Posts tagged ‘Qatar’

August 31, 2016

الاقتصاد السياسي للطائفية في الخليج

by mkleit

معهد كارنيجي للشرق الأوسط

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يُواجه حكّام الخليج العربي حوافز تدفعهم إلى تطوير مصادر غير اقتصادية للشرعية، بهدف الحفاظ على الدعم الشعبي مع زيادة الإيرادات الشحيحة من الموارد. ومن خلال زرع بذور الريبة المجتمعية، وتسليط الضوء على التهديدات، والتأكيد على قدرتها على ضمان الأمن، يمكن للأنظمة تعزيز التأييد المحلي والحدّ من الضغوط التي تطالب الإصلاح بتكلفة أقلّ من توزيع إعانات الرعاية الاجتماعية. وتُظهر بيانات الدراسة المسحية من دول خليجية أربعة (البحرين والكويت وعُمان وقطر) أن في وسع الحكومات إرغام السكان على القبول بالجمود السياسي، حتى في الوقت الذي تتضاءل فيه الفوائد الاقتصادية التي يحصل عليها المواطنون.

الأفكار الرئيسة

  • سنّت أنظمة الخليج قواعد انتخابية وتشريعية تضفي طابعاً مؤسسياً على الانقسامات القائمة على سياسة الهوية.
  • كثيراً ماتقتصر السرديات الوطنية الرسمية في الخليج على فئة معينة، بحيث تبرز الاختلافات بين المواطنين، ويتم تمييز بعض فئات السكان على الفئات الأخرى.
  • تعامل الأنظمة الخليجية المعارضة السلمية والاحتجاج على نحو متزايد باعتبارها تشكّل تهديدات حقيقية للأمن القومي، وليس على أنها تحدّيات سياسية عادية.
  • مارست بعض دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي سياسة خارجية حازمة ومغامرة، ساهمت في زعزعة الاستقرار الإقليمي وعزّزت النزعة الوطنية العسكرية.
  • تتزايد مشاعر عدم الأمان بسبب الوعود الحكومية بالقيام بعملية إعادة تنظيم اقتصادي جذرية، في مواجهة تراجع عائدات النفط والغاز.

النتائج

  •  يكشف تحليل بيانات الدراسة المسحية المستقاة من المنطقة عن أن المزيد من المواطنين الخليجيين ذوي التفكير الأمني، مستعدون للقبول بمستويات أقلّ من الأداء الاقتصادي من جانب الحكومة في مقابل توفير الاستقرار. إذ يمثّل توفير الدولة للأمن، بالنسبة إلى هؤلاء، بديلاً عن الفوائد المالية التي يتوقع المواطنون الحصول عليها في الدول الغنية بالنفط.
  • بهذه الطريقة، يمكن لحكومات دول الخليج الاستفادة من المخاوف الأمنية للمواطنين لشراء الدعم السياسي الشعبي بتكلفة أقلّ من تكلفة توزيع المنافع المادية.
  • وبالتالي، لدى أنظمة الخليج أسباب اقتصادية وسياسية لتلوين أو اصطناع التهديدات الداخلية والخارجية، بهدف تأجيج المخاوف الشعبية على الأمن وبالتالي خفض تكلفة زيادة الدعم السياسي
  •  حكّام الخليج غير قادرين في الغالب على إدارة التوترات الاجتماعية حين تنطلق، وقد انتهى الأمر ببعضهم إلى تأجيج المعارضة ذاتها التي رغبوا في قمعها. وهذه الاستراتيجية الخطرة تنطوي على مخاطر جدّية لرفاهية المواطنين ولبقاء الأنظمة على المدى البعيد.
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March 25, 2016

Stop Wahhabist School to Fight Terrorism

by mkleit
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Young man sitting in front of Brussels’ stock exchange building

 

Terrorist attacks in Europe has caused a two-way incitement between Europeans and Muslims, which is a result that terrorist group ISIL is trying to reach as they’ve said after the Charlie Hebdo attacks on the 7th of January 2015: “compel the Crusaders (Europeans) to actively destroy the garrison themselves… Muslims in the West will quickly find themselves between one of two choices, they either apostatize… or they emigrate to the Islamic State and thereby escape persecution from the Crusader governments and citizens”.

The latest attacks on the Belgian capitol Brussels left 35 dead and 270 injured when suicide bombers hit Zaventem airport and Maalbeek metro station on Tuesday morning. Recent reports from Belgian media showed that people involved in the terrorist attacks are Muslims and of Arab background.

Mostly, Europeans would blame the millions of Muslims in Europe (and a lot of them have done so) for being the cause of religious incitement, and by far that’s sort of right, since there’s a minority of Muslims whose taking a big part of inciting against the “Crusaders”.

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Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia hitting several nations

The Arab – Muslims whom are able to go to Europe and live there (aside of refugees and asylum seekers) can afford the living, where the biggest percentage comes from the GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Emirates). And the ideology that all of these countries share (except Oman and partially Kuwait) is Wahhabism or Salafism. This sect is considered to be the most fanatic, extremist, and inciting amongt all Muslim sects – consider them as the KKK or the Nazis of Islam. This ideology is also the root of many terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda (Iraq, Syria, Morocco, Egypt, Afghanistan..) ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and Levant/ Syria and Iraq), Boko Haram (Nigeria), al Nusra Front (Jabhat al Nusra/ Syria), Ahrar al Sham (Syria), Jaysh al Islam (Syria), al Shabab(Somalia), Taliban (Afghanistan, Pakistan) etc…

One might think that abolishing ISIL, the most prominent terrorist group would save the world from terrorism, but no! Such an action wouldn’t do anything, because religious fanaticism is not bound by a group, it’s an idea, and ideas don’t die by bombs and bullets; ideas should be fought by ideas.

In their book, Global Terrorism and New Media, Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek argue that terrorist groups are teaching younger generations (between 10 and 12 years old) their ideology through boot camps and schools that are in their area of control. This strategy elongates the group’s survival for a longer time. They would teach students how to be hate-filled fighters, as well as how much other sects and religious groups are “sinners and blasphemers”, most evidently the crusaders (Euro-Christians) and the Rawafids (Shiites Muslims, the second biggest sect in Islam). And among this, they would teach them that it’s okay to call them blasphemers and punish them for being from a different sect, where punishment varies from flogging to beheading and public execution.

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These schools of thought are not solely found in areas of terrorist groups, but also in countries like Saudi Arabia. And they’re also expanding to European countries – under Saudi funding – such as France, Belgium, Germany, and Britain; since the mentioned countries have close relations with the Gulf state, as well as big Muslim communities.

When Europeans blame Muslims for this problem, they are partially correct, but they’re mistaken when they blame the refugees for causing the damage. Although some of the latter have took part in the battles in Syria, as many pictures show ex-fighters from extremist factions seeking refuge with the influx to Europe. But the problem is inside Europe itself, where it comes from these school and extremists Salafi-Wahhabi communities that are spreading fanaticism. Thus, they serve as a “shelter” and “sanctuary” for extremists coming from the MENA region and Asia, whether these countries are suffering from turmoil like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Nigeria, or countries that serve as a holder for this thought like Saudi Arabia.

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The only way to protect the EU, is to do what Tunisia has been recently doing by their campaign “tomorrow is better”, where they are re-educating inmates imprisoned for terrorist act by extracting the extremist thought from their heads and planting patriotic and moderate-religious ideology. As for the schools, the government is keeping an eagle’s eye on academic curricula, so that they would not contain topics of incitement and fanaticism.

If such procedures are made, alongside other educational and security ones, not only in  Europe but also in the countries that are being vastly effected by extremist thoughts like Lebanon, Syria, Pakistan, Iraq and others, we would gradually defeat extremist thoughts and potential terrorism, because it’s not fair nor right to blame millions of people for the acts of a few.

October 11, 2015

How The US Uses (Takfiri) Extremists

by mkleit

Source

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Many doubts, questions, and dilemmas have arisen concerning the contradicting conduct of the West while dealing with extremist movements. The West exploited these movements in Afghanistan during the late 1970’s, opposed them in the Arabian Peninsula in the nineties, and then launched war against them in Afghanistan in 2001, and in Iraq after the invasion of 2003. However, in 2011, the West returned to taking advantage of these extremist groups and we are currently faced with a rather vague Western connection with Isis.

The reason behind the doubts and different points of view is that analyses are based on relatively rigid mental paradigms which fail to proceed in accordance with the flexibility and pragmatic segmentation of the cowboy mentality. On the other hand, the alignment of extremist groups in many instances with the West has induced powers which oppose these groups to accuse them of treacherous conduct.

This is accurate, but it is accomplished through the Western scheme of indirect control of these groups. This indirect control is due to the ideological and strategic disorder which extremist groups suffer from, and the disapproval which those in their infrastructure, supportive environment, and their mustering forces maintain toward any connection with the United States- let alone full alliance with America. This is what the inconstancies in relations from 1979 up until this day indicate.

Another factor which has spurned these doubts is the vehement self-defense which the “takfiris” display when they are accused of having connections with the United States or with any countries which adhere to America or revolve around it.

The examination of the course of this movement leads to a specific model which displays how the relation with Isis is controlled by Western powers with the United States at their head. This model is composed of three aspects:

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1) Commission 2) Steering 3) Restraint

Each one of these aspects forms a set of tools which The US select according to the time and condition they deem as most appropriate. They do not necessarily benefit from all of these aspects in a simultaneous manner.

1) Commission

This policy depends on assessing which geographical area is most suitable for the movement of extremist groups, but under the condition that these movements do not pose a threat on American interests and that they also provide a strategic advantage. This policy is fulfilled according to circumstances and through certain means which are chosen according to time and place. There are five essential means.

1) Ensuring geographical domains: Weakening a country’s control in the target region through commotions, political turmoil, political settlement, and national uprising – as was the case in Syria in 2011, and Mosul in 2014.

2) Securing logistical pathways: Ensuring roads for extremists to reach target regions whether these pathways are by land, sea, or air. They also provide visas and even means of transportation in order to reach the area of conflict. They used Egypt, Pakistan, and Yemen as transits during the war on Afghanistan in 1979, and Turkey and Jordan during the war on Syria in 2011

3) Allowing financial aid and armament: Giving approval to their allied powers which wish to support extremist groups with money and weapons whether directly or indirectly (through certain institutions and weapon dealers). Rationing and organizing financial aid is done according to the time which ensures the imposition of a strategic course upon extremist groups.

The United States might also resort to direct weapon provision in some cases of tactical exceptions, such as throwing weapons and equipment from the air to Isis fighters in Kobani more than five times, and presenting this act in the guise of “a mistake”.

4) Transport: Expelling extremists from the countries which are harmed by their presence or from countries which desire to take advantage of them.

5) Facilitating the work of preachers: Allowing extremist preachers to fulfill their activity of spreading extremist ideology and mobilizing “takfiris” in the areas of transference, at departure, and at arrival. Extremist preachers are also allowed to spread their views on satellite TV stations and through different media.

2) Steering

This policy is based upon exerting an effort in media, mobilization, and in the field of action in order to direct the strategic priority of extremist groups toward movement in a certain sphere only, to target a specific enemy, or even to change the strategic and tactical course at a certain stage. All of this is done according to circumstances, requirements, and capacity.

The United States is very active in this domain with the aid of its regional and international allies. It achieves its aim through nine principal means.

1) Specifying the “preferable enemy”: the US have created “stars” among the “takfiri” environment for their own purposes and interests. They shed light on commanders or convenient extremist factions through inserting them on the list of terrorism. They focus on them in the media and select them in a way in which their prominence on the political scene leads to regional and international political achievements. For example, at the beginning of the war on Iraq, Colin Powell proclaimed that the enemy of the United States was al-Zarqawi. The US media machine placed him under the spotlight in a way where he became a prominent figure on the scene, and the conflict considerably shifted to internal Iraqi strife.

This is what Israel did a few months ago when it imposed on Jabhat Nusra to assign certain commanders in charge of control of the positions along the Jolan Heights- under threat of military intervention.

2) Assassinating commanders: Targeting extremist leaders who pose a threat on American or Western national security, or leaders whose regional influence negatively affects the scheme of steering and exploiting. For example, assassinating Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al-‘Awlaqi, and most Qaeda commanders in Yemen.

3) Arabian and International Media: Delivering ideological and provocative concepts which aggravate extremist groups and urge them to head to a certain target region to fight the side which America chooses.

4) Saudi Arabian clerics: The Saudi Arabian religious institution is performing a central role through issuing fatwas which declare jihad in a target region.

5) Security Breaches: Recruiting, sending “Islamized” Western men to fight, the role of Arabian secret services, imprisonment, and attracting a supportive environment which is discontent with the conduct of the extremists. Prisons play a central role in recruiting commanders and prominent figures whether in an explicit or indirect way.

6) Taking command of conflicts: Handling the crisis in the target region in a way which achieves the goals of the United States, and preserving the controllable and exploitable extremist power through suspicious operations and different means of steering.

7) Causing a suitable environment of strife: Creating a setting of conflict in which the mustering forces of the extremist groups are presented as the targets, the oppressed, and the infringed upon – as in the case of Afghanistan and Syria.

8) Dividing the “takfiri” factions: Creating conflicts, tactical clashes in the field of combat, and producing a multiple set of goals and priorities through different means in order to prevent the formation of a unified power- as in the case of the clash between Isis and Jabhat Nusra in Syria.

9) Strategic Theorization: Presenting comprehensive strategic plans which represent the interest of the extremist scheme in the targeted geographical range. The security services infiltrates the Salafist jihadi virtual world and make their own Salafist websites, and in some cases they have the advantage of recruiting few ideologue under the coercion or persuasive instrument in the secret jails, those ideologue are capable of making the paradigm shift when needed.

3) Restraint

Takfiri factions strive to maintain their own agendas – in spite of the great influence of the United States and its agents – in order to preserve their rank among their mustering forces and political authorities. Western powers need to restrain takfiri groups in order to prevent them from crossing strategic or military limits, and they fulfill this through force or control of their incomes.

Regulation is based on six essential means:
1) Direct Confrontation: Carrying out direct military operations to strike at the critical takfiri forces or those which pose a threat, as in the case of Afghanistan in 2001 for example.

2) Limiting financial aid and armament: Monitoring the flow of money and weapons; the amount, type, and timing. They also uphold the limits which prevent the takfiris from becoming a threat while allowing them to act in a way which benefits the United States, as in the case of Syria since 2011.

3) Geographical Restraint: When necessary, the military forces of the United States or its allies fire at the posts where takfiris pose a current or future threat, as the coalition forces did when Isis fighters entered Irbil.

4) Providing a Geographical Substitute: If takfiri groups increase in number or if it becomes hard to control them or their actions, a new battlefield is provided which forms a vent for emotional and military zeal. The most prominent example is allowing Isis forces to engage in fighting in Mosul.

5) Steering through the Media: Provocations in the media contribute to maintaining military and political zeal to achieve the intended and previously specified goal. Thus, it becomes difficult for the leaders of takfiri factions to turn around on the intermediate range.

6) Assassinating Commanders: This was explained among the aforementioned means of steering. The best example on resorting to this course of action during operations of restraint is the assassination of Al-Zarqawi when the United States became suspicious that he had pledged allegiance to Bin Laden and that he had restored the struggle against America as his main priority.

terrorist Abu Mes'ab al Zarqawi

terrorist Abu Mes’ab al Zarqawi

Exemplification

The usage of these means was fulfilled in different circumstances and course of events. In Afghanistan in 1979, the United States had previously designated the course of events. The National Security Advisor to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had formulated a plan to bring Islamists to Afghanistan, to lure the Soviets, and to trigger a long term exhaustive struggle between them.

The second example was after the eleventh of September when the United States resorted to means of restraint in the face of takfiri groups which had left Afghanistan in search of a range of movement. A clash of interests ensued and resulted in the war on Afghanistan in 2001 and the operation of complete security restraint in Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, the zeal of these takfiri groups was directed toward Iraq in 2003 under the banner of fighting America only to be steered toward internal strife.

After that, the great operation to engage in Syria commenced and it is still continuing. The takfiri factions had envisioned in their consciousness and political cognizance an old enterprise in that country. One of the results of this operation was the emergence of Isis whose military effort has been steered once again toward Iraq- in limited mutual interests which the United States has not allowed to cross their specified sphere. Now, Isis is heading toward targeting Saudi Arabia which induced the international coalition to strike it.

Art of the Possible

The United States, its allies, and its regional adherents have adopted this three dimensional policy. This is due to the deep hostility which Arabian and Islamic nations hold toward America, the inability of the US army to engage in the battlefield for military and economic reasons, and the steady growth of powers which oppose America and Israel. Thus, the need for substitute armies able to accomplish strategic and tactical missions arose.

The second reason is the difficulty in engaging in direct combat with takfiri groups which Bin Laden had been temporarily able to drive toward fighting the far enemy in the late nineties and the new millennium, and the need which arose after September eleventh to return these groups to their favorite ideology of targeting the near enemy and regional foes.

Thirdly, Western powers were most of the time in need for an excuse for military intervention. They were also in need of signing long-term agreements (in security, economics…) with the terrorist takfiris. This is why they enabled the takfiris to be present- in order to justify intervention as in the case of Iraq in 2003.

Fourth is the need of America and Western countries to import the takfiri individuals who are active on their soil and to get rid of them.

Regional allies have other concerns – the most important which is the need to vent the internal pressure which these takfiri movements of revolutionary quality pose, and to solve jurisprudential issues when dealing with takfiri groups which lessen their excommunicative speech against certain regimes when they find a suitable range of movement abroad.

On another level, Arabian and Islamic countries need to get rid of the organizational structures of the takfiris or to weaken them as much as possible through driving them toward areas of conflict and strategic ambushes, as Saudi Arabia did in 2003 when it imported its dilemma with Qaeda to Iraq and got rid of that great predicament. The final motive for countries which are involved in the strategy of indirect control has to do with the regional aspect- they make use of takfiri groups to accomplish political regional goals, as in the case of Syria since 2011.

The nature of the takfiri groups is the reason why they have a tendency to be under this strategy. They are hostile and excommunicate everyone, even one another. Thus, they are prone to be steered in any possible direction. Due to the intellectual and jurisprudential differences among takfiri groups, and the lack of a unified command and strategy, they have a tendency to be infiltrated and to be steered in different directions. They also suffer from great vulnerability in security and this has facilitated the endeavors to recruit agents and secret intelligence infiltration.

They are also faced with a major problem which is financial aid – they lack an independent Islamic country which provides them with the money they need. This is why they depend on countries which exclusively adhere to the United States such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Pakistan. On the other hand, due to the security and political pressure exerted on takfiri groups, they are usually in search of any available outlet- especially since their speech carries very ambitious goals in comparison with their ability and narrow range of movement.

ألعوبة السعودية في سوريا

ألعوبة السعودية في سوريا

Courses of Action and Achievements

The main cases in this strategy are Afghanistan 1979, Iraq 2003, and Syria 2011. These cases have been generally successful in accomplishing their main goal which is transformation as much as possible of the threat which takfiri movements pose into a chance, and to take advantage of their blood-thirsty and destructive nature for the benefit of strategic US enterprises. They were successful in Afghanistan which the Soviets left, and they were successful in kindling sectarian and ethnic turmoil in Iraq in 2003. Currently, the United States has benefitted from these takfiri groups in Syria through destroying a great deal of the infrastructure of that country which is central in the allegiance of resistance. Israel has benefitted in creating an obstructive line on the border of the Jolan Heights which is formed of the Jabhat Nusra forces. In Iraq today, Isis represents a case which we wait to discover its outcomes and strategic courses.

On the long term, this strategy has been successful in shifting the military effort of takfiri groups away from directly targeting the West. In Afghanistan, the enemy was the Soviet Union, and in the period after that the targeting of American interests commenced up until the eleventh of September. Steering and indirect control were successful in Iraq in making American interests a secondary priority for takfiri groups in opposition to the priority of targeting other regional powers. As for Syria, American interests became completely distant from takfiri attacks, and Isis has almost fully eliminated attempts to target American interests. The main concern has become the geographical region- to establish the state of Isis, expand it, and to preserve its lands.

The profound and structural results show that America has been able to prevent takfiris from being active in regions where they pose threats on American interests. As a result of wide American domination, takfiri groups have not been able to move in an effective way which has influential political results anymore. They are only able to do so when there is no opposition to US interests which means where the US are at an advantage due to their presence. Thus, these takfiri groups – in an objective way- have become a part of the American scheme. With time they have avoided all regions vital to the United States and are active in less crucial areas.

June 15, 2015

جيش الـcia في سوريا: مليار دولار سنوياً لـ 10 آلاف مقاتل

by mkleit

جريدة الأخبار

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عدا عن الدعم السعودي والقطري والتركي والأردني والإسرائيلي لمسلحي الجنوب السوري، كشفت صحيفة «واشنطن بوست» أن الـ«سي أي ايه» تنفذ برنامجاً لدعم مقاتلي «الجبهة الجنوبية» كلفته مليار دولار سنوياً

لوكالة الاستخبارات المركزية الأميركية (سي آي ايه) جيش يضم آلاف المقاتلين المعارضين في سوريا. وهؤلاء يقاتلون في الجنوب السوري بشكل خاص، وتتولى الاستخبارات الأميركية تدريبهم وتسليحهم وتزويدهم بالمعلومات الميدانية. ما سبق ليس اتهاماً أطلقه الحكم في دمشق على معارضيه الذين يصنفهم الغرب بـ»المعتدلين»، بل وقائع كانت مدار بحث على طاولات صنع القرار في الولايات المتحدة الأميركية، وكشفتها صحيفة «واشنطن بوست» أول من أمس.

تمويل وتسليح وتدريب بكلفة مليار دولار سنوياً، يذهب جلّها إلى مقاتلي «الجبهة الجنوبية في الجيش السوري الحر». السخاء ليس حكراً على الأميركيين، بل إنه جزء من تعاون أميركي ــ سعودي ــ قطري ــ تركي. وإذا ما قيس هذا الأمر على السوابق الأميركية في أفغانستان ونيكاراغوا وغيرها من الدول التي بنت فيها وكالة الاستخبارات جيوشاً من المرتزقة، حيث كانت الولايات المتحدة تأخذ على عاتقها الجزء الأصغر من الإنفاق وتجعل حلفاءها يتولون الحصة الأكبر من الكلفة، يمكن توقع المبالغ الخيالية التي تنفق سنوياً في الجنوب السوري. ويمكن أيضاً تخيّل القدر الهائل من الأموال الذي يُدفع لإراقة الدم والتدمير في عموم سوريا، حيث لا تكف المعارضة منذ أربع سنوات عن الشكوى من الشح المالي والنقص في السلاح والذخيرة، وتزعم أنها متروكة لتواجه وحيدة النظام وحلفاءه.

برنامج الـ»سي أي ايه» الذي كشفت عنه الـ»بوست» هو من بين أكبر البرامج السرية التي تنفذها الوكالة في العالم، بحسب الصحيفة التي قالت إن كلفته تشكل نسبة «1 من 15» من إجمال إنفاق الـ»سي أي إيه» سنوياً. وهذا البرنامج، بحسب مسؤولين في الاستخبارات ورجال سياسة أميركيين قابلتهم الصحيفة، ينص على تدريب مقاتلين وتسليحهم، وتزويدهم بالمعدات اللوجستية، وجمع المعلومات التي يحتاجونها في معاركهم، وإيصالهم مع ما يحتاجونه إلى الأراضي السورية.

عنصر من المعارضة السورية مع صاروخ تاو الأمريكي

هو إذاً برنامج عسكري «متكامل»، يضمن بناء جيش تابع لـ»سي أي إيه»، على شاكلة ما قامت به الوكالة عينها في أفغانستان ونيكاراغوا في ثمانينيات القرن الماضي. الجزء الأكبر من هذا البرنامج يجري تنفيذه انطلاقاً من الأردن، حيث درّبت الاستخبارات المركزية الأميركية 10 آلاف مقاتل حتى اليوم، بحسب المقال الذي نشرته «واشنطن بوست» على رأس صفحتها الأولى السبت الماضي. مبلغ مليار دولار سنوياً، بحسب مسؤولين أميركيين، هو جزء من مشروع أكبر تبلغ كلفته مليارات الدولارات، وتساهم فيه إلى جانب الولايات المتحدة، السعودية وقطر وتركيا. ويتركز عمل هذه الدول في الجنوب السوري، لدعم ما يُسمى «الجبهة الجنوبية في الجيش السوري الحر». وأجرى كاتبا تقرير الـ»بوست» عملية حسابية بسيطة استنتجا فيها أن كلفة المقاتل الواحد سنوياً تبلغ 100 ألف دولار أميركي!  الكشف عن هذه العملية «المتواصلة منذ عام 2013»، أتى على خلفية قرار أصدرته بالإجماع لجنة الاستخبارات في مجلس النواب الأميركي، قضى بخفض ميزانية برنامج الـ»سي أي إيه» في سوريا بنسبة 20 في المئة. لكن هذا القرار لن يكون نافذاً إلا بعد سلسلة طويلة من الإجراءات، بينها تصويت المجلس عليه الأسبوع الجاري. كما أن سريان القرار بحاجة إلى تبنيه من قِبل مجلس الشيوخ ولجنة الاستخبارات الخاصة به التي ستبدأ درس ميزانية الاستخبارات قبل نهاية حزيران. وبحسب الصحيفة، فإن البيت الأبيض سيباشر اتصالاته بمجلس الشيوخ لتجنيب وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية خفض ميزانية برنامج عملها في سوريا الذي تبنته لجنة الاستخبارات في مجلس النواب.

كبير النواب الديموقراطيين في لجنة الاستخبارات آدم شيف قال للصحيفة إن ممثلي الحزبين (الديموقراطي والجمهوري) مجمعون على القلق حيال الاستراتيجية الأميركية في سوريا. هذا القلق، على ما يبدو مما نشرته اليومية الأميركية، متمحور حول نظرة الساسة الأميركيين ودوائر الاستخبارات إلى ما يجري في الميدان السوري. فبحسب تقرير الصحيفة، حتى المدافعون عن برنامج عمل الـ»سي أي إيه» يقرّون بالأداء الضعيف للفصائل «المعتدلة»، وبأنها ستهزم في أي معركة حاسمة مع «داعش». موقف أكثر «صراحة» في هذا السياق نقلته الـ»بوست» عن أحد كبار مساعدي الجمهوريين في الكونغرس، قائلاً إن تراجع قوات النظام في سوريا «ليس نتيجة عمل من يسمّون المعتدلين». أما شيف، فقال: «للأسف، أعتقد أن «داعش» و»النصرة» وبعض الفصائل الإسلامية المتطرفة الأخرى هم في أفضل موقع للاستثمار في الفوضى التي يمكن أن ترافق انحداراً سريعاً للنظام».

وينقل كاتبا التقرير عن مسؤولين قولهم إن هذه اللهجة مستندة إلى عدم قدرة وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية على «إظهار أن قواتها سيطرت على أراضٍ أو ربحت معارك أو حققت نتائج ملموسة».

في المقابل، يدافع داعمو البرنامج عن رجال الـ»سي أي ايه» في الميدان، قائلين إنهم «يحاصرون قاعدة للجيش السوري»، فيما يؤكد آخرون أنهم تمكنوا من السيطرة على عدد من القواعد الرئيسية للجيش السوري جنوب دمشق.

June 3, 2015

How Qatar Used and Abused Its Al Jazeera Journalists

by mkleit

JUNE 2, 2015

Mohamed Fahmy, an Egyptian-Canadian journalist who was the Cairo bureau chief for Al Jazeera English, is the author of “Baghdad Bound: An Interpreter’s Chronicles of the Iraq War.”

nytimes

CAIRO — This week, I am back in court in an effort to prove my innocence at a retrial on charges that I was a member of the banned Muslim Brotherhood, designated a terrorist organization in Egypt since December 2013, and that I sought to harm the country’s reputation and security. I already spent 412 days in detention before my conviction in the first trial was overturned on appeal earlier this year.

The terrorism charges against me and my colleague Baher Mohamed are unfounded and have been widely discredited. The other charges relate to our employment by the Al Jazeera media network, which is owned by the state of Qatar.

Following the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood-backed president, Mohamed Morsi, in 2013, Egypt moved to ban Al Jazeera’s Arabic service in the country, known as Mubasher Misr, because it was perceived as a Qatari-sponsored propaganda mouthpiece for the Brotherhood. I was the bureau chief of the Al Jazeera English service, a separate operation that adhered to higher journalistic standards, which, we assumed, would inoculate us against accusations of bias. We were mistaken.

 Mohamed Fahmy at his retrial on Monday. Credit Amr Nabil/Associated Press

Now, Baher and I find ourselves once again in the soundproof defendants’ cage, fighting to avoid long prison terms. Our friend and fellow Jazeera journalist, Peter Greste, will not be with us. Thanks to his government’s work to win his release, Peter is home in Australia.

At the retrial, we will argue that we continued to work despite the broadcast ban because we believed the English service was exempt and Al Jazeera failed to obtain legal clarification from the Egyptian authorities. If, as a result, there were violations of licensing laws, which in any case would be merely misdemeanors, it is the network’s executives from Qatar who should pay, not us. A final ruling from the Egyptian court could come later this month.

My 18-month ordeal may be close to an end, yet I find myself increasingly angry at how my life and the lives of my family and loved ones have been turned upside down. My anger, however, is not directed primarily at the prosecutor, the judiciary or the government of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. It is aimed at my employer, Al Jazeera.

The network knowingly antagonized the Egyptian authorities by defying a court-ordered ban on its Arabic-language service. Behind that, I believe, was the desire of the Qatari royal family to meddle in Egypt’s internal affairs. While Al Jazeera’s Doha executives used the Cairo bureau of Al Jazeera English to give their scheme a veneer of international respectability, they made us unwitting pawns in Qatar’s geopolitical game.

Midway through our first trial, last year, Al Jazeera undermined our defense when it sued Egypt for $150 million in compensation for business losses in Egypt. The network’s own lawyer in our case criticized the lawsuit and quit the case. “Al Jazeera is using my clients,” he told the court,according to Agence France-Presse. “I have emails from (the channel) telling me they don’t care about the defendants and care about insulting Egypt.”

This is why in May I filed a lawsuit in Canada, where I hold citizenship as well as in Egypt, against Al Jazeera. I intend to hold the network accountable for its negligent conduct, and I am seeking $83 million in compensation for my ordeal.

When Al Jazeera was started in 1996, Qatar was widely praised for its enlightened thinking. The network’s 24-hour rolling news coverage was a breath of fresh air in the Middle East’s torpid media scene. The international services, like Al Jazeera English, recruited some of the best names in journalism.

Like many young Arabs, I was impressed. Al Jazeera seemed a model of courageous broadcasting in a region not known for upholding freedom of speech. That was still my view when I became Cairo bureau chief in September 2013.

I have since realized how deeply I, like the viewing public, was duped. I came to see how Qatar used Al Jazeera as a pernicious, if effective, tool of its foreign policy.

A court order shut down Mubasher Misr the same month I joined Al Jazeera English, but the channel continued to broadcast by satellite and Internet from studios in Doha. I soon had concerns that Qatar was compromising our journalism. Against my objections, the Arabic station redubbed our English-language news packages with inflammatory commentary.

I frequently complained to the Doha bosses that broadcasting our reports on the banned Mubasher Misr, which was officially classified as “a national security threat,” put our lives at risk. They told me to get on with the job, but the practice continued — even after Egypt declared the Brotherhood a terrorist group, days before our arrest. When we came to trial, the network’s actions made it much harder to disprove the testimony of the prosecution’s lead national security witness that I had worked for Mubasher Misr, inaccurate though it was.

The Doha management also neglected to tell me that it was providing Brotherhood activists in Egypt with video cameras and paying them for footage, which it then broadcast, without explaining its political provenance, on the banned Arabic channel. During my detention, I met a number of prisoners who told me how this worked, and I have seen court documents confirming it.

Al Jazeera’s managers crossed an ethical red line. By attempting to manipulate Egypt’s domestic politics, they were endangering their employees.

Qatar and Al Jazeera will continue to talk about Doha’s progressive values and support for freedom of speech in the region. Just days ago, Qatar’s ambassador to the United Nations piously told the Security Council that her country supported efforts to enhance the safety of journalists and voted for a resolution calling for “a safe and enabling environment for journalists, media professionals and associated personnel to perform their work independently and without undue interference.”

I wonder how the Qatari poet Mohammed al-Ajami feels as he languishes in Doha’s central prison, serving a life sentence for “criticizing the emir” in a poem. You won’t find his plight highlighted on Al Jazeera’s outlets anytime soon.

I have come to understand that Al Jazeera’s noble-sounding claims are nothing but a glossy whitewash.

May 10, 2015

Al-Jazeera Host Incites Genocidal Hatred Towards Syrian Alawites

by mkleit

almasdar

The controversial Syrian host of Al-Jazeera’s “The Opposite Direction”, Dr. Faisal Al-Qassem, posted a disturbing tweet on Wednesday, inciting sectarian hatred and blame towards the minority Alawite Muslims for allegedly “destroying” Syria for their own personal interests.

In his tweet, Dr. Faisal Al-Qassem asks the Syrian people if they would like avenge the Alawites of Syria for destroying the country; this tweet followed the main topic of his TV program on Tuesday, where he invited a number of guests to discuss the Alawite situation at the Islamist controlled city of Jisr Al-Shughour in Syria.

For over an hour, the tweet was shared by numerous Twitter accounts that not only questioned his professionalism, but also, his motives, as Dr. Qassem pinned blame on this minority religious group as a whole.

Finally, after receiving an unexpected number of tweets condemning his post, Dr. Qassem deleted the tweet; however, this was not before he engaged Dr. Joshua Landis – Associate Professor at the University of Oklahoma – in a heated conversation on Twitter, further proving his bias and antipathy for Alawites.

Dr. Qassem is notorious for making comments that have stirred-up controversy in the past (e.g. Lebanese Army comments in 2014), but never to the extent of inciting genocidal thoughts against a Levantine religious group.

Faisal’s Tweet: Isn’t it the Syrians’ right to take vengeance from Alawites that destroyed Syria and displaced its people for their own interests?

May 7, 2015

Preaching Hate and Sectarianism in the Gulf

by mkleit

Why did Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates provide a pulpit for a firebrand cleric who calls for the destruction of Shiites, Alawites, Christians, and Jews?

BY OREN ADAKI, DAVID ANDREW WEINBERG

Source

Arab Gulf states

Saudi Arabia expands its involvement in wars across the Middle East, the kingdom has given a platform to an extremist cleric who seems to believe this struggle is not just against the Islamic State or rivals in Yemen. Saad bin Ateeq al-Ateeq, a Saudi preacher with long-standing ties to the kingdom’s government, recently called upon God to “destroy” Shiites, Alawites, Christians, and Jews.

Saudi King Salman insists that Sunni-Shiite hatred only motivates intervention in Yemen by other “regional powers” — meaning Iran. Ateeq, however, tells a different story: Speaking to the Saudi state news channel al-Ekhbariya one day after Riyadh went to war, he argued that Yemen’s lands were designated “purely for monotheism” and “may not be polluted, neither by Houthis nor Iranians.” He labeled these groups “rafidis,” a derogatory label bashing Shiite Islam, and ominously elaborated: “We are cleansing the land from these rats.”

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates — the three most influential members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — have recently displayed surprising unity through their shared participation in multilateral military operations, first against the Islamic State in Syria and now against Houthi insurgents in Yemen.

Yet these three governments have another thing in common — each has provided a platform for the radical preaching of Ateeq, whose toxic incitement against other religions parallels the narrative of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and al Qaeda. That America’s allies would tolerate a religious leader as extreme as this Saudi preacher poses a threat to U.S. interests and suggests the Gulf is failing to live up to its explicit commitments to repudiate the Islamic State’s hateful ideology.

It’s not like these Persian Gulf states can claim not to know about Ateeq’s hate-filled rhetoric — he has been repeating it for years in prominent, government-affiliated places of worship. Earlier this year, Ateeq delivered a televised sermon at Qatar’s state-controlled Grand Mosque beseeching God to “destroy the Jews and whoever made them Jews, and destroy the Christians and the Alawites and whoever made them Christian, and the Shiites and whoever made them Shiite.” He also prayed for God to “save [the] Al-Aqsa [mosque in Jerusalem] from the claws of the Jews.”

Yet calling for the wholesale destruction of other religions appears to be one of the preacher’s favorite refrains. In February 2013, Ateeq delivered a Fridaysermon at Qatar’s Grand Mosque using an almost identical formulation, once again urging God to destroy the Christians and Jews. Similarly, in October of that year, Ateeq declared from Qatar’s Grand Mosque that Jews and Christians are enemies of God, and this February he delivered anothersermon, apparently from Sudan, calling for the destruction of Christians, Alawites, Shiites, and Jews.

When approached for comment regarding Ateeq’s views, Ali Saad al-Hajiri, the director of the media office at the Qatari Embassy in Washington, D.C., said Doha “in no way endorses or supports this individual” and “rejects any divisions in Arab society along sectarian lines.” Hajiri added that Qatar “faces the challenge of balancing the needs of a free society and freedom of speech with the need to take the strongest possible stance against terrorism and hate speech.” The Saudi and Emirati embassies in Washington did not respond to requests for comment.

Despite Ateeq’s unmistakable incitement of religious hatred, he is treated as an establishment figure in the Gulf. He regularly preaches in Qatar, addressing crowds in the gas-rich emirate on at least 13 occasions since 2010, typically as a guest of Qatar’s Ministry of IslamicAffairs. Notably, half of these invitations transpired after his 2013 sermon under government supervision calling for the destruction of other religions. He has spoken several times to different branches of Qatar’s security services: According to local media, one lecture in July 2013 to the Qatari navy, a frequent U.S. military partner in the Gulf, was attended by the commander of the Qatari Royal Navy Forces; that same month, Ateeq gave another lectureto security officials organized by the Qatari Interior Ministry’s airport security and airport passports departments. Qatar has invested billions of dollars in its airports in hopes of becoming a global aviation hub, and the Interior Ministry is Washington’s main interlocutor for discussing terror finance.

But it’s not just Qatar, which has long been accused of turning a blind eye to Islamist radicals, that has lent official legitimacy to Ateeq’s message. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has arrayed itself against Islamist forces in Egypt and Libya, has also given him a platform: In July 2014, the preacherwas featured as a speaker at the Dubai International Holy Quran Award, a yearly competition promoting Quranic memorization and Islamic culture. The event was organized “under the sponsorship” of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the vice president and prime minister of the UAE as well as the ruler of Dubai.

According to Sheikh Mohammed’s official website, his advisor for humanitarian and cultural affairs — who chaired the contest’s organizing committee — announced that Ateeq would be attending as one of the “elite group of scholars and preachers” hosted by the event. Ateeq singled out the advisor in the audience by name, saying that he deserved the “thanks of God,” and the two were photographed shaking hands on stage.

Yet it is Saudi Arabia where Ateeq has most firmly embedded himself within government institutions. According to the biography on his website, heserves as a “supervisor for Islamic awareness” at the Saudi Education Ministry and directs an Islamic awareness council at the Riyadh regional government’s Department of Education. His involvement with Riyadh’s education department apparently goes back to the days when Saudi Arabia’s current king was the region’s governor. Ateeq has regularly been involved in educational events in the region, including lecturing to children.

Ateeq also exerts an influence over the next generation of the Saudi armed forces, serving as the director of the Guidance Office for housing at King Khaled Military Academy (KKMA). The academy is classified by the Saudi Arabian National Guard Ministry as one of its “departments and units,” and graduates of the academy automatically earn the rank of lieutenant. His role as a preacher at the university goes back to 1994, when Saudi Arabia’s late — supposedly reformist — King Abdullah was the commander in charge of the National Guard.

Ateeq also has contributed in other ways to shaping the ideology of members of the Saudi security forces. In 2013, the Interior Ministry’s Facilities Security Force (FSF), which is in charge of protecting Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities,hosted Ateeq at its headquarters to run a seminar under the direction of the FSF’s commanding general regarding the hajj, including how to treat pilgrims properly. The Interior Ministry is under the control of Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who was just promoted to next in line to inherit the Saudi throne.

Further, Ateeq’s biography states that he chairs the board of a quasi-governmental Saudi religious authority known as the Cooperative Office for Preaching, Guidance, and Direction in the Neighborhoods of West Naseem in Riyadh. Such cooperative offices around Saudi Arabia have sponsored dozens of Ateeq’s lectures throughout the country, with fliers featuring the logo of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, which supervises the government-subsidized offices. Saudi Arabia’s official news wire has similarly promoteddozens of lectures by Ateeq, going back as far as a decade.

This March, Ateeq delivered a lecture at Riyadh’s King Khaled Mosque. The mosque’s “religious and social activities” come with the “sponsorship” of the King Khaled Charitable Foundation, the board of which is overseen by six princes and princesses fathered by the late King Khaled. Fliers used by the mosque to promote Ateeq’s lecture included logos of the Saudi Islamic Affairs Ministry and the late king’s foundation, and the foundation’s logo was also prominently featured behind Ateeq during his talk. The King Khaled Charitable Foundation did not respond to requests for comment on its involvement with Ateeq.

It is perhaps an irony of the Arabic language that Ateeq’s last name translates to “archaic” or “antiquated,” since he embodies the Gulf’s most backward impulses. But the Saudi preacher’s obvious incitement is far from an isolated case: The kingdom systematically indoctrinates its youth with hateful views in official, government-published school textbooks. Recent government-published textbooks state that those who renounce Islam to convert to another religion should be killed and that the most important debate about homosexuality is how gay people should be murdered. That is unlikely to change anytime soon so long as religious hard-liners such as Ateeq are granted influence over the Saudi education system.

As the region’s superpower patron, it is up to Washington to voice its displeasure about the continued flow of state privileges to preachers of hate. Such incitement undoubtedly poses a long-term threat to the fight against terrorism and to U.S. national security.

U.S. President Barack Obama should say as much when he sits down with GCC leaders at Camp David later this month. The president himself warned recently that the Gulf states face an internal threat from a “destructive and nihilistic” ideology; when he meets with the Gulf leaders, he can argue that tackling this sort of religious incitement is in these regimes’ best interest. By providing an official platform to hate preachers such as Ateeq, Gulf rulers are feeding an ideological chimera that threatens their ultimate survival.

September 30, 2014

سوريا… تكرار لليبيا؟

by mkleit

خليل حرب

تاريخ المقال من جريدة السفير اللبنانية: 30-09-2014 02:16 AM

ليس طبيعيا ان يشارك طيارون في مهمات عسكرية حساسة، ثم تتباهى وسائل اعلام دولهم بهذه الخفة بنشر صورهم وكشف هوياتهم في اليوم ذاته.

بمثل هذا «التحالف» الذي نشأ بهذه العجالة والروابط الفضفاضة والمصالح المبهمة، يصبح مثل هذا السلوك محل ريبة.

لنتفق اولا ان دول «التحالف» في سوريا، ليست هي ذاتها في العراق. بمعنى ان المقاتلات الجوية التي تشارك في تنفيذ هجمات على الاراضي السورية، لا تنفذ مهمات مشابهة على الاراضي العراقية. في العراق، تنحصر المهمات القتالية الجوية بالولايات المتحدة، وانضمت اليها الان كل من فرنسا وبريطانيا، مع احتمالات مشاركة كندا واستراليا وغيرهما من الدول الغربية لاحقا.

وعلى الرغم من ان العنوان العريض للحملة العسكرية، العابرة للحدود، كما وصفها الاميركيون قبل بدايتها، هو «الحرب على داعش»، الا ان المشهد في سوريا، مغاير تماما. تتذرع قائدة «التحالف»، اي واشنطن، بأن حكومة بغداد هي التي طلبت تدخلنا. وعندما يشار الى سوريا، يجري تجاهل حقيقة ان دمشق نادت بتعاون دولي واقليمي لمواجهة الخطر منذ اكثر من ثلاثة اعوام، اي قبل سقوط الموصل بكثير، وبروز خيار «التحالف» كأداة ضرورية وملحة لمواجة تداعيات الموقف اقليميا. وهكذا، فانه عندما تتم الاشارة الى سوريا، فان المنطق السياسي يتبدل، ويتم الحديث عن عبثية ضرب «داعش» في العراق، من دون ضرب مواقعه في سوريا.

الجدل يبدو عقيما في ظل الحلقة المفرغة التي تقدم فيها التبريرات السياسية والعسكرية. لكن طرح التساؤلات يصبح اكثر مشروعية، ولعل اهمها الان: لماذا راحت تصريحات دول «التحالف» ومواقفها، تتبدل ما بين عشية الغارات وبعد بدايتها بأيام خصوصا في ما يتعلق بأهداف الحرب ومراميها؟ data=VLHX1wd2Cgu8wR6jwyh-km8JBWAkEzU4,jYbgdwQ-zXk9LcFt1rD2IdV3QE4m0wGpL1Ca5OV0NjtIMs34KEQE3511OhkVfBrEfxiGlzwONSEt7VsEnp0-84kUiNoL_hJbIo7tZQ

لن نقف طويلا امام خطوة نشر صور الطيارين الخليجيين وهويات بعضهم منذ اليوم الاول لبدء الضربات الجوية، ولا امام الاعلان الاميركي في اليوم الثاني ان المقاتلات الخليجية، والاردنية، نفذت 80 في المئة من المهمات الهجومية، بعدما كان الاميركيون انفسهم، اعلنوا في اليوم الاول ان المقاتلات الاميركية نفذت كل الهجمات من مناطق الحدود مع العراق مرورا بدير الزور، ووصولا الى ريف حلب، وان اسلحة الجو العربية، اكتفت بمهمات المساندة الجوية والدعم.

ولن نقف طويلا ايضا امام تعليقات العديد من السوريين واللبنانيين وهي محقة بالمناسبة بأن كمين العتيبة الشهير في الغوطة الشرقية، اوقع لوحده قتلى في صفوف الارهابيين، اكثر مما فعلته مئات الغارات التي نفذها «التحالف» طوال سبعة ايام، بما في ذلك الهجمات بصواريخ «توماهوك» التي اطلقت من الخليج العربي والبحر الاحمر، وهي كلها هجمات لم تبدأ سوى بعد القيام بالالاف من عمليات الاستطلاع الجوي والتجسس المكثف طوال شهور.

لا، لن نقف طويلا امام ذلك. لكننا نحتاج الى فهم مغزى هذا التبدل والتلون في مصطلحات ومفاهيم قادة دول «التحالف»، وكأننا امام سيناريو شبيه بما بات يعرف بـ…الخديعة الليبية. بعد شهور على بداية الحرب السورية، سعى الغرب الى محاولة ابتكار «بنغازي سورية» في مدينة حماة. فشلت المحاولة، لكن المغزى كان، التسلل من شعار حماية المدنيين في مدينة سورية، لاجترار قرار من مجلس الامن يجيز التدخل الجوي لفرض منطقة حظر جوي والدفاع عن اهل المدينة. جرى ما يشبه ذلك تماما في مدينة بنغازي، بعد شهر فقط على بداية «الثورة الليبية» ضد النظام الليبي. تحول قرار مجلس الامن 1973، الصادر في 17 اذار 2011، الى منصة انقض منها الفرنسيون والانكليز والاميركيون على نظام معمر القذافي. ويقال دائما ان الروس تعلموا درسا ديبلوماسيا قاسيا من خلال تلك المكيدة التي نصبها الغرب لموسكو التي بنت على ذلك الكثير من التشدد في مواقفها السورية لاحقا.

كانت الدول الغربية ذاتها تقول ان القرار 1973 لم يكن يهدف الى احتلال ليبيا ولا تغيير النظام فيها. قبل شهر ونصف الشهر، تبنى مجلس الامن القرار رقم 2170 تحت الفصل السابع للتحرك ضد تنظيمي «داعش» و«جبهة النصرة». سارعت روسيا الى القول ان القرار لا يجيز العمل العسكري تلقائيا، ويحتاج ذلك الى عودة مجلس الامن لاتخاذ قرار لاحق. لم يحدث ذلك. شكل باراك اوباما «التحالف» على عجل، وذهب الى الحرب.

ومنذ ذلك اليوم، والتصريحات والمواقف تتبدل وتتلون. الداهية البريطاني يغازل ايران بشكل لم يسبق له مثيل. يكتشف الان فجأة ان لطهران ادوارها الاساسية في تسوية النزاعات في كل من العراق وسوريا ويطالب بافساح الطريق امامها سياسيا وديبلوماسيا. يقول وزير الخارجية البريطاني فيليب هاموند قبل ايام، ان مشاركة بريطانيا في الغارات على سوريا مستقبلا ستكون ممكنة. العراب الاميركي اصبح يتحدث عن عملية عسكرية قابلة للتطور تدريجيا، بعدما كان يقول بداية انها حرب من السماء فقط. يروج الاميركي تدريجيا لفكرة الحاجة لنحو 15 الف مقاتل من «المعارضة المعتدلة». لم يستبعد كما هو ظاهر، احتمال الحاجة الى قوات خاصة تتحرك على الارض احيانا. مملكة الالتباس، السعودية، تقول الان بوضوح، ان الخطوة الامثل في القضاء على «داعش»، يجب ان تكون بابعاد الرئيس بشار الاسد. تستحضر الان، في مثل هذه الاجواء الملتهبة، وجود «الحرس الثوري» و«حزب الله» في سوريا. تتعامى، هي وقطر، عن الشبهات الملتصقة بهما، بضلوعهما في دعم نفس المجموعات الارهابية التي يفترض ان يقاتلها «اميرهم المحارب» خالد بن سلمان في اطار حرب «التحالف». وفي نكتة سمجة، تقول السعودية وقطر بكل ثقة انهما لم تدعما المتطرفين في سوريا، وان مليارات الدولارات التي تدفقت على المعارضة ذهبت الى «المعتدلين». ويخلص الامير تميم والامير سعود الفيصل الى ان لب المشكلة يكمن في وجود الاسد في الحكم، وما من نصر سيتحقق، الا برحيله. يقول تميم، الامير الحديث العهد بالحكم، ان «الهدف على المدى الطويل، يجب أن يكون مهاجمة النظام السوري».

 خالد بن سلمان

خالد بن سلمان

ومن جهتهم، يشكك الاتراك بفكرة الاكتفاء بالضربات الجوية. يروجون لفكرة «المنطقة الآمنة» وفرض حظر جوي على الشمال السوري. اليوم سيسعى اردوغان الى نيل تفويض واضح من البرلمان بذلك. وبخبث، يعمل الاسرائيليون على المقلب الاخر على تهيئة الظروف الملائمة ميدانيا، لقيام «شريط حدودي» على غرار ما سمي بـ«الجدار الطيب» في الجنوب اللبناني في سنوات الاحتلال.

ما زالت عوامل كثيرة تحول دون «اطلسة» الصراع مع سوريا، وتمنع تطوير العدوان، الى مرحلة المواجهة المباشرة. يصح ذلك حتى اللحظة الراهنة. لكن المشهد يمكن ان يتبدل غدا، فمن بإمكانه الادعاء ان حسابات الحروب تبنى بشكل صحيح دائما؟

October 28, 2013

المخطوفين في أعزاز كانوا في عهدة المخابرات التركية

by mkleit

موضوع كتبته في اليوم الذي خرج منه المخطوفين اللبنانيين في أعزاز من أسر لواء عاصفة الشمال، حيث تبين ما كتبته صحيحا أول من أمس على لسان وزير العمل، سليم جريصاتي، بأن اللواء المذكور هو فرع مخابراتي تركي:

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انتهت قضية المخطوفين اللبنانيين منذ بضعة ايام بعودة اللبنانيين التسعة والطياريّن التركيين الى ديارهم سالمين. وقد تمت بدفع ملايين الدولارات من قطر الى ما يسمى بلواء عاصفة الشمال وتحرير الطيارين المخطوفين، بالاضافة الى تحرير معتقلات سوريات في سجون الحكومة السورية، بينما الطرف الآخر ما عليه سوى اطلاق سراح اللبنانيين المحتجزين في أعزاز، الملاصقة للحدود التركية السورية. ولكن العملية لم تتم على أكمل وجه حيث ما زالت السوريات داخل السجن، رغم تخبط الأخبار حول وصولهم الى مطار أضنة في جنوب تركيا.

وفي الأطراف الثلاثة، اللبنانية-التركية-المعارضة السورية، لم يكن الخاسر سوى الأخيرة. فلبنان استعاد مخطوفيه وبرء ذمته مع الأتراك، أما تركيا فقد استرجعت طياريها وقبضت مبلغ 150 مليون دولار في العملية من الوسيط القطري. ولكن المعارضة السورية، أو من مثلها، أي لواء عاصفة الشمال، لم تكترث بتا ان حررن المعتقلات أم لا. بيد أنه لم يكن هذا المطلب الوحيد خلال السنة والخمسة أشهر التي خطف فيها اللبنانيون، بل بدأت المطالب بعدول حزب الله عن رأيه السياسي المعادي للثورة السورية، ومن بعدها الطلب من أمين عام حزب الله، السيد حسن نصر الله، الاعتذار من الشعب السوري لدعمه السياسي للرئيس بشار الأسد.

وقد تلاها جولات من الأعذار والمطالب التي لا ترتبط ببعضها البعض كانتماء المخطوفين الى حزب الله وأنهم عملاء لهم، بل جواسيس يعملون داخل الأراضي السورية. ولكن حرر المخطوفين ولم يثبت تعاملهم مع حزب الله ولا انتمائهم اليه، بل كانوا زوار عتبات اسلامية مقدسة في ايران ومروا برًا في الشمال السوري. ولم يعتذر السيد نصر الله ولم يغيّر الحزب رأيه المؤيد للنظام السوري.

ولكن السؤال الأبرز يتمحور حول أصل لواء عاصفة الشمال ولماذا اختفى بعد تحرير المخطوفين؟

قال سائق الباص من مخطوفي أعزاز أن المخابرات التركية هي من أوقفتهم وعصبوا أعينهم الى أن وصلوا الى أيدي اللواء المذكور، وقد وصلوا مطار اسطنبول أيضا بالطريقة ذاتها. وبذلك، كان أول ظهور رسمي للواء عاصفة الشمال في مدينة أعزاز شمال حلب. وانتهى بشكل غير رسمي بعد انتهاء الصفقة التركية-اللبنانية، دون اتمام شرط تحرير المعتقلات السوريات.

وتصف أوساط ناشطو المعارضة السورية من ما يسمى بجيش الاسلام والجيش السوري الحر وغيرها من الفصائل المسلحة لواء عاصفة الشمال بأنهم سارقون وينهبون “غنائم المعارك” غيرها. أما رموز القاعدة في سوريا، مما يسمى بدولة الاسلام في العراق والشام وجبهة النصرة وغيرهم، تسميهم بقطاع الطرق والمرتدين عن الثورة. فلماذا لم يعد هناك غير تركيا تتعاون مع هذا الفصيل السوري؟ لربما يكون السبب هو الوصول الى أهداف اقليمية تركية للضغط على حلفاء الأسد، وأبرزهم حزب الله، وبغطاء فصيل معارض سوري.

وعلى لسان مصادر وزارية لجريدة “السفير” اللبنانية، أنه لم تكن تريد الدولة اللبنانية أن يكون الخطف يقابله خطف مضاد من أجل تحرير اللبنانيين التسعة. ولكن عملية خطف الطيارين التركيين كانت عنصرا هامًا في معادلة الصفقة، حيث احرجت تركيا ولم تجد مخرجا من المأزق سوى الرضوخ لما طالب به أهالي المخطوفين اللبنانيين. فقام الشريك المالي لتركيا، امارة قطر، بتغطية نفقات الصفقة، بينما تركيا تولّت اللوجستيات. ولم يكن للمعارضة السورية أي كلام في الموضوع سوى وهم “تحرير المعتقلات السوريات في سجون النظام السوري”.

ولم يظهر لواء عاصفة الشمال في اي مكان بعد واقعي في حلب، بيد أنه احتل مركز مهم في الأخبار الالكترونية لنشطاء الثورة، حيث التهم اللواء انتقادات مؤيدي ما يسمى بالجيش السوري الحر والفصائل المسلحة الأخرى.

July 25, 2013

Kafala System: Modern Day Slavery (CASES – Itijah TV)

by mkleit

The kafala system (sponsorship system) is a system used to monitor the construction and domestic migrant laborers in the Arab States of the Persian Gulf.

The system requires all unskilled laborers to have an in-country sponsor, usually their employer, who is responsible for their visa and legal status.

This practice has been criticised by human rights organizations for creating easy opportunities for the exploitation of workers, as many employers take away passports and abuse their workers with little chance of legal repercussions.

The show CASES, produced by Aly Sleem and hosted by Farah Atoui, deals with human rights violations regardless of any political affiliation/agenda. They stand by oppressed people everywhere so they aim to tackle their cases professionally from both humanitarian and legal perspectives. Their objective is to raise awareness and to speak out for those who have no voice.

In Studio: Mr. Mohammed Kleit: a Social and Human Rights Activist

Through Skype from London: Mr. Nicolas McGeehan: the UAE Researcher at HRW

By Phone from Dubai: Mr. Alex Malouf: a Journalist and Analyst

By Phone from Manama: Mr. Mohammed Al-Maskati: the President of Bahrain Youth Society for Human Rights.

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