سنة 1938 حين شجّع رئيس وزرائها آنذاك أدولف هتلر على كثرة الإنجاب مقابل إعفاءات ضريبية (25% إعفاء ضريبي لكل ولد من أم وأب ألمانيّين). ولعل هتلر درى ما فعله للحضارة الألمانية، كما ذكر المتخصص في علم الاجتماع والتاريخ العالمي دان مارتن في كتابه “Apocalypse: How to Survive a Global Crisis” من أن “معدّل الإنجاب لبقاء أي حضارة على مدى ربع قرن يجب أن يكون 2.11 طفل لكل عائلة، ولم تنجُ أي حضارة كان معدل الإنجاب فيها 1.9 طفل لكل عائلة. وكلما قلّ معدل الإنجاب قلّت نسبة انتشار الحضارة في منطقة معيّنة”. ومن المعروف عالمياً أن الدول الأوروبية تستحوذ على أقل معدلات إنجاب، حيث إن 31 دولة لديها معدل عام 1.38 طفل لكل عائلة.

تعود أبرز أسباب التضخم السكاني في القارة العجوز، منذ 1990 إلى اليوم، إلى الهجرة واللجوء. ويشير مارتن في كتابه إلى أهمية عامل الهجرة في تحويل الطابع المسيحي في الدول الأوروبية إلى إسلامي، وأضاف أنه في سنة 2027، شخص واحد من أصل خمسة سيكون مسلماً في فرنسا، وفي 39 سنة (منذ سنة 2008)، فرنسا ستكون دولة مسلمة، أما في بريطانيا فقد ازدادوا من 82 ألفاً إلى 2.5 مليون شخص، مع وجود أكثر من ألف مسجد، معظمها كانت كنائس سابقاً”. وقد ذكرت الحكومة البلجيكية في تصريحات سابقة أن ثلث الأطفال الأوروبيين سيولدون لأهل مسلمين سنة 2025. بينما المكتب الفدرالي الألماني للاحصاءات أكد على “عدم قدرتنا على إيقاف هبوط النمو السكاني الألماني (أي من والدين ألمانيّين)… وألمانيا سوف تصبح دولة إسلامية بحلول سنة 2050”.

The Economist

هذه العوامل كلها تشكّل هاجس خوف عند الأوروبيّين، بالأخص في المناطق الشرقية والوسطى. ففي جمهورية التشيك، مثلًا، حصل عدد من التعديات على المساجد والمسلمين في الأيام الأخيرة، حيث هاجم بعض المتشددين يوم الثلاثاء الماضي مسجداً وألصقوا على عمود بالقرب منه ملصقاً كُتب عليه “المسلمون وحوش” في منطقة فيدنتسكا في مدينة برنو، جنوب البلاد، وبرغم قلة عدد المسلمين في هذه المدينة والذين يبلغ عددهم 800 مسلم فقط، فلم يكن هذا الاعتداء الأول من نوعه على مسلميها وعلى المسجد نفسه، ففي عام 2013 تم رمي قطع من لحم الخنزير أمام المسجد وكتب عليه عبارات. وصرّح مؤخراً رئيس الوقف الإسلامي الأستاذ منيب الراوي قائلا “الاعتداءات بحقنا تتصاعد ولكن لن ندعها تؤثر بنا”. وقد ذكر أن نسبة الاعتداءات ضد المسلمين في التشيك زادت في السنوات الأخيرة،

مع وجود هاجس مادي أيضاً، حيث تقول سيدة تشيكية إنه تمّ تخفيض معاشها من 18000 كرون (أي 752$) إلى 14000 كرون (585$) في سبيل إجراءات الدولة لدعم اللاجئين القادمين من الشرق. ولكن التغيّر الديموغرافي لصالح المسلمين القادمين من الأراضي السمراء يشكل هاجساً أكبر عند “البيض”، شبيهاً بذلك إبّان الأيام الأولى لانتشار المسيحية في أوروبا حين كانت الوثنية العقيدة الطاغية على معظم القارة.

July 31, 2015

Ottoman Hustler

by mkleit
Turkish president Recip-Tayyip Erdogan

Turkish president Recip-Tayyip Erdogan

Turkish president Recip-Tayyip Erdogan has understood the economic and geopolitical importance of the Iranian nuclear deal. Iran will have now more power in the Middle East to support its affiliates, especially Syria, which would diminish Erdogan’s hopes in toppling Bashar al-Assad’s regime. This would explain the policy-change Erdogan took towards ISIL, by supporting the US-led coalition against the terrorist group, and in return, US would support Turkey in toppling the Syrian regime and support his plan to create a buffer zone in Northern Syria.

Map of Middle East with Kurdistan

Map of Middle East with Kurdistan

The Turkish government has done its best to practice madness in politics and military in the past few weeks, and sometimes, schizophrenia. First, it has a dream to topple neighboring Syria’s regime, thus it supported armed opposition divisions, as well as radical brigades like Ahrar al-Sham and others. Then, it logistically aided ISIL, whom are anti-regime and anti-opposition and are looking for build their own state. And finally, bombing sites for Kurdish brigades, whom have their own dream of an independent Kurdistan. A dream that Turkey has always fought to stop, politically and militarily.

It’s not a surprise why the Turkish government would raid several PKK sites in Syria and Iraq, but it’s strange that this would happen after a terrorist attacks targeting a pro-Kurdish rally in Suruc, southern Turkey, on July 23rd, killing 32 persons and wounding 100 others. The Turkish government later on held ISIL responsibility of the attack. But wait a minute! Turkish government accuses ISIL yet it attacks Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq? Yes.

Erdogan’s has succeeded in making use of the terrorist attack by launching air-strikes on the Kurds and ISIL at the same, with the Kurds suffering the most of it. In the end, Turkey wouldn’t go too far in bombing ISIL, the group that Turkey itself trained and opened routes in and out of Syria and Iraq, as well as opening a market for ISIL-connected oil smugglers coming from oil-rich areas of Deir al-Zour and Raqqa in Eastern and Northern Syria.

Kurdish fighters heading for Kobane in Northern Syria to fight ISIL

Kurdish fighters heading for Kobane in Northern Syria to fight ISIL

He also used the “humanitarian crisis” to support his claims during a press conference at one of Turkey’s airports before heading to China on the 28th of July, when saying that creating a buffer zone in Northern Syria “would help a million and 700 thousand refugees go back” and then adding “no peace process with those who endanger Turkish unity”, meaning the creation of an independent Kurdistan which would take part of Turkish lands. But the Turkish government, headed by Erdogan’s right-hand man, Ahmet Davutoğlu, is resuming talks with Turkish political parties, including the Kurds, to create the new government, which just adds to dichotomy.

But there’s a reason for this new rhetoric, since war a sign to escape the loss in the recent parliamentary elections and the upcoming government, as well as winning people’s support, by manufacturing fear and insecurity. Thus the war on the Kurds would make the latter think twice before forming Kurdistan, as well as joining Kurdish areas in northern Syria after it was dismantled by ISIL militants.

Erdogan making the ISIS beast a friendly pet

Erdogan making the ISIS beast a friendly pet

Although over six ISIL-related attacks occurred in Turkey and threats of more to come, as German intelligence warned Turkish governments of attacks targeting metro stations and malls in Istanbul; Turkey has not placed ISIL on its terrorist list yet.

Nonetheless, ISIL was able to succeed in one thing – if it was ever intentional; it loosened the Kurdish forces’ pressure on northern Syria by shifting the latter’s fights gradually towards the Syrian – Iraqi – Turkish joint borders, as well as letting Turkey focus on bombing Kurdish military sites in Iraq and Syria – as if Turkey never wanted that to happen.

While the Kurds have also made use of the ISIL attacks by forming their own local security forces in Kurdish cities in Southern and Eastern Turkey. Soon enough, roadblocks, identity checks, questioning of passengers, and prevention of state security from entering those areas will soon be evident in the aforementioned cities.

Through all this, the “war on terror” rhetoric that Erdogan has been waving recently, seems to be another PR campaign for his political party, in addition to a pretext to start a war on the Kurds, and possibly the Syrian army. But his newly-made war may turn into a war of three fronts: ISIL, Kurds, and Syrian army, which Erdogan wouldn’t be sure he could handle, knowing that the first two are inside Turkey already.

Published also on: Teleghraph

July 20, 2015

Iraq crisis: How Saudi Arabia helped Isis take over the north of the country

by mkleit


How far is Saudi Arabia complicit in the Isis takeover of much of northern Iraq, and is it stoking an escalating Sunni-Shia conflict across the Islamic world? Some time before 9/11, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, once the powerful Saudi ambassador in Washington and head of Saudi intelligence until a few months ago, had a revealing and ominous conversation with the head of the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove. Prince Bandar told him: “The time is not far off in the Middle East, Richard, when it will be literally ‘God help the Shia’. More than a billion Sunnis have simply had enough of them.”

The fatal moment predicted by Prince Bandar may now have come for many Shia, with Saudi Arabia playing an important role in bringing it about by supporting the anti-Shia jihad in Iraq and Syria. Since the capture of Mosul by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isis) on 10 June, Shia women and children have been killed in villages south of Kirkuk, and Shia air force cadets machine-gunned and buried in mass graves near Tikrit.

In Mosul, Shia shrines and mosques have been blown up, and in the nearby Shia Turkoman city of Tal Afar 4,000 houses have been taken over by Isis fighters as “spoils of war”. Simply to be identified as Shia or a related sect, such as the Alawites, in Sunni rebel-held parts of Iraq and Syria today, has become as dangerous as being a Jew was in Nazi-controlled parts of Europe in 1940.

There is no doubt about the accuracy of the quote by Prince Bandar, secretary-general of the Saudi National Security Council from 2005 and head of General Intelligence between 2012 and 2014, the crucial two years when al-Qa’ida-type jihadis took over the Sunni-armed opposition in Iraq and Syria. Speaking at the Royal United Services Institute last week, Dearlove, who headed MI6 from 1999 to 2004, emphasised the significance of Prince Bandar’s words, saying that they constituted “a chilling comment that I remember very well indeed”.

He does not doubt that substantial and sustained funding from private donors in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, to which the authorities may have turned a blind eye, has played a central role in the Isis surge into Sunni areas of Iraq. He said: “Such things simply do not happen spontaneously.” This sounds realistic since the tribal and communal leadership in Sunni majority provinces is much beholden to Saudi and Gulf paymasters, and would be unlikely to cooperate with Isis without their consent.

Prince Bandar bin Sultan

Prince Bandar bin Sultan

Dearlove’s explosive revelation about the prediction of a day of reckoning for the Shia by Prince Bandar, and the former head of MI6’s view that Saudi Arabia is involved in the Isis-led Sunni rebellion, has attracted surprisingly little attention. Coverage of Dearlove’s speech focused instead on his main theme that the threat from Isis to the West is being exaggerated because, unlike Bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida, it is absorbed in a new conflict that “is essentially Muslim on Muslim”. Unfortunately, Christians in areas captured by Isis are finding this is not true, as their churches are desecrated and they are forced to flee. A difference between al-Qa’ida and Isis is that the latter is much better organised; if it does attack Western targets the results are likely to be devastating.

The forecast by Prince Bandar, who was at the heart of Saudi security policy for more than three decades, that the 100 million Shia in the Middle East face disaster at the hands of the Sunni majority, will convince many Shia that they are the victims of a Saudi-led campaign to crush them. “The Shia in general are getting very frightened after what happened in northern Iraq,” said an Iraqi commentator, who did not want his name published. Shia see the threat as not only military but stemming from the expanded influence over mainstream Sunni Islam of Wahhabism, the puritanical and intolerant version of Islam espoused by Saudi Arabia that condemns Shia and other Islamic sects as non-Muslim apostates and polytheists.

Dearlove says that he has no inside knowledge obtained since he retired as head of MI6 10 years ago to become Master of Pembroke College in Cambridge. But, drawing on past experience, he sees Saudi strategic thinking as being shaped by two deep-seated beliefs or attitudes. First, they are convinced that there “can be no legitimate or admissible challenge to the Islamic purity of their Wahhabi credentials as guardians of Islam’s holiest shrines”. But, perhaps more significantly given the deepening Sunni-Shia confrontation, the Saudi belief that they possess a monopoly of Islamic truth leads them to be “deeply attracted towards any militancy which can effectively challenge Shia-dom”.

Western governments traditionally play down the connection between Saudi Arabia and its Wahhabist faith, on the one hand, and jihadism, whether of the variety espoused by Osama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida or by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Isis. There is nothing conspiratorial or secret about these links: 15 out of 19 of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudis, as was Bin Laden and most of the private donors who funded the operation.

Sir Richard Dearlove

Sir Richard Dearlove

But there has always been a second theme to Saudi policy towards al-Qa’ida type jihadis, contradicting Prince Bandar’s approach and seeing jihadis as a mortal threat to the Kingdom. Dearlove illustrates this attitude by relating how, soon after 9/11, he visited the Saudi capital Riyadh with Tony Blair.

He remembers the then head of Saudi General Intelligence “literally shouting at me across his office: ‘9/11 is a mere pinprick on the West. In the medium term, it is nothing more than a series of personal tragedies. What these terrorists want is to destroy the House of Saud and remake the Middle East.'” In the event, Saudi Arabia adopted both policies, encouraging the jihadis as a useful tool of Saudi anti-Shia influence abroad but suppressing them at home as a threat to the status quo. It is this dual policy that has fallen apart over the last year.

Saudi sympathy for anti-Shia “militancy” is identified in leaked US official documents. The then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote in December 2009 in a cable released by Wikileaks that “Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, LeT [Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan] and other terrorist groups.” She said that, in so far as Saudi Arabia did act against al-Qa’ida, it was as a domestic threat and not because of its activities abroad. This policy may now be changing with the dismissal of Prince Bandar as head of intelligence this year. But the change is very recent, still ambivalent and may be too late: it was only last week that a Saudi prince said he would no longer fund a satellite television station notorious for its anti-Shia bias based in Egypt.

The Sunni Ahmed al-Rifai shrine near Tal Afar is bulldozed

The Sunni Ahmed al-Rifai shrine near Tal Afar is bulldozed

The problem for the Saudis is that their attempts since Bandar lost his job to create an anti-Maliki and anti-Assad Sunni constituency which is simultaneously against al-Qa’ida and its clones have failed.

By seeking to weaken Maliki and Assad in the interest of a more moderate Sunni faction, Saudi Arabia and its allies are in practice playing into the hands of Isis which is swiftly gaining full control of the Sunni opposition in Syria and Iraq. In Mosul, as happened previously in its Syrian capital Raqqa, potential critics and opponents are disarmed, forced to swear allegiance to the new caliphate and killed if they resist.

The West may have to pay a price for its alliance with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, which have always found Sunni jihadism more attractive than democracy. A striking example of double standards by the western powers was the Saudi-backed suppression of peaceful democratic protests by the Shia majority in Bahrain in March 2011. Some 1,500 Saudi troops were sent across the causeway to the island kingdom as the demonstrations were ended with great brutality and Shia mosques and shrines were destroyed.

An alibi used by the US and Britain is that the Sunni al-Khalifa royal family in Bahrain is pursuing dialogue and reform. But this excuse looked thin last week as Bahrain expelled a top US diplomat, the assistant secretary of state for human rights Tom Malinowksi, for meeting leaders of the main Shia opposition party al-Wifaq. Mr Malinowski tweeted that the Bahrain government’s action was “not about me but about undermining dialogue”.

Iraqi leader al-Maliki

Iraqi leader al-Maliki

Western powers and their regional allies have largely escaped criticism for their role in reigniting the war in Iraq. Publicly and privately, they have blamed the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for persecuting and marginalising the Sunni minority, so provoking them into supporting the Isis-led revolt. There is much truth in this, but it is by no means the whole story. Maliki did enough to enrage the Sunni, partly because he wanted to frighten Shia voters into supporting him in the 30 April election by claiming to be the Shia community’s protector against Sunni counter-revolution.

But for all his gargantuan mistakes, Maliki’s failings are not the reason why the Iraqi state is disintegrating. What destabilised Iraq from 2011 on was the revolt of the Sunni in Syria and the takeover of that revolt by jihadis, who were often sponsored by donors in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. Again and again Iraqi politicians warned that by not seeking to close down the civil war in Syria, Western leaders were making it inevitable that the conflict in Iraq would restart. “I guess they just didn’t believe us and were fixated on getting rid of [President Bashar al-] Assad,” said an Iraqi leader in Baghdad last week.

Of course, US and British politicians and diplomats would argue that they were in no position to bring an end to the Syrian conflict. But this is misleading. By insisting that peace negotiations must be about the departure of Assad from power, something that was never going to happen since Assad held most of the cities in the country and his troops were advancing, the US and Britain made sure the war would continue.

The chief beneficiary is Isis which over the last two weeks has been mopping up the last opposition to its rule in eastern Syria. The Kurds in the north and the official al-Qa’ida representative, Jabhat al-Nusra, are faltering under the impact of Isis forces high in morale and using tanks and artillery captured from the Iraqi army. It is also, without the rest of the world taking notice, taking over many of the Syrian oil wells that it did not already control.

The Shia Al-Qubba Husseiniya mosque in Mosul explodes

The Shia Al-Qubba Husseiniya mosque in Mosul explodes

Saudi Arabia has created a Frankenstein’s monster over which it is rapidly losing control. The same is true of its allies such as Turkey which has been a vital back-base for Isis and Jabhat al-Nusra by keeping the 510-mile-long Turkish-Syrian border open. As Kurdish-held border crossings fall to Isis, Turkey will find it has a new neighbour of extraordinary violence, and one deeply ungrateful for past favours from the Turkish intelligence service.

As for Saudi Arabia, it may come to regret its support for the Sunni revolts in Syria and Iraq as jihadi social media begins to speak of the House of Saud as its next target. It is the unnamed head of Saudi General Intelligence quoted by Dearlove after 9/11 who is turning out to have analysed the potential threat to Saudi Arabia correctly and not Prince Bandar, which may explain why the latter was sacked earlier this year.

Nor is this the only point on which Prince Bandar was dangerously mistaken. The rise of Isis is bad news for the Shia of Iraq but it is worse news for the Sunni whose leadership has been ceded to a pathologically bloodthirsty and intolerant movement, a sort of Islamic Khmer Rouge, which has no aim but war without end.

The Sunni caliphate rules a large, impoverished and isolated area from which people are fleeing. Several million Sunni in and around Baghdad are vulnerable to attack and 255 Sunni prisoners have already been massacred. In the long term, Isis cannot win, but its mix of fanaticism and good organisation makes it difficult to dislodge.

“God help the Shia,” said Prince Bandar, but, partly thanks to him, the shattered Sunni communities of Iraq and Syria may need divine help even more than the Shia.

June 15, 2015

جيش الـcia في سوريا: مليار دولار سنوياً لـ 10 آلاف مقاتل

by mkleit

جريدة الأخبار


عدا عن الدعم السعودي والقطري والتركي والأردني والإسرائيلي لمسلحي الجنوب السوري، كشفت صحيفة «واشنطن بوست» أن الـ«سي أي ايه» تنفذ برنامجاً لدعم مقاتلي «الجبهة الجنوبية» كلفته مليار دولار سنوياً

لوكالة الاستخبارات المركزية الأميركية (سي آي ايه) جيش يضم آلاف المقاتلين المعارضين في سوريا. وهؤلاء يقاتلون في الجنوب السوري بشكل خاص، وتتولى الاستخبارات الأميركية تدريبهم وتسليحهم وتزويدهم بالمعلومات الميدانية. ما سبق ليس اتهاماً أطلقه الحكم في دمشق على معارضيه الذين يصنفهم الغرب بـ»المعتدلين»، بل وقائع كانت مدار بحث على طاولات صنع القرار في الولايات المتحدة الأميركية، وكشفتها صحيفة «واشنطن بوست» أول من أمس.

تمويل وتسليح وتدريب بكلفة مليار دولار سنوياً، يذهب جلّها إلى مقاتلي «الجبهة الجنوبية في الجيش السوري الحر». السخاء ليس حكراً على الأميركيين، بل إنه جزء من تعاون أميركي ــ سعودي ــ قطري ــ تركي. وإذا ما قيس هذا الأمر على السوابق الأميركية في أفغانستان ونيكاراغوا وغيرها من الدول التي بنت فيها وكالة الاستخبارات جيوشاً من المرتزقة، حيث كانت الولايات المتحدة تأخذ على عاتقها الجزء الأصغر من الإنفاق وتجعل حلفاءها يتولون الحصة الأكبر من الكلفة، يمكن توقع المبالغ الخيالية التي تنفق سنوياً في الجنوب السوري. ويمكن أيضاً تخيّل القدر الهائل من الأموال الذي يُدفع لإراقة الدم والتدمير في عموم سوريا، حيث لا تكف المعارضة منذ أربع سنوات عن الشكوى من الشح المالي والنقص في السلاح والذخيرة، وتزعم أنها متروكة لتواجه وحيدة النظام وحلفاءه.

برنامج الـ»سي أي ايه» الذي كشفت عنه الـ»بوست» هو من بين أكبر البرامج السرية التي تنفذها الوكالة في العالم، بحسب الصحيفة التي قالت إن كلفته تشكل نسبة «1 من 15» من إجمال إنفاق الـ»سي أي إيه» سنوياً. وهذا البرنامج، بحسب مسؤولين في الاستخبارات ورجال سياسة أميركيين قابلتهم الصحيفة، ينص على تدريب مقاتلين وتسليحهم، وتزويدهم بالمعدات اللوجستية، وجمع المعلومات التي يحتاجونها في معاركهم، وإيصالهم مع ما يحتاجونه إلى الأراضي السورية.

عنصر من المعارضة السورية مع صاروخ تاو الأمريكي

هو إذاً برنامج عسكري «متكامل»، يضمن بناء جيش تابع لـ»سي أي إيه»، على شاكلة ما قامت به الوكالة عينها في أفغانستان ونيكاراغوا في ثمانينيات القرن الماضي. الجزء الأكبر من هذا البرنامج يجري تنفيذه انطلاقاً من الأردن، حيث درّبت الاستخبارات المركزية الأميركية 10 آلاف مقاتل حتى اليوم، بحسب المقال الذي نشرته «واشنطن بوست» على رأس صفحتها الأولى السبت الماضي. مبلغ مليار دولار سنوياً، بحسب مسؤولين أميركيين، هو جزء من مشروع أكبر تبلغ كلفته مليارات الدولارات، وتساهم فيه إلى جانب الولايات المتحدة، السعودية وقطر وتركيا. ويتركز عمل هذه الدول في الجنوب السوري، لدعم ما يُسمى «الجبهة الجنوبية في الجيش السوري الحر». وأجرى كاتبا تقرير الـ»بوست» عملية حسابية بسيطة استنتجا فيها أن كلفة المقاتل الواحد سنوياً تبلغ 100 ألف دولار أميركي!  الكشف عن هذه العملية «المتواصلة منذ عام 2013»، أتى على خلفية قرار أصدرته بالإجماع لجنة الاستخبارات في مجلس النواب الأميركي، قضى بخفض ميزانية برنامج الـ»سي أي إيه» في سوريا بنسبة 20 في المئة. لكن هذا القرار لن يكون نافذاً إلا بعد سلسلة طويلة من الإجراءات، بينها تصويت المجلس عليه الأسبوع الجاري. كما أن سريان القرار بحاجة إلى تبنيه من قِبل مجلس الشيوخ ولجنة الاستخبارات الخاصة به التي ستبدأ درس ميزانية الاستخبارات قبل نهاية حزيران. وبحسب الصحيفة، فإن البيت الأبيض سيباشر اتصالاته بمجلس الشيوخ لتجنيب وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية خفض ميزانية برنامج عملها في سوريا الذي تبنته لجنة الاستخبارات في مجلس النواب.

كبير النواب الديموقراطيين في لجنة الاستخبارات آدم شيف قال للصحيفة إن ممثلي الحزبين (الديموقراطي والجمهوري) مجمعون على القلق حيال الاستراتيجية الأميركية في سوريا. هذا القلق، على ما يبدو مما نشرته اليومية الأميركية، متمحور حول نظرة الساسة الأميركيين ودوائر الاستخبارات إلى ما يجري في الميدان السوري. فبحسب تقرير الصحيفة، حتى المدافعون عن برنامج عمل الـ»سي أي إيه» يقرّون بالأداء الضعيف للفصائل «المعتدلة»، وبأنها ستهزم في أي معركة حاسمة مع «داعش». موقف أكثر «صراحة» في هذا السياق نقلته الـ»بوست» عن أحد كبار مساعدي الجمهوريين في الكونغرس، قائلاً إن تراجع قوات النظام في سوريا «ليس نتيجة عمل من يسمّون المعتدلين». أما شيف، فقال: «للأسف، أعتقد أن «داعش» و»النصرة» وبعض الفصائل الإسلامية المتطرفة الأخرى هم في أفضل موقع للاستثمار في الفوضى التي يمكن أن ترافق انحداراً سريعاً للنظام».

وينقل كاتبا التقرير عن مسؤولين قولهم إن هذه اللهجة مستندة إلى عدم قدرة وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية على «إظهار أن قواتها سيطرت على أراضٍ أو ربحت معارك أو حققت نتائج ملموسة».

في المقابل، يدافع داعمو البرنامج عن رجال الـ»سي أي ايه» في الميدان، قائلين إنهم «يحاصرون قاعدة للجيش السوري»، فيما يؤكد آخرون أنهم تمكنوا من السيطرة على عدد من القواعد الرئيسية للجيش السوري جنوب دمشق.

May 10, 2015

Al-Jazeera Host Incites Genocidal Hatred Towards Syrian Alawites

by mkleit


The controversial Syrian host of Al-Jazeera’s “The Opposite Direction”, Dr. Faisal Al-Qassem, posted a disturbing tweet on Wednesday, inciting sectarian hatred and blame towards the minority Alawite Muslims for allegedly “destroying” Syria for their own personal interests.

In his tweet, Dr. Faisal Al-Qassem asks the Syrian people if they would like avenge the Alawites of Syria for destroying the country; this tweet followed the main topic of his TV program on Tuesday, where he invited a number of guests to discuss the Alawite situation at the Islamist controlled city of Jisr Al-Shughour in Syria.

For over an hour, the tweet was shared by numerous Twitter accounts that not only questioned his professionalism, but also, his motives, as Dr. Qassem pinned blame on this minority religious group as a whole.

Finally, after receiving an unexpected number of tweets condemning his post, Dr. Qassem deleted the tweet; however, this was not before he engaged Dr. Joshua Landis – Associate Professor at the University of Oklahoma – in a heated conversation on Twitter, further proving his bias and antipathy for Alawites.

Dr. Qassem is notorious for making comments that have stirred-up controversy in the past (e.g. Lebanese Army comments in 2014), but never to the extent of inciting genocidal thoughts against a Levantine religious group.

Faisal’s Tweet: Isn’t it the Syrians’ right to take vengeance from Alawites that destroyed Syria and displaced its people for their own interests?

March 20, 2015

Israeli army admits aiding al-Qaeda in Syria

by mkleit

Asa Winstanley

ME Monitor

israeli occupation troops with al Nusra terrorist mercenaries at Syrian Golan Heights (unknown source)

An under-noticed news report last week confirmed previously-held suspicions and strong implications that Israeli troops are aiding the Nusra Front, al-Qaeda’s official Syrian affiliate.

Speaking to Israeli occupation troops last week, a Wall Street Journal reporter on the ground in Mount Bental (part of the occupied Golan Heights) found that Israeli troops receive wounded al-Qaeda fighters, treat them in Israeli hospitals and send them back to continue fighting against the government in Syria.

The Nusra Front in August overran the Qunaitra crossing, the checkpoint between the Israeli-occupied and Syrian-controlled sectors of the Golan Heights. Israeli invaded that region of south-west Syria in 1967 and has illegally occupied most of the Golan Heights ever since.

As I pointed out in a previous column, the reports of UN peacekeeping forces since Nusra took over the checkpoint were highly suggestive of Israeli contacts and even military aid to the al-Qaeda rebels. But this Wall Street Journal report has confirmed the fact.

“We don’t ask who they are, we don’t do any screening,” the unnamed Israeli military official told the paper of the hospital treatment of al-Qaeda fighters. “Once the treatment is done, we take them back to the border [sic – ceasefire line] and they go on their way [in Syria],” he said.

An unnamed military official also said there is an “understanding” between Israeli forces and al-Qaeda fighters there and that “there is a familiarity of the [al-Qaeda] forces on the ground”.

Popular conspiracy theories have it that al-Qaeda and the “Islamic State” (also known as ISIS or ISIL) are Israeli- and/or US-intelligence creations. While there’s no evidence for that, it’s certainly true that the US-UK invasion of Iraq in 2003, and its consciously sectarian occupation regime of the country thereafter, created the conditions in which al-Qaeda in Iraq (later known as ISIS) was formed and thrived. Veteran journalist Patrick Cockburn demonstrates this most convincingly in his essential new book The Rise of Islamic State, which I have previously lauded here.

And now it seems that Israel is in a direct alliance with al-Qaeda in Syria. This is a tactical alliance, meant purely to bleed the country and prolong the civil war.

Read the quotes from Israeli officials in recent months about the Nusra Front and you will see a strange sort of soft-peddling of the group, casting them as a kind of “moderate al-Qaeda” if you will.

“Nusra is a unique version of al-Qaeda,” retired Brigadier General Michael Herzog told the Wall Street Journal. “They manage to cooperate with non-Islamist and non-jihadi organizations in one coalition.” Herzog is a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP, the think tank of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the première Israel lobby group in the US) and former chief of staff for Israel’s defence minister. The Nusra Front “are totally focused on the war in Syria and aren’t focused on us,” he claimed. “But when Hezbollah and Iran and others are pushing south, they are very much focused on us.”

Hizballah and Iran, allies of the Bashar al-Assad regime, are aiding the government in Syria and fighting on the ground alongside Syrian army troops against al-Qaeda, the “Islamic State” and other Sunni rebel groups.

Even before Nusra took over the Qunairtra checkpoint in August, reports suggested Israel seemed on rather friendly terms with the al-Qaeda affiliate.

In June, army spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner told Foreign Policy that the Israeli government has provided medical assistance to more than 1,000 Syrians over the past fourteen months. “We give medical aid to people who are in dire need,” he said in a telephone interview with the magazine, echoing the statement made last week to the Wall Street Journal. “We don’t do any vetting or check where they are from or which group they are fighting for, or whether they are civilians.”

Ehud Yaari, an Israeli fellow at WINEP, admitted that Israeli assistance has benefited fighters: “The wounded are both fighters and civilians but there are not too many civilians left because of the fighting raging there … Close to 900 Syrians have been treated in Israel.”

Foreign Policy reports that, even earlier than June 2014, in March 2013: “Some 400 armed opposition fighters, backed by artillery fire from three tanks, seized a Syrian military outpost atop a hill at Tal al-Garbi, planting four black flags and raising concern that extremist groups are moving into the zone.

“More than two weeks later, opposition fighters captured two other strategically important hilltop military outposts in Tal al-Jabiya and Tal al-Sharqi.

“‘In the afternoon of 24 April, two members of the armed opposition displayed the severed head of a presumed Syrian armed forces officer as they passed’ a UN outpost, according to the [UN] report. By the end of April [2013], UN observers ‘detected the flying of black flags believed to be associated with militant groups scattered throughout the central and southern part of the area of separation, including three Syrian armed forces positions captured by the armed members of the opposition.'”

So Israeli aid to al-Qaeda in Syria may have been ongoing for as long as nearly two years now. But what is sure is that Israeli aid to al-Qaeda in Syria has now been confirmed.

February 6, 2015

عبدالله الأردن: ملك داعش

by mkleit
ابراهيم الأمين


كمن جاءته الفرصة ليقدم عرضاً بهلوانياً لافتاً، استعاد ملك الاردن حطّته العربية، وتوجه صوب العشائر، معلناً بدء عملية الثأر لقتل «داعش» الطيار الأردني معاذ الكساسبة. وفي حمأة حفلة مشاعر غير جامعة، بخلاف كل ما يشاع، أغمض المتهور عينيه، وبقي في لباس المقامر، ملقياً نرده على طاولة سوريا، في حركة تعيد تثبيت صورته كسليل عائلة المقاولين الأمنيين عند الغرب وإسرائيل.
وعلينا، نحن الذين نموت يومياً بأبشع ممّا حصل مع الطيار الاردني، أن نصفّق لملك الأردن، ونصدّق بأنه انضم فعلياً الى جبهة مواجهة الارهاب الذي يدمي بلادنا.
ربما، من خارج كل سياق مرافق للمشهدية الدموية خلال الايام القليلة الماضية، وجب الحديث مباشرة عمّا يقوم به الاردن. فهو لا يمثل «انتفاضة شرف»، ولا هو «يقظة وطنية أو عربية أو إسلامية». كل ما يجري، وسيجري، سيظل في سياق الدور الذي ارتضى ملك الاردن ومن يدعمه أن يلعبوه، وهو دور الدمية، أو المرتزق الذي يقدم خدمات أمنية وعسكرية لمن يدفع أكثر، ولكن مع أولوية للأميركي والاسرائيلي. يعرف الجميع أن على الاردن، في حال أراد الدفاع عن أمنه وشعبه في وجه الارهاب، مغادرة المربع الذي يقيم فيه الآن، وهي أمر غير متوقع في القريب العاجل، وربما لن تحصل الاستدارة إلا بعد فوات الاوان، لأن دور ملك الاردن في سوريا، اليوم، هو بالضبط الدور المكمل لما يقوم به «داعش» في سوريا والعراق.

King Abdullah of Jordan

اليوم المسرحي الطويل لن يخفّف من مسؤولية ملك الاردن عن محاولة الهروب من مهمة مكافحة قواعد الارهاب ومدارسه القائمة داخل حدود بلده، قبل أن يتطوع لتدمير إضافي في سوريا. والكل يعرف أن عمان لا تزال، حتى اللحظة، مركزاً لكل أشكال التآمر على كل خصوم أميركا وإسرائيل وحكام الجزيرة العربية، من المقاومة في فلسطين التي تواجه قمعاً أردنياً غير مسبوق على أبواب الضفة، الى دعم المجموعات التي تعمل على تخريب سوريا بإشراف أميركي وفرنسي وبريطاني، وبتمويل سعودي وقطري، الى غض الطرف عن عمليات التجنيد المتواصلة لآلاف الشباب المقيمين أو العابرين نحو «الجهاد في سوريا»، الى المساعدة على تدريب عصابات القتل التي يتم تمييزها عن الاسلاميين بوصفها «معارضة معتدلة»، الى ترك الحدود مع العراق مفتوحة لكل أنواع العربدة السعودية.
ما ظهر في الصوت المرتفع و»السيرك الجوي» لن يغيّر في واقع أن ملك الاردن شريك في معركة إسرائيل والغرب ودول الجنون في الجزيرة العربية ضد سوريا ومحور المقاومة. فقط لنراجع بعض الوقائع:
ماذا يفعل ملك الاردن اليوم في سوريا؟
ــ يستضيف غرفة عمليات تضم أميركيين وسعوديين، وتنسق مع الإسرائيليين، لإدارة المجموعات المسلحة في الجنوب السوري. ينتمي هؤلاء الى «جبهة النصرة» ومجموعات إسلامية تدور في فلك «القاعدة». وغالبية ما قام به المسلحون، من السيطرة على مواقع عسكرية وبلدات كانت تحت سيطرة الدولة السورية، تم بإيعاز وإرشاد وتوجيه تفصيلي من هذه الغرفة

– هو يواصل لعبته المفضّلة: «الكذب على الجميع طوال الوقت». فهو ينفّذ برنامج دعم المعارضة، وعلى رأسها «جبهة النصرة» في الجنوب السوري، ويبعث إلى دمشق برسائل تتحدّث عن ضرورة التعاون لمكافحة الارهاب، وعن تعرضه لـ»ضغوط كبيرة» من أميركا وأوروبا والدول الخليجية. ويحصر تنسيقه مع دمشق بإبلاغ الجيش السوري بالمناورات التي يجريها الجيش الاردني قبالة الحدود، قبل أن يطلب مساندة السوريين له في مكافحة تهريب السلاح والمسلحين إلى الأردن.
ــ وهو يدير، أيضاً، الجماعات المسلّحة في شرق درعا وجنوبها، ممن تمّ تدريبهم في عرعر السعودية والزرقاء الأردنية، وتزويدهم بالأسلحة الثقيلة من قواعد للاستخبارات الأردنية في مدينة الرمثا، مع العلم بأن غالبية قادة «جبهة النصرة» في الجنوب هم من الأردنيين، وبعضهم من ضباط عملوا سابقاً (أو لا يزالون) في الاستخبارات الأردنية. وهو أغلق مستوصفات النازحين في شمالي الأردن، وألزم الذكور منهم بالعودة إلى سوريا والقتال الى جانب المسلحين، من دون أن يتوقف عن فتح معسكرات سرية جنوبي البلاد وشرقيها لتدريب مقاتلين سوريين من قبل الولايات المتحدة ، ثم صدرت تأكيدات بأن العديد من هؤلاء المقاتلين الذين تم تدريبهم في الأردن انضموا الى «داعش» لاحقاً.
عن أي جيش أردني نتحدث؟
عندما يلجأ ملك الاردن الى استخدام مقدراته العسكرية، يكون الحديث عن جيش جرى تعريضه لتغييرات هيكلية منذ الاتفاق مع إسرائيل (وادي عربة)، وتعززت بعد تسلم الملك السلطة. فقُلّصت القوى البرية وأُوقفت تنمية قدراتها الهجومية في مقابل تقديم طائرات مجانية للأردن (أكثرها اف-16 فائضة لحلفاء أوروبيين) قابلة للدمج ضمن المنظومة الاميركية، بينما تمثل مناورات «الأسد المتأهب» السنوية الدور المتخيّل للقوى المسلحة الأردنية في المنطقة اليوم. كذلك تم إلغاء التجنيد الإلزامي وتقرر التوجه صوب جيش صغير «محترف».
وبحسب بعض المختصين، فإن التشبيه الأنسب لحالة الجيش هو أنه جيش انشأه البريطانيون أساساً كقوة حرس حدود، تحفظ حدود «الإقليم» واستقراره من الغزوات البدوية والحركات التي لا تعترف بالحدود، وهو عاد، بعد عام 94، الى أداء مهمة مشابهة (محاربة إرهاب، دعم جهود غربية، ومساندة إسرائيل).
وعندما شعر الملك بأن في الجيش من يفكر عكس هذا المنطق، وسمع مطالبات من عسكريين كبار بالعمل على منع تقسيم سوريا والامتناع عن دعم الاسلاميين المتشددين هناك، عمد قبل أقل من عشر سنوات الى إنشاء «قوات الدرك»، وهي «جناح ميداني مستقل عالي الجاهزية بمهمات مختلفة عن مهمات الأمن العام، ويرتبط مباشرة بوزير الداخلية»، علماً بأنه يتبع عملياً لديوان الملك وسلطته المباشرة، من دون المرور بالقوات المسلحة. ونظراً الى طبيعة المهمات الفضفاضة، تمكن هذا الفصيل من توسيع قاعدته البشرية وخدماته لينافس أجهزة الامن التقليدية، وكذلك مهمات القوات المسلحة.
إن ما يحاول ملك الاردن، ومن معه داخل البلاد أو خارجها، الإيحاء به، لا يعدو كونه جزءاً من مناورة لن تغير في الوقائع الصلبة. وإذا كان إطلاق سراح الداعية المقدسي لأنه ضد «داعش»، أو إكراما لدوره في المفاوضات الفاشلة الشهر الماضي، فإن الأخير ليس سوى أحد آباء «القاعدة» وفرعها السوري المعروف بـ»جبهة النصرة». تلك التي تعلن التحالف مع إسرائيل، ليس بحجة أنها تقبل من الشيطان دعماً ضد حكومة بشار الاسد، بل لكونها صارت طرفاً في الحرب ضد المقاومة التي صار الجولان وجنوبي سوريا وحدود الاردن مسرحاً طبيعياً لعملها.

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