Posts tagged ‘EU’

May 31, 2016

روبرت فيسك: السلطان «أردوغان» يبتز أوروبا لترحيل الأكراد

by mkleit
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الرئيس التركي رجب طيب أردوغان

لماذا يتعجل سلطان تركيا حصول شعبه على حق دخول الاتحاد الأوروبي دون تأشيرة؟ وخَطب الأسبوع الماضي قائلا إنه إذا لم يقفز الاتحاد الأوروبي إلى خانة التوقيع، سيفسد البرلمان التركي الصفقة برمتها، وكان هذا تلميحا بأنه سيترك هذا الجيش من اللاجئين العرب يبحرون مرة أخرى عبر بحر إيجه لليونان. أين الـ3 مليارات يورو التي وُعدت بها تركيا؟
ومع ذلك، سأل قليل من الأوروبيين عما إذا كان هذا الأمر المتعلق بالتأشيرة والسفر له علاقة بمجموعة معينة من الشعب التركي: الأكراد.

الأوروبيون، الذين يشاركون في حملة واسعة من الرشوة لوقف جحافل الفقراء الشرق أوسطيين الذين يصلون إلى أراضيهم، أهدروا رغبة «أردوغان» في الحفاظ على قوانينه الوحشية لمكافحة الإرهاب. أنجيلا ميركل التي وضعت هذه الصفقة الفظيعة لتجنب تكرار ما حدث لها العام الماضي، توارت بعيدا في الخلفية.

عدد من وزراء خارجية منطقة الشرق الأوسط (مع استبعاد السوريين نظرا لأنهم حالة خاصة) يعتبرون أن السلطان «أردوغان» يسعى بهذه الصفقة إلي توفير حل لأكبر مشاكله الداخلية، خاصة في المنطقة الجنوبية الشرقية من البلاد، التي يمثل فيها الأكراد غالبية السكان، من خلال تشجيعه لـ16 مليون مواطن كردي على الاستفادة من السفر للاتحاد الأوروبي بدون تأشيرة.

«هل تعتقدون أن أردوغان يتوقع أن يتزاحم شعبه على أوروبا لأنهم يريدون التسوق في باريس مثلا؟».. سؤال وجهه دبلوماسي عربي مقيم في بيروت، بروح حزينة وسلبية.

بالطبع، يود السلطان الانضمام إلي الاتحاد الأوروبي، لأنه يريد في الأساس الحصول على 3 مليارات يورو، ويعتزم الاحتفاظ بسلطاته الديكتاتورية المتزايدة. والعمال الضيوف الأتراك كانوا في أوروبا لعقود من الزمن.

لكن الشتات الكردي المتزايد في «شنجن أوروبا»، ربما أكثر من 1.5 مليون شخص، سيزداد بشكل كبير إذا انتهى بنزوح غالبية الأكراد في منطقة ديار بكر الفقيرة والمهمشة إلي ألمانيا والدنمارك والسويد للعيش هناك.

ولفهم ما يحدث، فإن الإمبراطورية العثمانية دمرت معظم سكانها المسيحيين في الإبادة الجماعية للأرمن، الذين وصل عددهم إلى مليون ونصف المليون شخص عام 1915، وشارك خلفاء أتاتورك في ذبح أكثر من 50 ألفا من الأكراد والعلويين بين 1937 و1938. ووسط حرب أخرى في كردستان تركيا، الناجمة عن رفض السلطان الحديث الالتزام بوقف إطلاق النار، أضاف حافزا لهجرة أخرى لغير الأتراك.. مرحبا بكم في الاتحاد الأوروبي.

نعم، أصبح مقدرا الآن أن يكون هناك مجرد «السفر بدون تأشيرة»، لكننا نعلم جميعا ماذا يعني ذلك. ونحن سنتحمل وصول مئات الآلاف من الأكراد حتى لا نرى وجوها هزيلة مرة أخرى أمام سلك الحدود.

التاريخ، بالطبع، يلعب حيلا غريبة وسط الجمر الذي لا يزال يتطاير دخانه الكثيف من عهد الإمبراطورية العثمانية القديمة. منذ 5 سنوات فقط، كنا نظن جميعا أن رجب طيب أردوغان الديمقراطي كان نموذجا للقيادة العربية في المستقبل. الرجل الذي أدار ظهره لـ«أتاتورك»، القدوة السابق لفقراء العالم العربي القديم، قد يكون مؤيدا للإخوان المسلمين، لكنه يؤمن بانتخابات حرة وصحافة حرة واقتصاد السوق وحملات واسعة النطاق لمكافحة الإرهاب، والسبب الأخير هو ما جعله الورقة الرابحة فورا في واشنطن ولندن وباريس، وكذلك وفر «الأهداف الناعمة» الأخرى، التي كانت مغطاة بقشرة من الاهتمام بحقوق الإنسان.

لكن الآن، السلطان القابع في قصره ذو الألف غرفة، المزودة بالكراسي الذهبية، يبدو أقرب للعثمانيين من أتاتورك، الرجل الذي كان من المفترض أنه يحتقره.

لا يزال السلطان يتحدث عن الشعارات، يتحدث عن إعادة إدخال اللغة العثمانية في الكتابة العربية، رغم أن الأرشيف العثماني عن الإبادة الجماعية للأرمن سيبقى مغلقا، يتحدث أيضا عن تشجيع السيدات على ارتداء الحجاب. لكن السلطان بدأ الآن يعمل كأنه الأب لشعبه.

من المفيد أن نتذكر أن دولة واحدة في أوروبا كانت تُكِن إعجابا هائلا لأتاتورك وأرضه الجديدة: ألمانيا النازية. وقد أشيد بالفوهرر التركي في الصحافة النازية لأسباب واضحة، إذ أعاد بلاده بعد الهزيمة من فرنسا وألمانيا في الحرب العالمية الأولي. كان يحكم دولة أطلق سراحها (من قبل العثمانيين) من أقلية مكروهة. كان يدير نظام الحزب الواحد إلي حد كبير، وقمع المعارضة بقسوة، وهمّش الدين.

لكن من هو «أردوغان» اليوم؟، الرجل الذي استأنف الحرب الكردية، والآن يريد ترحيلهم بدون تأشيرة سفر إلى أوروبا بسرعة؟ هل هو السلطان في قصره، سيد عظيم صاحب إمبراطورية خيالية، أم كما وصفه بشجاعة أحد الصحفيين الأتراك بأنه «طفل أتاتورك»؟ أنا لا أريد أن أقول إنه مزيج من الاثنين معا.

أعتقد أن «أردوغان» يحاول الجمع بين الأمرين. والد الأمة ومنظف الأرض، الأب الروحي والنموذج والقدوة لتركيا النقية، وإمبراطور الشرق الأوسط الذي يصل صوته من قصر الباب العالي مثل الرعد إلى قاعات ملوك الخليج.

وبالمناسبة، أين قرار الموافقة على السفر بدون تأشيرة إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي؟ أحضريها علي الفور أنجيلا. فأنت ستحصلين على الكثير من الأكراد في برلين، لكن إن وافقتِ أن تكوني المسؤولة عن اتفاقية الرشوة، فلا يمكن أن تشكي الآن من طلبات الجانب الآخر في الصفقة. وهذا ما يسمي «التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية لدولة ذات سيادة».

ترجمة غادة غالب – المصري اليوم

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April 6, 2016

Armenia and Azerbaijan – The History Behind the Recent Tensions

by mkleit

Andrew Korybko

Source

 

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The unprecedented upsurge in violence along the Line of Contact between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh has raised universal concern that a larger conflict might be brewing, with some analysts seeing it as an outgrowth of Turkey’s destabilizing anti-Russian policies over the past couple of months.

As attractive as it may be to believe such that Azerbaijan is behaving as a total puppet of the West, such an explanation is only a superficial description of what is happening and importantly neglects to factor in Baku’s recent foreign policy pivot over the past year. It’s not to necessarily suggest that Russia’s CSTO ally Armenia is to blame for the latest ceasefire violations, but rather to raise the point that this unfolding series of militantly destabilizing events is actually a lot more complex than initially meets the eye, although the general conclusion that the US is reaping an intrinsic strategic benefit from all of this is clearly indisputable.

Instead of beginning the research from a century ago and rehashing the dueling historic interpretations that both sides have over Nagorno-Karabakh, the article at hand begins at the present day and proceeds from the existing on-the-ground state of affairs after the 1994 ceasefire, whereby the disputed territory has de-facto been administered as its own unrecognized state with strong Armenian support in all sectors. There’s no attempt to advocate one side or denigrate the other, but rather to objectively understand the situation as it is and forecast its unfolding developments.

In keeping with the task at hand, it’s essential that the point of analytical departure be an overview of Armenia and Azerbaijan’s latest geopolitical moves in the year preceding the latest clashes. Afterwards, it’s required that an analysis be given about the limits to Russia’s CSTO commitment to Armenia, which thus helps to put Russia’s active diplomatic moves into the appropriate perspective.

Following that, Part II of the article raises awareness about the US’ Reverse Brzezinski stratagem of peripheral quagmire-like destabilization along the post-Soviet rim and how the recent outbreak of violence is likely part and parcel of this calculated plan. Finally, the two-part series concludes with the suggested appeal that Armenia and Azerbaijan replace the stale OSCE Minsk Group conflict resolution format with a fresh analogue via their newly shared dialogue partner status under the SCO.

 

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Not What One Would Expect

Over the past year or so, Armenia and Azerbaijan’s geopolitical trajectories haven’t exactly been moving along the course that casual commentators would expect that they would. Before beginning this section, it’s necessary to preface it with a disclaimer that the author is not referring to the average Armenian or Azeri citizen in the following analysis, but rather is using their respective countries’ names interchangeably with their given governments, so “Armenia” in this instance refers to the Yerevan political establishment while “Azerbaijan” relates to its Baku counterpart.

This advisory note is needed in order to proactively prevent the reader from misunderstanding the author’s words and analyses, since the topic is full of highly emotionally charged elements and generally evokes a strong reaction among many, especially those of either of the two ethnicities.

 

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Armenian troops during clashes with Azerbaijan

 

Armenia:

The general trend is that the prevailing geopolitical stereotypes about Armenia and Azerbaijan are not as accurate as one would immediately think, and that neither country adheres to them to the degree that one would initially expect. It’s true that Armenia is a staunch and loyal Russian CSTO ally which maintains a presence of 5,000 troops, a handful of jets and helicopters, a forthcoming air defense shield, and possibly soon even Iskander missiles there, but it’s been progressively diversifying its foreign policy tangent by taking strong strides in attempting to reach an Association Agreement with the EU despite its formal Eurasian Union membership.

This has yet to be clinched, but the resolute intent that Yerevan clearly demonstrated in May 2015 raises uncomfortable questions about the extent to which its decision-making elite may have been co-opted by Western influences. The author was so concerned about this eventuality that he published a very controversial analysis that month explaining the various ploys by which the West has sought to woo Armenia over to its side, including the shedding of crocodile tears for its genocide victims during their centenary remembrance commemoration.

As is the established pattern which was most clearly proven by Ukraine, the more intensely that a geostrategically positioned country flirts with the West, the more susceptible that it is to a forthcoming Color Revolution attempt, so it’s unsurprising in hindsight that the “Electric Yerevan” destabilization was commenced just one month after the Armenian President was publicly hobnobbing with so many of his Western “partners”.

That anti-government push was a proto-manifestation of what the author later described in an unrelated work as “Color Revolution 1.5” technologies which seek to use “civil society” and “anti-corruption” elements as experimental triggers for testing the catalyzation of large-scale regime change movements. The geopolitical end goal in all of this, as the author wrote in his “Electric Yerevan” piece cited above, was to get Armenian nationalists such as Nikol Pashinyan into power so that they can provoke a continuation war in Nagorno-Karabakh that might conceivably end up dragging in Russia.

They thankfully didn’t succeed in this, and the sitting Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan has repeatedly underscored that Armenia does not want to see a conflict escalation in the disputed territory.

Strangely, despite the regime change attempt that the West tried to engineer against Armenia, Sargsyan still declared in early 2016 that “Armenia’s cooperation and development of relations with the EU remain a priority for Armenia’s foreign policy” and “expressed gratitude to the EU for their assistance in carrying out reforms in Armenia.” Also, the EU’s External Action Service reports that the two sides formally relaunched their negotiation process with one another on 7 December with the aim of reaching a “new agreement (that) will replace the current EU-Armenia Partnership and Cooperation agreement.”

An EU analyst remarked in March of this year that he obviously doesn’t believe that it will be identical to the Association Agreement that the EU had offered to Armenia prior to its Eurasian Union ascension, but that of course doesn’t mean that it couldn’t share many similarities with its predecessor and create geopolitical complications for Yerevan’s economic alliance with Moscow.

It must be emphasized at this point that while the Armenian state is still closely linked to Russia on the military-political level and formally part of the Eurasian Union, it is provocatively taking strong economic steps in the direction of the EU and the general Western community, disturbingly raising the prospect that its schizophrenic policies might one day engender a crisis of loyalty where Yerevan is forced to choose between Moscow and Brussels much as Kiev was artificially made to do so as well (and possibly with similar pro-Western urban terrorist consequences for the “wrong choice”).

 

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Armenian house destroyed due to Azerbaijan shelling

 

Azerbaijan:

On the other hand, while Armenia was bucking the conventional stereotype by moving closer to the West, Azerbaijan was also doing something similar by realigning itself closer to Russia. Baku’s relations with Washington, Brussels, Ankara, and even Tel Aviv (which it supplies 40% of its energy to via the BTC pipeline) are well documented, as is its geostrategic function as a non-Russian energy source for the EU (particularly in the context of the Southern Corridor project), so there’s no use regurgitating well-known and established facts inside of this analysis.

Rather, what’s especially interesting to pay attention to is how dramatically the ties between Azerbaijan and the West have declined over the past year. Even more fascinating is that all of it was so unnecessary and had barely anything to do with Baku’s own initiative.

What happened was that Brussels started a soft power campaign against Baku by alleging that the latter had been violating “human rights” and “democratic” principles, which resulted in Azerbaijan boldly announcing in September 2015 that it was cancelling the planned visit of a European Commission delegation and considering whether it “should review [its] ties with the European Union, where anti-Azeri and anti-Islam tendencies are strong.”

For a country that is stereotypically seen as being under the Western thumb, that’s the complete opposite of a subservient move and one that exudes defiance to the West. Earlier that year in February 2015, Quartz online magazine even exaggeratedly fear mongered that “Azerbaijan is transforming into a mini-Russia” because of its strengthening domestic security capabilities in dealing with asymmetrical threats.

While Azerbaijan’s resistance certainly has its pragmatic limits owing to the country’s entrenched strategic and energy infrastructural relationship with the West over the past couple of decades, it’s telling that it would so publicly rebuke the West in the fashion that it did and suggests that the problems between Azerbaijan and the West are deeper than just a simple spat.

Part of the reason for the West’s extreme dislike of the Azerbaijani government has been its recent pragmatic and phased emulation of Russia’s NGO security legislation which aims to curb the effectiveness of intelligence-controlled proxy organizations in fomenting Color Revolutions. Having lost its influence over the country via the post-modern “grassroots-‘bottom-up’” approach, it’s very plausible that the US and its allies decided to find a way to instigate Nagorno-Karabakh clashes as a means of regaining their sway over their wayward Caspian ‘ally’.

Amidst this recent falling out between Azerbaijan and the West and even in the years preceding it, Moscow has been able to more confidently position itself as a reliable, trustworthy, and non-discriminatory partner which would never interfere with Baku’s domestic processes or base its bilateral relations with the country on whatever its counterpart chooses to do at home.

Other than the unmistakable security influence that Russia has had on Azerbaijan’s NGO legislation, the two sides have also increased their military-technical cooperation through a surge of agreements that totaled $4 billion by 2013. By 2015, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported that Azerbaijan’s total arms spending for the five-year period of 2011-2014 had increased by 249%, with 85% of its supplies coming from Russia.

In parallel to that, it also asserted that Russia’s weapons exports to Europe for 2011-2015 increased by 264%, “mainly due to deliveries to Azerbaijan”. It’s plain to see that Russia isn’t treating Azerbaijan as though it were an unredeemable Western puppet state, but is instead applying a shrewd and calculated military balancing strategy between it and Armenia.

While unconfirmed by official sources, the head of the Political Researches Department of the Yerevan-based Caucasian Institute Sergey Minasian claimed in 2009 that Russia was supplying its Gyumri base in Armenia via air transit permission from Azerbaijan after Georgia banned such overflights through its territory after the 2008 war.

If this is true, then it would suggest that Russian-Azeri strategic relations are at their most trusted level in post-independence history and that Baku has full faith that Moscow will not do anything to upset the military balance in the Southern Caucasus, which of course includes the paranoid fear that some Azeri observers have expressed about Russia conspiring with Armenia to wage another war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

 

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Armenian troops during clashes with Azerbaijan

 

Strategic Calculations and CSTO Limits

Russia And Armenia:

Everything that was written above likely comes as a complete shock to the casual observer of international affairs because it flies in the face of presumed “logic”, but this just goes to show that the prevailing geopolitical stereotypes about Armenia and Azerbaijan are inaccurate and do not fully reflect the present state of affairs.

The common denominator between the two rival states is their evolving relationship with Russia, which as was just described, appears to be progressively moving in opposite directions. Again, the author does not intend to give the impression that this reflects popular sentiment in either country or its expatriate and diaspora communities, especially Armenia and its affiliated ethnic nationals, since the general attitude inside the country (despite the highly publicized “Electric Yerevan” failed Color Revolution attempt) and for the most part by its compatriots outside of it could safely be described as favorable to Russia.

This makes Yerevan’s pro-Western advances all the more puzzling, but that only means that the answer to this paradox lies more in the vision (and possible monetary incentives) of the country’s leadership than the will of its people. Still, the situation is not critical and has yet to approach the point where the pragmatic and trusted state of bilateral relations is endangered.

Russia And Azerbaijan:

That being said, to many conventional observers, Russia’s close military cooperation with Azerbaijan might seem just as peculiar as Armenia’s intimation of a forthcoming pro-Western economic pivot, but that too can be explained by a strategic calculation, albeit one of a much more pragmatic and understandable nature.

Russia has aspired to play the role of a pivotal balancing force between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and truth be told and much to the dismay of many Armenians, it did approve of UNSC Resolutions affirming Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity along its internationally recognized borders, specifically the most recent 62/243 one from 2008 which:

“Reaffirms continued respect and support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders” and “Demands the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan”.

What’s happening isn’t that Russia is “betraying Armenia” like some overactive nationalist pundits like to allege, but that it’s maintaining what has been its consistent position since the conflict began and is abiding by its stated international guiding principle in supporting territorial integrity.

Key to this understanding is that the conception of territorial integrity is a guiding, but not an irreversible, tenet of Russian foreign policy, and the 2008 Russian peace-enforcement operation in Georgia that led to the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the 2014 reunification with Crimea prove that extenuating circumstances can result in a change of long-standing policy on a case-by-case basis.

This can be interpreted as meaning that Moscow at this stage (operative qualifier) does not support the independence of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, but to be fair, neither does Yerevan, although the Armenian state just recently repeated its previously stated position that it could recognize the Armenian-populated region as a separate country if the present hostilities with Azerbaijan increase.

Therefore, the main condition that could push Armenia to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state and possibly even pressure Russia to follow suit would be the prolonged escalation of conflict around the Line of Contact.Geopolitical Consistency:

 

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Armenian troops during clashes with Azerbaijan

 

The Unification Conundrum:

As much as some participants and international observers might think of such a move as being historically just and long overdue, Russia would likely have a much more cautious approach to any unilateral moves that Armenia makes about recognizing the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.

To repeat what was earlier emphasized about Russia’s political approach to this conflict, this would not amount to a “betrayal” of Armenia but instead would be a pragmatic and sober assessment of the global geostrategic environment and the likely fact that such a move could instantly suck Russia into the war.

As it stands, Russia has a mutual defense commitment to Armenia which makes it responsible for protecting its ally from any aggression against it, however this only corresponds to the territory that Russia internationally recognizes as Armenia’s own, thereby excluding any Armenian forces and passport holders in Nagorno-Karabakh.

If Armenia recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state, it would likely initiate a rapidly progressing process whereby the two Armenian-populated entities vote for unification, which would then place Russia in the very uncomfortable position of having to consider whether it will recognize such a unilateral move by its ally and thereby extend its mutual defense umbrella over what would by then be newly incorporated and Russian-recognized Armenian territory.

On the one hand, Moscow wouldn’t want to be perceived as “betraying” its centuries-long Armenian ally and thenceforth engendering its unshakable hate for the foreseeable future, but on the other, it might have certain reservations about getting directly involved in the military conflict as a warfighting participant and forever losing the positive New Cold War inroads that it has made with Baku.

Russian-Azeri relations, if pragmatically managed along the same constructive trajectory that they’ve already been proceeding along, could lead to Moscow gaining a strategic foothold over an important Turkish, EU, and Israeli energy supplier and thus giving Russia the premier possibility of indirectly exerting its influence towards them vis-à-vis its ties with Baku.

In any case, the Russian Foreign Ministry would prefer not to be placed on the spot and in such a zero-sum position where it is forced to choose between honoring its Armenian ally’s unilateral unification with Nagorno-Karabakh and abandoning its potential outpost of transregional strategic influence in Azerbaijan, or pursuing its gambit to acquire grand transregional influence via Azerbaijan at the perceived expense of its long-standing South Caucasus ally and risk losing its ultra-strategic military presence in the country.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Question is thus a quandary of epic and far-reaching geostrategic proportions for Russia, which is doing everything that it can to neutrally negotiate between the two sides in offsetting this utterly destabilizing scenario and preventing it from being forced to choose a disastrous zero-sum commitment in what will be argued in Part II to likely be an externally third-party/US-constructed military-political dilemma.

Furthermore, both Armenia and Azerbaijan want to retain Russian support and neither wants to risk losing it, which also explains why Azerbaijan has yet to unleash its full military potential against the Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and why Armenia hasn’t unilaterally recognized Nagorno-Karabakh or made an effort to politically unite with it.

Conclusively, it can be surmised that the only actor which wants to force this false choice of “either-or” onto Russia is the US, which always benefits whenever destabilization strikes Moscow’s periphery and its Eurasian adversary is forced into a pressing geopolitical dilemma.

March 25, 2016

Stop Wahhabist School to Fight Terrorism

by mkleit
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Young man sitting in front of Brussels’ stock exchange building

 

Terrorist attacks in Europe has caused a two-way incitement between Europeans and Muslims, which is a result that terrorist group ISIL is trying to reach as they’ve said after the Charlie Hebdo attacks on the 7th of January 2015: “compel the Crusaders (Europeans) to actively destroy the garrison themselves… Muslims in the West will quickly find themselves between one of two choices, they either apostatize… or they emigrate to the Islamic State and thereby escape persecution from the Crusader governments and citizens”.

The latest attacks on the Belgian capitol Brussels left 35 dead and 270 injured when suicide bombers hit Zaventem airport and Maalbeek metro station on Tuesday morning. Recent reports from Belgian media showed that people involved in the terrorist attacks are Muslims and of Arab background.

Mostly, Europeans would blame the millions of Muslims in Europe (and a lot of them have done so) for being the cause of religious incitement, and by far that’s sort of right, since there’s a minority of Muslims whose taking a big part of inciting against the “Crusaders”.

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Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia hitting several nations

The Arab – Muslims whom are able to go to Europe and live there (aside of refugees and asylum seekers) can afford the living, where the biggest percentage comes from the GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Emirates). And the ideology that all of these countries share (except Oman and partially Kuwait) is Wahhabism or Salafism. This sect is considered to be the most fanatic, extremist, and inciting amongt all Muslim sects – consider them as the KKK or the Nazis of Islam. This ideology is also the root of many terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda (Iraq, Syria, Morocco, Egypt, Afghanistan..) ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and Levant/ Syria and Iraq), Boko Haram (Nigeria), al Nusra Front (Jabhat al Nusra/ Syria), Ahrar al Sham (Syria), Jaysh al Islam (Syria), al Shabab(Somalia), Taliban (Afghanistan, Pakistan) etc…

One might think that abolishing ISIL, the most prominent terrorist group would save the world from terrorism, but no! Such an action wouldn’t do anything, because religious fanaticism is not bound by a group, it’s an idea, and ideas don’t die by bombs and bullets; ideas should be fought by ideas.

In their book, Global Terrorism and New Media, Philip Seib and Dana M. Janbek argue that terrorist groups are teaching younger generations (between 10 and 12 years old) their ideology through boot camps and schools that are in their area of control. This strategy elongates the group’s survival for a longer time. They would teach students how to be hate-filled fighters, as well as how much other sects and religious groups are “sinners and blasphemers”, most evidently the crusaders (Euro-Christians) and the Rawafids (Shiites Muslims, the second biggest sect in Islam). And among this, they would teach them that it’s okay to call them blasphemers and punish them for being from a different sect, where punishment varies from flogging to beheading and public execution.

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These schools of thought are not solely found in areas of terrorist groups, but also in countries like Saudi Arabia. And they’re also expanding to European countries – under Saudi funding – such as France, Belgium, Germany, and Britain; since the mentioned countries have close relations with the Gulf state, as well as big Muslim communities.

When Europeans blame Muslims for this problem, they are partially correct, but they’re mistaken when they blame the refugees for causing the damage. Although some of the latter have took part in the battles in Syria, as many pictures show ex-fighters from extremist factions seeking refuge with the influx to Europe. But the problem is inside Europe itself, where it comes from these school and extremists Salafi-Wahhabi communities that are spreading fanaticism. Thus, they serve as a “shelter” and “sanctuary” for extremists coming from the MENA region and Asia, whether these countries are suffering from turmoil like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Nigeria, or countries that serve as a holder for this thought like Saudi Arabia.

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The only way to protect the EU, is to do what Tunisia has been recently doing by their campaign “tomorrow is better”, where they are re-educating inmates imprisoned for terrorist act by extracting the extremist thought from their heads and planting patriotic and moderate-religious ideology. As for the schools, the government is keeping an eagle’s eye on academic curricula, so that they would not contain topics of incitement and fanaticism.

If such procedures are made, alongside other educational and security ones, not only in  Europe but also in the countries that are being vastly effected by extremist thoughts like Lebanon, Syria, Pakistan, Iraq and others, we would gradually defeat extremist thoughts and potential terrorism, because it’s not fair nor right to blame millions of people for the acts of a few.

February 3, 2014

ما بين شبيحة النظام الأوكراني والمندسين

by mkleit
محمد قليط
متظاهرون يهددون الشرطة بجرافة

متظاهرون يهددون الشرطة بجرافة

تفاقمت حدة الخلاف في أوكرانيا بين السلطة والمعارضة بنحو متسارع. الخلاف الذي كان أساسه طلب المعارضة من الحكومة تذليل العقبات أمام انضمام كييف إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي، احتدم بعد إقرار الحكومة قانون منع التظاهر الذي دفع المعارضة إلى تصعيد تحركاتها واندلاع أعمال شغب أودت بحياة 6 من أفراد الشرطة واحتلال مبان حكومية، الأمر الذي جعل الحكومة والرئيس يرضخون لشروط المعارضة بالتراجع عن القانون واستقالة رئيس الحكومة وعرض الرئيس فيكتور يانوكوفيتش على المعارضة تسلمها.

الأزمة التي بدأت بتظاهرات سلمية سرعان ما تحولت إلى مواجهات محتدمة بالأيدي والأسلحة ما بين الطرفين بعدما دخل العنصر الأمني أو «الطابور الخامس»، فيما تقاذف طرفا النزاع المسؤولية عمّا حصل ورماها على الطرف الآخر.

داخلياً، «انشقت» صفوف الشعب الأوكراني إلى طرفين: الأول ينتمي إلى تنظيمات المعارضة، المعروفة بـ«مايدان الراديكالية أو الأوروبية» (Radical-Euro Maidan)، التي تطالب بتغيير القوانين «اللاديموقراطية» في البلاد والانضمام إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي، الذي أصبح شارة على كتف المتظاهرين المؤيدين. أما الطرف الثاني، فهم مؤيدو نظام الرئيس فيكتور يانوكوفيتش، وهم مؤلفون من رجال الأمن «بيركوت» (Berkut) بالإضافة إلى «التيتوشكي» (Titushki)، وإن جاز التعبير «شبيحة النظام» أو «وحدات الحماية الشعبية».

مع تطور الأوضاع، انقسمت المعارضة بين معتدل ومتطرف. فطالب المعترضون بالتغيير الديموقراطي عبر الانتخابات المقبلة القريبة، ووافقت على التنازلات التي قدمتها الحكومة.

بينما طالب المتطرفون بإسقاط السلطة بشكل تام والانضمام إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي. المعارضة الأوكرانية، آرينا كوزنيتوفا رأت أن المتطرفين «لا يستحقون الانضواء تحت اسم الاتحاد الأوروبي؛ لأنهم يتصرفون بطريقة همجية، فمن يرد الانضمام إلى الاتحاد الاوروبي، فعليه التصرف بأن لا أحد فوق القانون، وأن لا يحصل التعدي على الممتلكات العامة، وهو ما لا ينطبق على المتظاهرين من «مايدان الراديكالية»».

وأضافت كوزنيتوفا في حديث لها مع «الأخبار» أن «المعارضة الراديكالية تعرضت للضرب المبرح وسقط عدد من المتظاهرين بسبب عنف الشرطة ووحشيتهم، ولكن هناك المئات من رجال الشرطة ذهبوا إلى المستشفيات بحالات حروق حرجة جراء رمي قنابل المولوتوف عليهم من قبل متظاهرين ملثمين ويحملون شعار السواستيكا النازية (الصليب المعقوف)».

المشهد الأوكراني استحوذ على اهتمام شاشات التلفزة وعناوين الجرائد العالمية، ولم تمر مرور الكرام، وكانت فقرةً أساسية في نشرات أخبار التلفزة، وبالأخص تلك المنضوية تحت مظلة المعسكر الأميركي ـ الأوروبي. وبدا واضحاً وقوف الإعلام الأميركي، بطرفيه المعارض والرسمي، مع مطالب المتظاهرين المعارضين للحكومة الأوكرانية على اعتبار أنها محسوبة على «العدو» روسيا، واتفقت المحطات على أحقية الشعب الأوكراني في التظاهرات ووجود «وحشية» في التعامل مع المتظاهرين، على حد تعبير بعض وسائل الإعلام هناك.

بدورهم، نسي طرفا النزاع المبادئ الإعلامية التي تتعلق بالحيادية والموضوعية، فحتى الآن لم تُنشَر أخبار عن الإصابات البالغة في صفوف الشرطة والتعديات عليهم من قبل الإعلام المؤيد لـ«المايدان»، الذي يجهد بطرفيه المعارض والحكومي لإظهار الحكومة الأوكرانية ورجال أمنها على أنهم «مرتزقة».

ووصل الأمر إلى حد نشر أخبار مفبركة على حساب المعارضة الأميركية من حركة «احتلوا وال ستريت» الرسمي، التي تتضمن فبركات عن الاستعانة برجال أمن روس يرتدون الزي الأمني الأوكراني، وذلك «لحماية مصالح (الرئيس الروسي) بوتين في أوكرانيا»، بحسب أحد الحسابات المنثبقة من الحركة. وأضاف مخترق الحساب أن «التيتوشكي» يقبضون يومياً ما يعادل 42$، وهو ما دفع الحكومة الأوكرانية إلى نفي ما عدّته «تلفيقاً» ضدها. قناة «سي أن أن» على سبيل المثال، الوجه الإعلامي الأبرز لأميركا، عرضت مقالاً على موقعها، بدا أكثر إدانةً ليانكوفيتش، حيث أظهرت جزءاً بسيط يدافع عن الرئيس الأوكراني، بينما الإدانات كانت بنسبة أكبر من التأييد، وقد استعانت «بأهل الديموقراطية»، أي الاتحاد الأوروبي، الذي أعرب عن «قلقه في ما خص التقارير «الموثوقة» عن التعذيب وسوء معاملة الشرطة للمتظاهرين».

من جهته، الإعلام التابع والمؤيد للحكومة الأوكرانية، وبالأخص الروسي والبيلاروسي، ركز على مبدأ وجود «طابور خامس» في صفوف المعارضة، مدعوم من أطراف خارجية «تحاول إغراق أوكرانيا في فخ الاتحاد الأوروبي الرأسمالي وجعل أوكرانيا سوق تجاري لها»، بحسب إيوجين تيتوف، مؤيد أوكراني لنظام يانكوفيتش، في تعليق له على موقع «other98.com» التابع للمعارضة الأميركية. وأضاف تيتوف: «إن أردتم تغيير يانكوفيتش، فالانتخابات قريبة. قوموا بذلك كالأوروبيين الذين تزعمون أنكم منهم، لا كالنازيين البربر». من جهتها قناة «روسيا اليوم»، لم تتوانَ عن اتهام الإعلام الغربي بالقيام بحملة علاقات عامة للمتظاهرين، حيث نشرت مقال رأي للصحافي والمدون نيل كلارك أشار فيه إلى لقاءات السيناتور الأميركي جون ماكين مع المعارضة قبل التظاهرات، بينما شكك بأصالة المعارضة في ظل اهتمام غربي كبير «بالجماعة النيو ــ نازية واليمين السياسي المتطرف»، مضيفاً: «لو حصلت هذه التظاهرات وعلى النحو ذاته في أوروبا الغربية، لما وجدت هذا الاهتمام الكبير سياسياً وإعلامياً، أو لو قامت الموالاة بتظاهرات كهذه، لكانوا هم الغوغاء والهمج».

السيناتور الأميركي جون ماكين يقف مع قادة المعارضة الأوكرانية

السيناتور الأميركي جون ماكين يقف مع قادة المعارضة الأوكرانية

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